Pitelis, C. N., & Teece, D. J. 2010. Cross-border market co-creation, dynamic capabilities and the entrepreneurial theory of the multinational enterprise. Industrial and Corporate Change, 19: 12471270.
Pitelis, C. N., & Teece, D. J. 2010. Cross-border market co-creation, dynamic capabilities and the entrepreneurial theory of the multinational enterprise. Industrial and Corporate Change, 19: 12471270.
Pitelis, C. N., & Teece, D. J. 2018. The new MNE: “Orchestration” theory as envelope of “Internalisation” theory. Management International Review, 58: 523539.
Pitelis, C. N., & Teece, D. J. 2018. The new MNE: “Orchestration” theory as envelope of “Internalisation” theory. Management International Review, 58: 523539.
Pitelis, C. N., & Wagner, J. D. 2019. Strategic shared leadership and organizational dynamic capabilities. Leadership Quarterly, 30: 233242.
Pitelis, C. N., & Wagner, J. D. 2019. 战略共享领导与组织动态能力。《领导力季刊》，30: 233242。
Porter, M. E. 1980. Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries $\pmb { \delta }$ competitors. New York, NY: Free Press.
波特，M. E. 1980. 竞争战略：分析行业与竞争对手的技术。纽约，纽约州：自由出版社。
Porter, P. K., & Scully, G. W. 1987. Economic efficiency in cooperatives. Journal of Law & Economics, 30: 489512.
Porter, P. K., & Scully, G. W. 1987. 合作社的经济效率。《法律与经济学杂志》，30: 489-512.
Powell, W. W. 1990. Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of organisation. Research in Organizational Behavior, 12: 295336.
鲍威尔，W. W. 1990. 既非市场也非层级：组织的网络形式。《组织行为研究》，12：295-336。
Powell, W. W., Koput, K. W., & Smith-Doerr, L. 1996. Interorganizational collaboration and the locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41: 116145.
鲍威尔（Powell, W. W.）、科帕特（Koput, K. W.）和史密斯 - 多尔（Smith - Doerr, L.）。1996年。组织间合作与创新的定位：生物技术中的学习网络。《行政科学季刊》，41：116145。
Putterman, L., & Skillman, G. L. 1992. The role of exit costs in the theory of cooperative teams. Journal of Comparative Economics, 16: 596618.
Putterman, L. & Skillman, G. L. 1992. The role of exit costs in the theory of cooperative teams. Journal of Comparative Economics, 16: 596618.
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. 1998. Power in a theory of the firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113: 387432.
拉詹（Rajan, R. G.）和津加莱斯（Zingales, L.），1998年。企业理论中的权力。《经济学季刊》，113卷：387-432。
Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. 2009. Managing the rivalry of competing institutional logics. Organization Studies, 30: 629652.
Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. 2009. Managing the rivalry of competing institutional logics. Organization Studies, 30: 629652.
Reypens, C., Lievens, A., & Blazevic, V. 2021. Hybrid orchestration in multi-stakeholder innovation networks: Practices of mobilizing multiple, diverse stakeholders across organizational boundaries. Organization Studies, 42: 6183.
Reypens, C., Lievens, A., & Blazevic, V. 2021. 多利益相关者创新网络中的混合协调：跨组织边界动员多元利益相关者的实践。《组织研究》，42：6183。
Rothschild, J. 1979. The collectivist organization: An alternative to rational-bureaucratic models. American Sociological Review, 44: 509527.
罗斯柴尔德，J. 1979. 集体主义组织：理性-官僚模型的替代方案。《美国社会学期刊》，44：509-527。
Rothschild, J. 2009. Workers’ cooperatives and social enterprise: A forgotten route to social equity and democracy. American Behavioral Scientist, 52: 10231041.
罗斯柴尔德，J. 2009. 工人合作社与社会企业：实现社会公平与民主的一条被遗忘的路径。《美国行为科学家》，52: 10231041.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. 2000. Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55: 6878.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. 2000. 自我决定理论与内在动机、社会发展及幸福感的促进。《美国心理学家》，55：6878.
Sabatini, F., Modena, F., & Tortia, E. 2014. Do cooperative enterprises create social trust? Small Business Economics, 42: 621641.
萨巴蒂尼，F.，莫德纳，F.，& 托尔蒂亚，E. 2014. 合作社是否能建立社会信任？《小企业经济学》，42: 621641.
Sacchetti, S., & Tortia, E. 2020. Social responsibility in non-investor-owned organisations. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 20: 343363.
萨凯蒂（Sacchetti, S.）和托尔蒂亚（Tortia, E.），2020年。非投资者所有制组织中的社会责任。《公司治理：国际商业与社会杂志》，20: 343363。
Scholz, T. 2016. Platform cooperativism: Challenging the corporate sharing economy. New York, NY: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.
肖尔茨，T. 2016. 平台合作社：挑战企业共享经济。纽约，纽约州：罗莎·卢森堡基金会。
Seuring, S., & Gold, S. 2013. Sustainability management beyond corporate boundaries: From stakeholders to performance. Journal of Cleaner Production, 56: 1-6.
Seuring, S., & Gold, S. 2013. 超越企业边界的可持续性管理：从利益相关者到绩效。《清洁生产杂志》，56：1-6。
Shipilov, A. V., & Gawer, A. 2019. Integrating research on interorganizational networks and ecosystems. Academy of Management Annals, 14: 92121.
Shipilov, A. V., & Gawer, A. 2019. 整合组织间网络与生态系统的研究。《管理学会年刊》，14：921-212。
Silvia, S. J. 2013. Holding the shop together: German industrial relations in the postwar era. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
西尔维娅，S. J. 2013. 维系企业：战后德国的劳资关系。纽约伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社。
Simon, H. A. 1991. Organizations and markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5: 2544.
西蒙，H. A. 1991. 组织与市场。《经济展望杂志》，5：2544。
Sison, A. J. G. 2007. Toward a common good theory of the firm: The Tasubinsa case. Journal of Business Ethics, 74: 471480.
Sison, A. J. G. 2007. 走向企业共同善理论：塔苏宾萨案例。《商业伦理学期刊》，74：471-480。
Smith, W. K., & Besharov, M. L. 2019. Bowing before dual gods: How structured flexibility sustains organizational hybridity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 64: 144.
Smith, W. K., & Besharov, M. L. 2019. 屈从于双重神祇：结构化灵活性如何维持组织混合性。《行政科学季刊》，64：144。
Smith, W. K., & Lewis, M. W. 2011. Toward a theory of paradox: A dynamic equilibrium model of organizing. Academy of Management Review, 36: 381403.
Smith, W. K., & Lewis, M. W. 2011. 迈向悖论理论：组织的动态平衡模型。《管理学会评论》，36：381403。
Stashevsky, S., Burke, R., Carmeli, A., & Tishler, A. 2006. The relative importance of the top management team’s managerial skills. International Journal of Manpower, 27: 936.
Stashevsky, S., Burke, R., Carmeli, A., & Tishler, A. 2006. The relative importance of the top management team’s managerial skills. International Journal of Manpower, 27: 936.
Stilwell, F. 2019. The political economy of inequality. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
史迪威，F. 2019. 不平等的政治经济学。纽约，纽约州：约翰·威利父子出版公司。
Teece, D. J. 1986. Profiting from technological innovation: Impltio tion, tion and public policy. Research Policy, 15: 285305.
Teece, D. J. 1986. 从技术创新中获利：影响、意义与公共政策。《研究政策》，15：285-305。
Teece, D. J. 2003. Expert talent and the design of (professional services) firms. Industrial and Corporate Change, 12: 895916.
Teece, D. J. 2003. 专家人才与（专业服务）公司的设计。《产业与公司变革》，12：895-916。
Teece, D. J. 2007. Explicating dynamic capabilities: The nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28: 13191350.
Teece, D. J. 2007. 阐释动态能力：（可持续）企业绩效的本质与微观基础。《战略管理杂志》，28：13191350。
Tirole, J. 1986. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 2: 181214.
蒂罗尔，J. 1986. 层级与官僚机构：论组织中合谋的作用。《法律、经济与组织杂志》，2: 181-214.
Toms, S. 2012. Producer co-operatives and economic efficiency: Evidence from the nineteenth-century cotton textile industry. Business History, 54: 855882.
Toms, S. 2012. 生产者合作社与经济效率：19世纪棉纺织业的证据。《商业史》，54: 855882。
Tortia, E. C. 2018. The firm as a common: Nondivided ownership, patrimonial stability and longevity of co-operative enterprises. Sustainability, 10: 1023.
Tortia, E. C. 2018. 公司作为共同所有：合作社企业的非分割所有权、家族式稳定性及长寿性。《可持续性》，10: 1023。
Ulrich, D., & Barney, J. B. 1984. Perspectives in organizations: Resource dependence, efficiency, and population. Academy of Management Review, 9: 471481.
乌尔里希（Ulrich, D.）和巴尼（Barney, J. B.），1984年。组织视角：资源依赖、效率与种群。《管理学会评论》，9：471-481。
Uzzi, B. 1997. Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of embeddedness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 3567.
乌兹，B. 1997. 企业间网络中的社会结构与竞争：嵌入性的悖论。《行政科学季刊》，42：3567。
Vanek, J. 1970. The general theory of labor-managed market economies. New York, NY: Cornell University Press Ithaca.
Vanek, J. 1970. 劳动管理型市场经济的一般理论。纽约州伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社。
von Hippel, E., & von Krogh, G. 2003. Open source software and the “private-collective” innovation model: Issues for organization science. Organization Science, 14: 209223.
冯·希佩尔（E.）和冯·克罗格（G.），2003年。开源软件与“私有-集体”创新模型：组织科学的问题。《组织科学》，14：209223。
von Nordenflycht, A. 2010. What is a professional service firm? Toward a theory and taxonomy of knowledgeintensive firms. Academy of Management Review, 35: 155174.
冯诺登弗利希特，A. 2010. 什么是专业服务公司？知识密集型公司的理论与分类学研究。《管理学会评论》，35: 155-174。
Wang, H. C., & Barney, J. B. 2006. Employee incentives to make firm-specific investments: Implications for resource-based theories of corporate diversification. Academy of Management Review, 31: 466476.
王汉川（Wang, H. C.）、巴尼（Barney, J. B.）. 2006. 员工进行企业特异性投资的激励：对企业多元化资源基础理论的启示. 《管理学会评论》（Academy of Management Review）, 31: 466-476.
Ward, B. 1958. The firm in Illyria: Market syndicalism. American Economic Review, 48: 566589.
沃德，B. 1958. 伊利里亚的企业：市场工团主义。《美国经济评论》，48：566-589。
Weitzman, M. L. 1985. The simple macroeconomics of profit sharing. American Economic Review, 75: 937953.
Weitzman, M. L. 1985. The simple macroeconomics of profit sharing. American Economic Review, 75: 937–953.
Weizenbaum, J. 1976. Computer power and human reason: From judgment to calculation. Oxford, U.K.: W. H. Freeman & Co.
魏岑鲍姆，J. 1976. 计算机的力量与人类的理性：从判断到计算。英国牛津：W. H. 弗里曼公司。
Wenzel, M., Danner-Schröder, A., & Spee, A. P. 2021. Dynamic capabilities? Unleashing their dynamics through a practice perspective on organizational routines. Journal of Management Inquiry, 30: 395406.
文策尔（M.）、丹纳-施罗德（A.）与斯佩（A. P.），2021年。动态能力？从组织惯例的实践视角释放其动态性。《管理探究杂志》，第30卷：395-406。
Whittington, R., Cailluet, L., & Yakis-Douglas, B. 2011. Opening strategy: Evolution of a precarious profession. British Journal of Management, 22: 531544.
惠廷顿，R.，卡约莱特，L.，& 亚基斯-道格拉斯，B. 2011. 开拓策略：岌岌可危的职业的演变。《英国管理杂志》，22：531-544。
Williamson, O. E. 1973. Markets and hierarchies: Some elementary considerations. American Economic Review, 63: 316325.
威廉姆森，O. E. 1973. 市场与层级：一些基本考量。《美国经济评论》，63: 316-325。
Williamson, O. E. 1981. The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach. American Journal of Sociology, 87: 548577.
威廉姆森，O. E. 1981. 组织的经济学：交易成本方法。《美国社会学期刊》，87：548-577。
Williamson, O. E. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York, NY: Free Press.
威廉姆森，O. E. 1985. 资本主义的经济制度. 纽约, 纽约州: 自由出版社.
Yoffie, D. B., Gawer, A., & Cusumano, M. A. 2019, May 29. A study of more than 250 platforms reveals why most fail. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from https:// hbr.org/2019/05/a-study-of-more-than-250-platformsreveals-why-most-fail
Yoffie, D. B., Gawer, A., & Cusumano, M. A. 2019年5月29日。一项针对250多个平台的研究揭示了大多数平台失败的原因。《哈佛商业评论》。检索自https://hbr.org/2019/05/a-study-of-more-than-250-platformsreveals-why-most-fail
Zaheer, A., Gözübüyük, R., & Milanov, H. 2010. It’s the connections: The network perspective in interorganizational research. Academy of Management Perspectives, 24: 6277.
扎希尔（Zaheer, A.）、戈祖比尤克（Gözübüyük, R.）和米兰诺夫（Milanov, H.）。2010年。《它是连接：组织间研究中的网络视角》。《管理学会展望》（Academy of Management Perspectives），24卷：6277页。
Zamagni, S. 2005. Per una teoria economico-civile dell’impresa cooperativa. In E. Mazzoli & S. Zamagni (Eds.), Verso una nuova teoria economica della cooperazione: 1556. Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino.
扎马尼（Zamagni, S.）. 2005. 论合作社企业的经济-公民理论. 载于 E. 马佐利（E. Mazzoli）与 S. 扎马尼（S. Zamagni）编，《走向新的合作经济理论：1556》. 意大利博洛尼亚：伊尔穆利诺出版社（Il Mulino）.
Zamagni, V. 2017. A worldwide historical perspective on co-operatives. In J. Michie, J. R. Blasi, & C. Borzaga (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of mutual, co-operative and co-owned business: 97113. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
扎马尼，V. 2017. 合作社的全球历史视角。载于J. 米基、J. R. 布拉西与C. 博尔扎加（编），《牛津互助、合作与共同拥有企业手册》：97113。英国牛津：牛津大学出版社。
Zingales, L. 2000. In search of new foundations. Journal of Finance, 55: 16231653.
Zingales, L. 2000. 寻求新的基础。《金融杂志》，55: 1623-1653.
Zingales, L. 2017. Towards a political theory of the firm. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31: 113130. Zingales, L. 2017. 企业的政治理论初探. 《经济展望杂志》, 31: 113130.
M
M
Marco Berti (Marco.Berti@uts.edu.au) is senior lecturer in management at UTS Business School, University of Technology Sydney. His research focuses on organizational paradox and tensions, critical themes, and the role of power and discourse in organizations. He earned his PhD in organization studies from the University of Technology Sydney. Marco Berti (Marco.Berti@uts.edu.au) 是悉尼科技大学UTS商学院的高级管理学讲师。他的研究主要集中在组织悖论与张力、关键主题，以及组织中权力和话语的作用。他在悉尼科技大学获得组织研究博士学位。
Christos Pitelis (C.Pitelis@leeds.ac.uk) is professor of international business and sustainable competitiveness and head of international business, University of Leeds, and life fellow, Queens’ College, University of Cambridge. His research focuses on international business organization and governance and strategy for sustainable value cocreation and capture. He earned his PhD in economics from the University of Warwick. 克里斯托斯·皮泰利斯（C.Pitelis@leeds.ac.uk）是利兹大学国际商务与可持续竞争力教授、国际商务系主任，同时也是剑桥大学皇后学院终身院士。他的研究重点是国际商务组织与治理，以及可持续价值共创与获取的战略。他在华威大学获得经济学博士学位。
DIALOGUE
对话
We Are Crisis: Runtime Errors in Programmatic Theory
我们是危机：程序化理论中的运行时错误
Cronin, Stouten, and van Knippenberg’s (2021) piece makes the argument that programmatic theorizing (“PT” henceforth) is the right problem to solve in order to get the field out of its crisis. Theirs is a unique work of not-theory describing the use of something that is not-theory, appearing in a theory-only journal’s special topic forum on crises in theory. As such, it serves as a symptom of, rather than a solution to, the problems ailing the kind of theory that is being published and retained in our field. We explain why their piece is not theory, why PT is not theory, and what the true crises are in theory, all in the following sections. Cronin、Stouten和van Knippenberg（2021）的文章认为，程序化理论构建（以下简称“PT”）是解决该领域危机的正确方向。这篇文章以一种“非理论”的独特形式，描述了“非理论”的运用，发表在仅聚焦理论的期刊的“理论危机”专题论坛上。因此，它更多是该领域发表和保留的这类理论所存在问题的一种症状，而非解决方案。在接下来的部分中，我们将解释为何他们的文章不属于理论，为何PT不属于理论，以及理论领域真正的危机是什么。
WHY CRONIN ET AL. (2021) IS NOT THEORY
为什么克罗宁等人（2021）的研究不是理论
Theirs is a process description based on unjustified and inconsistent definitional statements (about a dozen alone for PT) that fails to provide any laws of interaction (e.g., among the unit theories), bounds (e.g., by under-delineating what a topic is), or proper event sequences (because every connection between their three boxes is double-arrowed) and, thus, does not meet the standards for being a theory (Arend, Sar-0oghi, & Burkemper, 2015). Cronin et al. (2021) is an essay. It is opinion. It does not offer explanation or prediction. 他们的描述是基于不合理且前后矛盾的定义性陈述（仅关于PT就有十几个），未能提供任何相互作用规律（例如单元理论之间）、界限（例如未充分界定“主题”是什么）或适当的事件序列（因为他们三个方框之间的每个连接都是双向箭头），因此不符合理论的标准（Arend, Sar-0oghi, & Burkemper, 2015）。Cronin等人（2021）是一篇文章。这是观点。它没有提供解释或预测。
WHY PT IS ALSO NOT THEORY
为什么PT也不是理论
Cronin et al. (2021) describe PT as a research program over a topic—with a topic apparently being a collection of related field phenomena. But, a research program is not theory itself, although some of its parts may be theory, or theory testing, and there may exist some implicit connection and consistency among the parts. Further, to argue that PTis theory in the manner that they do seems disingenuous. To start, none of their supporting citations actually use the term PT,1 but, rather, speak to activity or research instead. In fact, one of the few papers in the literature that does use the term PT (that they do not cite)—Royce (1987: 280281)—defines PT as metaphoric, weak, highly ambiguous, and speculative, with poorly defined concepts and poorly understood theoretical relationships, and, thus, strongly recommends going beyond PT in order to move a field in the direction of greater unification. Cronin等人（2021）将PT描述为一个围绕某一主题展开的研究项目——而该主题显然是一组相关领域现象的集合。然而，研究项目本身并非理论，尽管其部分内容可能是理论或理论检验，且各部分之间可能存在一些隐含的联系和一致性。此外，以他们所描述的方式声称PT是理论似乎有失真诚。首先，他们引用的支持性文献中没有一篇实际使用“PT”这一术语¹，而是讨论活动或研究本身。事实上，文献中少数使用“PT”这一术语的论文之一（他们并未引用）——Royce（1987：280-281）——将PT定义为隐喻性的、薄弱的、高度模糊的和投机性的，其概念定义不明确，理论关系也未被充分理解，因此强烈建议超越PT，以推动该领域朝着更大程度的统一方向发展。
WHY PT IS NOT THE SOLUTION
为什么PT不是解决方案
It would be impossible to get a decentralized and diverse set of scholars to tightly converge on any one research program when private incentives (e.g., for novelty), let alone the characteristics of our phenomena (e.g., their dynamic and complex nature), oppose such an outcome. Our fields have a long history of balking at such winner-takes-all contests, including the “paradigm wars” (e.g., Pfeffer, 1995; Van Maanen, 1995) that raised concerns that such programming would harm freedom of expression and the working ofourmarketplace forideas. Further, itishardtoimagine that a closely shared understanding exists in almost any substantive topic in our fields when we can’t even agree on basic definitions of key terms (like strategy, value, entrepreneurship, or opportunity), let alone on what the standards for theory should be (or even whether there are categories of theory that require their own unique standards; Arend, Sarooghi, & Burkemper, 2016). Our current system—one that already includes research programs and schools of thought—is overseen by no one and entails no objective measures of success, of truth, or of currency, and so there is no reason to believe any added pressure to adhere to specific programs would provide the answer. And, while such adherence may provide potentially greater focus on parts of a topic, it is without a guarantee that those are the right parts. 当私人激励（例如对新颖性的激励），更不用说我们研究现象的特性（例如其动态性和复杂性）反对这种结果时，要让一个分散且多元的学者群体紧密地围绕任何一个研究项目达成一致是不可能的。我们的学科长期以来一直对这种“赢家通吃”的竞争持犹豫态度，包括“范式战争”（例如 Pfeffer, 1995；Van Maanen, 1995），这些争议引发了人们对这种统一规划会损害言论自由和思想市场运作的担忧。此外，在我们的学科中，即使是对关键术语（如战略、价值、创业或机会）的基本定义都无法达成共识，更不用说理论标准应该是什么（甚至是否存在需要独特标准的理论类别；Arend, Sarooghi, & Burkemper, 2016），因此很难想象在几乎任何实质性主题上都存在高度一致的理解。我们当前的体系——已经包含研究项目和思想流派——无人监管，也没有衡量成功、真理或价值的客观标准，因此没有理由相信任何额外的压力去遵循特定项目会带来答案。而且，虽然这种遵循可能会让人们对主题的某些部分更加关注，但无法保证这些部分是正确的。
WHY THE THREE PROBLEMS DO NOT POSE A CRISIS
为什么这三个问题不会构成危机
The concerns over too much theory, over the novelty requirement, and over a lack of practicality are all debatable. To the first concern, it is yet to be proven what the ideal amount of theory is and in what form, let alone whether the current volume and variety indicates harmful confusion or valuable multi-lens coverage of complex phenomena. And, this may only be a concern for non-academics who want an up-to-date and coherent topic overview that Wikipedia cannot provide but a better database and search system could, if our field would invest in that. To the second concern, evidence that any novelty requirement does damage, especially given its inconsistent enforcement (e.g., on the amount of novelty required), is severely lacking. Rather, it seems prudent to have patent-like standards—like novelty and non-obviousness. If our goal is to add value, then explaining what managers are doing wrong—with new counter- and non-intuitive prescriptions—provides a greater contribution than telling them why what they are doing naturally is right.2 To the third concern, any lack of practicality seems to affect (directly) only one stakeholder group. But, managers trying to fix specific problems are not our only audience (and, even if it was, we don’t have the fine-grained data to do what is a consultant’s job in a 30-page paper that gets rewarded on its generalizability rather than its specificity). We also want to help a wider audience, including policy-makers and others, and do so by offering more than overly specific solutions. We want to help them better understand the kinds of phenomena, factors, relationships, bounds, states, and possible outcomes that matter to all affected stakeholders. We want to help them better conduct their own research and better interpret research results for bias and error. We want to help them better understand how others try to understand such phenomena. We want to give them deeper insights and critical tools, not just prescriptions. 对过多理论、新颖性要求以及缺乏实用性的担忧都值得商榷。对于第一个担忧，理想的理论量及其形式尚未得到证实，更不用说当前的理论数量和多样性是否表明存在有害的混淆，还是对复杂现象的有价值的多视角覆盖。而且，这可能只是针对非学术人士的担忧——他们希望获得最新且连贯的主题概述，而维基百科无法提供这样的概述，但如果我们的领域愿意投入资源，一个更好的数据库和搜索系统或许可以做到。对于第二个担忧，任何新颖性要求造成损害的证据（尤其是考虑到其执行不一致，例如对所需新颖性程度的要求）都严重缺乏。相反，制定类似专利的标准（如新颖性和非显而易见性）似乎更为谨慎。如果我们的目标是增加价值，那么用新的反直觉和非直觉的建议解释管理者的错误做法，比告诉他们为什么他们的自然做法是正确的更有贡献。2 对于第三个担忧，任何缺乏实用性的问题似乎只直接影响一个利益相关者群体。但是，试图解决特定问题的管理者并不是我们唯一的受众（而且，即使是，我们也没有足够精细的数据来完成顾问在30页论文中做的工作——这类论文的奖励机制在于其普适性而非具体性）。我们还希望帮助更广泛的受众，包括政策制定者和其他群体，并通过提供不仅仅是过于具体的解决方案来实现这一点。我们希望帮助他们更好地理解对所有受影响利益相关者都重要的现象类型、因素、关系、界限、状态和可能的结果。我们希望帮助他们更好地开展自己的研究，并更好地解释研究结果中的偏见和错误。我们希望帮助他们更好地理解他人如何尝试理解此类现象。我们希望给他们更深层次的见解和批判性工具，而不仅仅是建议。
IF THERE IS A THEORY CRISIS, IT IS OVER QUALITY
如果存在理论危机，那是关于质量的危机
We have no widely agreed upon standards for what theory is and is not, for what better theory is, for when bad theory should be rejected, for what are acceptable critiques of published theory, for how to hold editors and reviewers responsible for rejecting good or accepting bad theory, and so on. The obvious direct solution would be to openly debate, vote on, and then enforce such standards. An indirect solution would be to identify another basis for assessment of quality and use it. We could follow medicine in building a searchable AI-driven research database that tracks new measures of quality (e.g., based on qualified user feedback over concerns like practical value or the need for model modifications for different contexts). I, like others, have called on the major management associations to consider such implementable solutions, but as yet to no avail. 我们对于什么是理论、什么不是理论、什么是更好的理论、何时应该摒弃糟糕的理论、对已发表理论的可接受批评是什么、如何让编辑和审稿人对拒绝好理论或接受坏理论负责等等，尚未有广泛共识的标准。最明显的直接解决方案是公开讨论、投票并强制执行此类标准。间接解决方案则是确定另一个质量评估的基础并加以运用。我们可以借鉴医学领域的做法，建立一个可搜索的、由人工智能驱动的研究数据库，追踪新的质量衡量标准（例如，基于有资质用户对实际价值或模型针对不同情境的修改需求等问题的反馈）。和其他人一样，我呼吁主要的管理协会考虑这类可实施的解决方案，但目前尚未奏效。
WE ARE THE CRISIS
我们正面临危机
We have not moved much from a decades-old passive description of the sociology of scientific progress (Kuhn, 1962). We remain stuck in one of those self-regulated systems that tolerates corruption (e.g., data-mining, editorial conflicts of interest) on its slow path to degradation at a level just above what would be intolerable by the masses (i.e., where our overall scientific legitimacy is threatened) (e.g., Weismann, 2009). There are few ways out—for example, a rebellion by the masses to create and enforce standards, to make the big decisions transparent and hold those in power accountable; a new technology that will shift power to help do so (e.g., that AI-powered database that our major associations are not interested in); or, a real crisis that publicly questions the value of our collective work. None is likely; few are attractive. 我们与几十年前对科学进步社会学的被动描述（库恩，1962）相比，并没有太大进展。我们仍然被困在一个自我调节的系统中，这个系统对腐败（例如数据挖掘、编辑利益冲突）持容忍态度，在缓慢走向退化的过程中，其程度仅略高于大众无法容忍的水平（即我们整体科学合法性受到威胁的程度）（例如魏斯曼，2009）。出路寥寥无几——例如，大众发起反抗以制定和执行标准，使重大决策透明化并追究掌权者的责任；一种能转移权力以实现上述目标的新技术（例如我们主要协会不感兴趣的人工智能驱动的数据库）；或者，一场公开质疑我们集体工作价值的真正危机。这些出路中没有一个是可能实现的，也很少有吸引人的。
In reality, we are the crisis in theory. Our theorizing is more of a business that signals some perceived quality level than it is a science (Arend, 2019). The best strategy is to “co-opetite” (i.e., cooperate to push one’s school of thought over its alternatives and then compete to gain as much concept space in that school as possible with the goal of private gains from notoriety, position, salary, books, and consulting); it is not to advance scientific truth orto try to make a manager’s job easier. Until we actively try to change that reality— a reality that the powerful have no incentive to alter— no amount of special topic forums will help. So, while one can appreciate Cronin et al.’s (2021) optimistic view that some concerns about the state of theory can be easily addressed by shifting the focus up from units to programs, the real concerns run deeper and the real solutions entail difficulties that are insurmountable in the near future. There is no ready program to get out of this, nor, ironically, any practical theory for doing so—but, isn’t that the point? 实际上，我们在理论层面就是危机本身。我们的理论研究更像是一种生意，用来彰显某种感知到的质量水平，而非一门科学（Arend, 2019）。最佳策略是“合作竞争”（即合作以推动自己的思想流派超越其他流派，然后在该流派中竞争以获取尽可能多的概念空间，目标是通过知名度、职位、薪水、书籍和咨询获得私人利益）；而不是推进科学真理，也不是试图让管理者的工作更轻松。除非我们主动尝试改变这种现实——而这种现实中，有权势者没有改变它的动力——否则再多的专题论坛也无济于事。因此，尽管人们可以赞赏Cronin等人（2021）的乐观观点，即理论状态的一些问题可以通过将焦点从单元提升到项目层面来轻松解决，但真正的问题更深层，真正的解决方案所涉及的困难在短期内是无法克服的。没有现成的方案可以摆脱这种困境，具有讽刺意味的是，也没有实际的理论可以做到这一点——但，这难道不就是问题所在吗？
REFERENCES
参考文献
Arend, R. J. 2019. On theory: Brain-mind teleology and the failure in the success of the human use of science. Newcastle upon Tyne, U.K.: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Arend, R. J. 2019. 论理论：脑 - 心目的论与人类科学运用成功中的失败。英国泰恩河畔纽卡斯尔：剑桥学者出版社。
Arend, R. J., Sarooghi, H., & Burkemper, A. 2015. Effectuation as ineffectual? Applying the 3E theory-assessment framework to a proposed new theory of entrepreneurship. Academy of Management Review, 40: 630651.
Arend, R. J., Sarooghi, H., & Burkemper, A. 2015. Effectuation as ineffectual? Applying the 3E theory-assessment framework to a proposed new theory of entrepreneurship. Academy of Management Review, 40: 630651.
Arend, R. J., Sarooghi, H., & Burkemper, A. C. 2016. Effectuation, not being pragmatic or process theorizing, remains ineffectual: Responding to the commentaries. Academy of Management Review, 41: 549556.
Arend, R. J., Sarooghi, H., & Burkemper, A. C. 2016. 效应逻辑而非务实或过程理论化，仍无效果：回应评论。《管理学会评论》，41：549-556。
Byron, K., & Thatcher, S. M. 2016. Editors’ comments: “What I know now that I wish I knew then”—teaching theory and theory building. Academy of Management Review, 41: 18.
拜伦（Byron, K.）和撒切尔（Thatcher, S. M.）。2016。编辑评论：“我现在知道但希望当时就知道的事”——教学理论与理论构建。《管理学会评论》，41:18。
Cronin, M. A., Stouten, J., & van Knippenberg, D. 2021. The theory crisis in management research: Solving the right problem. Academy of Management Review, 46: 667 683.
Cronin, M. A., Stouten, J., & van Knippenberg, D. 2021. The theory crisis in management research: Solving the right problem. Academy of Management Review, 46: 667 683.
Davis, G. F. 2010. Do theories of organizations progress? Organizational Research Methods, 13: 690709.
戴维斯，G. F. 2010. 组织理论是否在进步？《组织研究方法》，13: 690-709.
Ferris, G. R., Hochwarter, W. A., & Buckley, M. R. 2012. Theory in the organizational sciences: How will we know it when we see it? Organizational Psychology Review, 2: 94106.
Ferris, G. R., Hochwarter, W. A., & Buckley, M. R. 2012. 组织科学中的理论：我们如何在看到它时识别它？《组织心理学评论》，2：94106。
Gray, P. H., & Cooper, W. H. 2010. Pursuing failure. Organizational Research Methods, 13: 620643.
Gray, P. H., & Cooper, W. H. 2010. 追求失败。组织研究方法，13：620643。
Huff, A. S. 2008. Finding the right conversation. In A. S. Huff (Ed.), Designing research for publication: 114. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE.
赫夫，A. S. 2008. 找到合适的对话。载于A. S. 赫夫（编），《为发表而设计研究》：114。加利福尼亚州洛杉矶：塞奇出版公司。
Kuhn, T. 1962. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
库恩，T. 1962. 科学革命的结构。伊利诺伊州芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社。
McGuire, W. J. 1989. A perspectivist approach to the strategic planning of programmatic scientific research. In B. Gholson (Ed.), Psychology of science: Contributions to metascience: 214245. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
麦圭尔，W. J. 1989. 项目式科学研究战略规划的透视主义方法。载于 B. 霍尔森（编），《科学心理学：对元科学的贡献》：214-245。英国剑桥：剑桥大学出版社。
McKinley, W. 2010. Organizational theory development: Displacement of ends? Organization Studies, 31: 4768.
麦金利，W. 2010. 组织理论的发展：目标的置换？《组织研究》，31：4768.
Pfeffer, J. 1995. Mortality, reproducibility, and the persistence of styles of theory. Organization Science, 6: 681686.
Pfeffer, J. 1995. 死亡率、可重复性及理论风格的持续性。《组织科学》，6：681-686。
Royce, J. R. 1987. A strategy for developing unifying theory in psychology. In A. W. Staats & L. Mos (Eds.), Annals of theoretical psychology, Vol. 5: 275285. Boston, MA: Springer.
罗伊斯，J. R. 1987. 心理学统一理论建立的策略。载于A. W. 斯塔茨与L. 莫斯（编），《理论心理学年鉴》，第5卷：275-285。马萨诸塞州波士顿：斯普林格出版社。
Van Maanen, J. 1995. Style as theory. Organization Science, 6: 132143.
范·曼嫩，J. 1995. 作为理论的风格。《组织科学》，6: 132-143。
Wagner, D. G., & Berger, J. 1985. Do sociological theories grow? American Journal of Sociology, 90: 697728.
瓦格纳，D. G.，& 伯杰，J. 1985. 社会学理论会发展吗？《美国社会学期刊》，90: 697-728.
Weismann, M. F. 2009. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The failure of the self-regulatory model of corporate governance in the global business environment. Journal of Business Ethics, 88: 615661. 魏斯曼，M. F. 2009. 《反海外腐败法》：全球商业环境中公司治理自我监管模式的失败。《商业伦理杂志》，88：615-661。
Richard J. Arend University of Southern Maine https://doi.org/AMR_20210251 理查德·J·阿伦德 南缅因大学 https://doi.org/AMR_20210251
Why Theory on “How Theory Fits Together” Benefits Management Scholarship
关于“理论如何整合”的理论为何有利于管理学研究
（注：此处“管理”为管理学领域常用译法，“Scholarship”结合语境译为“研究”更准确体现学术领域含义。）
We presented a theoretical analysis of the knowledge production process in scientific research (Cronin, Stouten, & van Knippenberg, 2021), and, from this, concluded that the proposed remedies to the current problems with theory in management (see Antonakis, 2017; Davis, 2015; Hambrick, 2007; Johnson, Payne, Wang, Asher, & Mandal, 2017; Mathieu, 2016, among many others) are not enough. These remedies focus only on unit theory without considering programmatic theory. “Unit theory” refers to specific models that are proposed and tested empirically, whereas “programmatic theory” refers to the general knowledge on a topic that is derived from the collection of verified unit theories. Thus, unit theories 我们对科学研究中的知识生产过程进行了理论分析（Cronin, Stouten, & van Knippenberg, 2021），并据此得出结论：针对当前管理学理论问题提出的补救措施（见Antonakis, 2017；Davis, 2015；Hambrick, 2007；Johnson, Payne, Wang, Asher, & Mandal, 2017；Mathieu, 2016等众多文献）并不充分。这些补救措施仅关注单元理论，而未考虑程序化理论。“单元理论”指的是经实证提出和检验的特定模型，而“程序化理论”指的是从已验证的单元理论集合中推导出来的关于某一主题的一般性知识。因此，单元理论
Copyright of Academy of Management Review is the property of Academy of Management and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder’s express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. 《管理学会评论》的版权归管理学会所有，未经版权所有者明确书面许可，其内容不得复制、发送到多个网站或发布到电子讨论组。不过，用户可打印、下载或通过电子邮件发送文章供个人使用。