BEYOND SHAREHOLDER VALUE MAXIMIZATION: ACCOUNTING FOR FINANCIAL/SOCIAL TRADE-OFFS IN DUAL-PURPOSE COMPANIES
超越股东价值最大化：双目标公司中的财务/社会权衡考量
JULIE BATTILANA Harvard University 朱莉·巴蒂拉娜 哈佛大学
TOMASZ OBLOJ HEC Paris TOMASZ OBLOJ 巴黎高等商学院（HEC Paris）
ANNE-CLAIRE PACHE ESSEC Business School ANNE-CLAIRE PACHE ESSEC商学院
METIN SENGUL Boston College METIN SENGUL 波士顿学院
A growing number of companies choose to pursue financial and social goals simultaneously. These dual-purpose companies face inherent trade-offs as they are caught between the competing expectations of different stakeholders. We build a theory predicting the intensity of such trade-offs faced by dual-purpose organizations located in different institutional settings and adopting different governance mechanisms. We theorize that the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by dual-purpose companies increases with the level of economic liberalism of the institutional setting in which they operate. We further theorize that the influence of the institutional setting on the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by dual-purpose companies is filtered by their governance arrangements. We conclude by discussing changes in the surrounding ecosystem that could help to reduce the intensity of the trade-offs that companies experience, thereby paving the way for a new form of capitalism. 越来越多的公司选择同时追求财务目标和社会目标。这些兼具两种目的的公司面临着固有的权衡，因为它们夹在不同利益相关者的相互竞争的期望之间。我们构建了一个理论，预测位于不同制度环境中并采用不同治理机制的兼具两种目的的组织所面临的这种权衡的强度。我们的理论认为，兼具两种目的的公司所经历的财务/社会权衡的强度随着其运营所在制度环境的经济自由主义水平的提高而增加。我们进一步提出，制度环境对这些公司所经历的财务/社会权衡强度的影响会受到其治理安排的过滤。最后，我们讨论了周围生态系统的变化，这些变化可能有助于降低公司所面临的权衡的强度，从而为一种新的资本主义形式铺平道路。
Shareholder value maximization has been the dominant model in management practice in the past decades. In much of the world, it has become the norm and expectation for publicly traded companies to put maximizing shareholder value above any other organizational goal and for privately held companies to pursue maximization of financial gains for their owners as the overarching organizational goal (Henderson, 2020; Stout, 2003). Yet, shareholder value maximization has not always been the takenfor-granted primary goal of companies. Rather, the perception of what goals a company should pursue has varied over time, based on the social context in which the company is embedded. 在过去几十年中，股东价值最大化一直是管理实践中的主导模式。在世界大部分地区，上市公司将最大化股东价值置于任何其他组织目标之上，而私营公司则将为所有者追求财务收益最大化作为首要组织目标，这已成为一种规范和期望（Henderson, 2020; Stout, 2003）。然而，股东价值最大化并非一直是公司理所当然的首要目标。相反，公司应追求何种目标的认知随时间变化，这取决于公司所处的社会环境。
In the past decades, corporate leaders who have questioned an exclusive focus on profit maximization (like Yvon Chouinard, founder of Patagonia; Emmanuel Faber, former CEO of Danone; Paul Polman, former CEO of Unilever; or the late Anita Roddick, founder of the Body Shop) seemed like outliers. Yet, such questioning of corporate purpose is not new. The wider responsibility of businesses toward various stakeholders was, for example, already being debated in 1932 by Merrick Dodd in a Harvard Law Review article entitled “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” In this article, Dodd challenged the shareholder-centric view, arguing in contrast that: 在过去几十年里，那些质疑单纯追求利润最大化的企业领导者（例如巴塔哥尼亚创始人伊冯·乔伊纳德、达能前首席执行官伊曼纽尔·法伯、联合利华前首席执行官保罗·波尔曼，或是已故的美体小铺创始人安妮塔·罗迪克）似乎是异类。然而，这种对企业宗旨的质疑并非新鲜事。例如，1932年，梅里克·多德在《哈佛法律评论》发表的题为《公司管理者为谁托管？》的文章中，就已经在探讨企业对各类利益相关者的更广泛责任。在这篇文章中，多德对以股东为中心的观点提出了挑战，相反地主张：
Public opinion, which ultimately makes law, has made and is today making substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function. (Dodd, 1932: 1148) 最终制定法律的公众舆论，已经并正在朝着将商业公司视为一种兼具社会服务和盈利功能的经济机构这一观点迈进，取得了实质性进展。（多德，1932：1148）
However, this balanced view of the financial and social responsibilities of corporations lost momentum in the second half of the 20th century with the rise of what Freeman, Martin, and Parmar (2020) referred to as “investor capitalism.” 然而，随着弗里曼、马丁和帕马尔（2020）所说的“投资者资本主义”的兴起，企业在金融和社会责任方面的这种平衡观点在20世纪下半叶失去了势头。
In recent years, especially in the face of the environmental crisis that threatens our ecosystem and the 2008 Great Recession that has further increased inequalities (Stiglitz, 2012), the social context of business has started to shift once again, with intense calls from various actors for companies to embrace both financial and social purposes as core to their mission. Not only government officials and social activists but also millennials (Deloitte, 2019), global investors (Mudaliar & Dithrich, 2019), and even CEOs of corporate giants (Business Roundtable, 2019) are calling upon companies to account for their effects on people and the planet and to take actions that positively impact society in addition to serving their shareholders. Some have been communicating about such actions mostly for public relations purposes in response to these calls, while others have been genuinely pushing for change. Since the start of 2020, the COVID-19 crisis has brought a new sense of urgency to the need for this change. 近年来，特别是在面临威胁生态系统的环境危机以及进一步加剧不平等现象的2008年大衰退（Stiglitz, 2012）时，商业的社会背景再次开始发生转变，各方强烈呼吁企业将财务目标和社会目标都作为其使命的核心。不仅政府官员和社会活动家，还有千禧一代（Deloitte, 2019）、全球投资者（Mudaliar & Dithrich, 2019），甚至企业巨头的首席执行官（Business Roundtable, 2019）都在呼吁企业考虑其对人类和地球的影响，并在服务股东的同时采取积极影响社会的行动。有些人开展此类行动主要是为了公关目的以回应这些呼吁，而另一些人则是真心推动变革。自2020年初以来，新冠疫情危机为这种变革的必要性带来了新的紧迫感。
Over the past decade, companies have thus been encouraged to embrace a dual purpose, combining the pursuit of profits with the pursuit of social goals. Social goals may be as diverse as lifting poor clients or suppliers out of poverty, ensuring employees’ well-being, developing eco-friendly technologies, promoting healthy living, or protecting the environment. At a minimum, social goals entail “not knowingly do[ing] anything that could harm stakeholders” and rectifying any harm that companies cause to their stakeholders if or when “harm is discovered and brought to their attention” (Campbell, 2007: 951). They can also take more ambitious forms of willingly engaging in behaviors that produce value for society (Kaplan, 2019).1 The pursuit of social goals may hence require a company to take actions both inside the company, like improving the eco-efficiency of production, and outside the company, such as investing in local communities that surround the company’s operations. 在过去十年中，企业因此被鼓励秉持双重目标，将追求利润与追求社会目标相结合。社会目标可能多种多样，例如帮助贫困客户或供应商脱贫、保障员工福祉、开发环保技术、促进健康生活或保护环境。至少，社会目标意味着“不故意做任何可能损害利益相关者的事情”，并且在“损害被发现并告知利益相关者时”纠正企业对利益相关者造成的任何损害（Campbell, 2007: 951）。它们也可以采取更具雄心的形式，即自愿开展为社会创造价值的行为（Kaplan, 2019）。1 因此，追求社会目标可能要求企业采取内部行动，例如提高生产的生态效率，以及外部行动，例如投资于公司运营所在的周边社区。
Despite the growing expectation that companies pursue both financial and social goals, this model is still far from dominant. Contemporary companies are embedded in pluralistic environments (Kraatz & 尽管人们越来越期望企业同时追求财务和社会目标，但这种模式仍远未占据主导地位。当代企业身处多元环境中（Kraatz &
Block, 2017; Pache & Santos, 2021) where different stakeholders hold different views of what goals companies should pursue. Dual-purpose companies are thus likely to experience difficult trade-offs stemming from the competing expectations of their various internal and external stakeholders. Although a growing number of voices argue that financial and social goals can become synergetic (e.g., Freeman et al., 2020; Porter & Kramer, 2011), most dualpurpose companies continue to operate in contexts where financial and social goals are often perceived as being in tension, and sometimes even as incompatible. As a result, these companies face situations in which they are caught between the competing expectations of their key stakeholders regarding what goals they should pursue and what means they should use to achieve these goals. Trade-offs stem from the fact that attending to a stakeholder’s demand may defy the demands of other stakeholders. Specifically, for dual-purpose companies, acting upon financial goals sometimes requires violating expectations from social stakeholders, whereas acting upon social goals can violate demands from shareholders. Such an experience of financial/social trade-offs tends to be “the rule rather than the exception” in dual-purpose companies (Hahn, Figge, Pinkse, & Preuss, 2010: 217). Block, 2017；Pache & Santos, 2021），不同利益相关者对公司应追求的目标持有不同看法。因此，双重目标公司很可能面临因内部和外部不同利益相关者的相互竞争期望而产生的艰难权衡。尽管越来越多的声音认为财务目标和社会目标可以形成协同效应（例如，Freeman et al., 2020；Porter & Kramer, 2011），但大多数双重目标公司仍在财务目标和社会目标常被视为相互冲突，有时甚至不相容的环境中运营。因此，这些公司面临着这样的情况：它们被关键利益相关者在“应追求什么目标”以及“应采用什么手段实现这些目标”方面的相互竞争期望所夹逼。权衡源于这样一个事实：满足某个利益相关者的需求可能会违背其他利益相关者的需求。具体而言，对于双重目标公司，追求财务目标有时需要违背社会利益相关者的期望，而追求社会目标则可能违背股东的要求。这种财务/社会权衡的经历在双重目标公司中往往是“常态而非例外”（Hahn, Figge, Pinkse, & Preuss, 2010: 217）。
Research shows that this experience can be draining and paralyzing for companies (e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Hahn, Pinkse, Preuss, & Figge, 2015). Even more challenging, it can result in organizations losing sight of social goals in the quest for survival and efficiency (e.g., Weber, 1904/2002). Selznick (1957: 134) famously warned of the “cult of efficiency” that leaders must transcend in order to “[create] a social organism capable of fulfilling [its] mission.” This risk of abandoning social goals is now often referred to as “mission drift” (Grimes, Williams, & Zhao, 2019). 研究表明，这种体验会让企业感到疲惫和瘫痪（例如，Battilana & Dorado，2010；Hahn、Pinkse、Preuss & Figge，2015）。更具挑战性的是，在追求生存和效率的过程中，组织可能会忽视社会目标（例如，Weber，1904/2002）。Selznick（1957：134）曾著名地警告过“效率崇拜”，领导者必须超越这种“崇拜”以“[创建]一个能够完成[其]使命的社会有机体”。如今，这种放弃社会目标的风险常被称为“使命漂移”（Grimes、Williams & Zhao，2019）。
The perception of incompatibilities between financial and social goals and ensuing risk of mission drift is neither new nor unique to dual-purpose companies. It has been shown to be a common experience in the context of medieval monasteries (Rost, Inauen, Osterloh, & Frey, 2010), not-for-profits (Battilana & Sengul, 2006), and professions (Abbott, 1988). Nonetheless, the challenge that dual-purpose companies face today stands out because they attempt to diverge from practices deeply rooted in the dominant narrative that has characterized the past 50 years. Hence, it is not just that financial goals are perceived as different from social goals. Rather, as financial goals, and corresponding economic assumptions, have become the sole lens through which we see business, contemporary dual-purpose companies have to navigate a business environment that has become decoupled from the social sphere. If we are to understand how dual-purpose companies can thrive, it is thus key to understand the specific challenges that they face, as well as how these challenges can be mitigated. 对财务目标和社会目标之间不兼容的认知以及随之而来的使命漂移风险，并非新现象，也并非只为双重目标公司所特有。研究表明，这种情况在中世纪修道院（Rost, Inauen, Osterloh, & Frey, 2010）、非营利组织（Battilana & Sengul, 2006）和专业领域（Abbott, 1988）中也普遍存在。尽管如此，当今双重目标公司面临的挑战尤为突出，因为它们试图偏离过去50年主导叙事中根深蒂固的做法。因此，问题不仅仅在于财务目标被视为与社会目标不同。相反，随着财务目标及其相应的经济假设成为我们看待商业的唯一视角，当代双重目标公司必须在一个与社会领域脱节的商业环境中导航。如果我们要理解双重目标公司如何能够蓬勃发展，那么关键在于了解它们面临的具体挑战，以及如何减轻这些挑战。
In this paper, we take a step in that direction and explore the conditions that influence the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by companies that simultaneously pursue financial and social goals. Building on institutional theory and accounting for the social construction of organizational goals, we first theorize that the institutional setting in which a dual-purpose company operates influences the intensity with which it experiences these trade-offs. We elaborate on the observation that financial/social trade-offs, rather than being uniform, depend on the context (Wry & Zhao, 2018). Specifically, we propose that the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by dual-purpose companies increases with the level of the economic liberalism of the institutional setting in which they operate. Level of economic liberalism matters for the experience of trade-offs because it affects the way in which private interests are organized in society, how they relate to the central state and how concertation on these interests is achieved (Scott & Meyer, 1991). 在本文中，我们朝着这个方向迈出了一步，探讨影响同时追求财务和社会目标的公司所经历的财务/社会权衡强度的条件。我们以制度理论为基础，并考虑组织目标的社会建构，首先从理论上阐述，双重目标公司所处的制度环境会影响其经历这些权衡的强度。我们详细阐述了一个观察结果：财务/社会权衡并非统一的，而是取决于具体背景（Wry & Zhao, 2018）。具体而言，我们提出，双重目标公司所经历的财务/社会权衡强度会随着其所处制度环境的经济自由主义水平的提高而增加。经济自由主义水平对权衡经历至关重要，因为它会影响社会中私人利益的组织方式、它们与中央国家的关系，以及如何实现对这些利益的协调（Scott & Meyer, 1991）。
Building on the observation that institutional processes are filtered and enacted differently by different organizations (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Lounsbury, 2001), we also posit that, in a given institutional setting, not all organizations experience financial/social trade-offs in a similar way. Governance arrangements—which define the ends toward which the organization is directed, the people who make key decisions in the organization, and the means employed to achieve the desired ends (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Cornforth, 2003; Kraatz & Block, 2008)—have been identified as one of the key sets of organizational attributes filtering institutional influences in pluralistic contexts (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). This is because they inscribe into organizational features the value commitments of the organization (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996) and thereby help the organization mitigate internal tensions that are unsettled within the broader environment. Accordingly, we propose that the influence of the institutional setting on the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by dual-purpose companies is filtered by their governance arrangements. 基于不同组织对制度性流程的过滤和实施方式存在差异这一观察（Greenwood & Hinings, 1996；Lounsbury, 2001），我们还认为，在特定的制度环境中，并非所有组织都会以类似方式经历财务/社会权衡。治理安排——即界定组织目标、组织内关键决策制定者以及实现目标所采用手段的安排（Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007；Cornforth, 2003；Kraatz & Block, 2008）——已被确定为在多元语境中过滤制度影响的关键组织属性之一（Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011）。这是因为治理安排将组织的价值承诺嵌入组织特征中（Greenwood & Hinings, 1996），从而帮助组织缓解在更广泛环境中未解决的内部紧张关系。因此，我们提出，制度环境对兼具双重目标的公司所经历的财务/社会权衡强度的影响，会受到其治理安排的过滤。
Taken together, our study contributes to the literature by recognizing the specific role played by institutional environments in shaping the experience of financial/social trade-offs in dual-purpose companies and unpacking how governance choices can mitigate this effect across companies. We see this as a critical step in predicting the sustainability and prevalence of these dual-purpose companies, in turn shaping the likelihood that they become a recognized and legitimate template, i.e., an institution in their own right. We conclude by discussing required changes in the surrounding ecosystem that could help reduce the frequency and intensity of the tradeoffs that companies face, thereby paving the way for a new form of capitalism. 综合来看，我们的研究通过明确制度环境在塑造兼具金融/社会权衡经验的双重目标公司中的特定作用，并揭示治理选择如何在不同公司中减轻这种影响，为相关文献做出了贡献。我们认为这是预测这些双重目标公司可持续性和普遍性的关键一步，进而影响它们成为公认且合法的模板（即自身成为一种制度）的可能性。最后，我们讨论了周围生态系统中所需的变革，这些变革可能有助于减少公司面临的权衡的频率和强度，从而为一种新的资本主义形式铺平道路。
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OFORGANIZATIONAL GOALS
组织目标的社会建构
Research has long pointed to the socially constructed nature of what we take for granted in organizations and, more broadly, in society (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Practices often become institutionalized when they come to be perceived as solutions that address collective problems (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010), and when, over time, people tend to consider them as the natural order of things, even when they have long ceased to satisfactorily solve any problem (Douglas, 1986). Indeed, practices and structures in organizations reflect myths derived from their social environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Although taken-for-granted norms and practices are enduring, stable, and difficult to change (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), they nevertheless evolve over time, under the influence of external shocks (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002), legal innovations (Scott, 2013), cultural processes (Hirsch, 1986), and social movements pushing for change (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017). As such, like most myths, the dominant conception of what goal a company ought to pursue has evolved over time. 研究长期以来一直指出，我们在组织乃至更广泛的社会中视为理所当然的事物具有社会建构的本质（Berger & Luckmann, 1966）。当实践被视为解决集体问题的方案时（Meyer & Höllerer, 2010），它们往往会被制度化；随着时间的推移，人们甚至会将这些实践视为事物的自然秩序，即便它们早已不再能令人满意地解决任何问题（Douglas, 1986）。事实上，组织中的实践和结构反映了其社会环境衍生的神话（Meyer & Rowan, 1977）。尽管这些被视为理所当然的规范和实践具有持久性、稳定性且难以改变（Greenwood & Hinings, 1996），但在外部冲击（Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002）、法律创新（Scott, 2013）、文化进程（Hirsch, 1986）以及推动变革的社会运动（Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017）的影响下，它们仍会随时间演变。因此，与大多数神话类似，企业应追求的目标的主流观念也随时间发生了演变。
How Shareholder Value Maximization Became Dominant
股东价值最大化如何成为主导理念
We tend to take it for granted today that maximization of economic value is the primary goal of companies. However, this was not always the case. In fact, there are many historical examples of conceptions of organizations and companies in which the production of economic and social value coexisted. Shareholder-centrism, which has been at the heart of the neoliberal paradigm over the past half century, is historically specific and has not always been the norm (Amable, 2011; Mudge, 2008). 如今，我们往往想当然地认为，经济价值最大化是企业的首要目标。然而，情况并非总是如此。事实上，历史上有许多关于组织和公司的理念，其中经济价值和社会价值的生产是共存的。在过去半个世纪中，以股东为中心的理念一直是新自由主义范式的核心，这种理念具有历史特殊性，并非一直是常态（Amable, 2011; Mudge, 2008）。
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, technological advances in communication and transportation paved the way for growth of companies in size and scope, leading to the emergence of “managerial capitalism,” characterized by large enterprises managed by hierarchies of salaried managers (Chandler, 1984). The particular structure of the corporate legal form, with provisions to encourage investment and enduring contracts, was originally meant to support large-scale ventures, such as banks or railroads. These early corporations were often understood to be in the service not only of their investors, but also of their communities and society more broadly (Dodd, 1932; Stout, 2003). Such a dual orientation was echoed by those who pioneered business schools and business education at the beginning of the 20th century, intending to imbue management with the moral legitimacy and authority to serve society (Khurana, 2007). 在19世纪末和20世纪初，通信和交通领域的技术进步为企业规模和范围的扩大铺平了道路，催生了“管理资本主义”，其特征是由领取薪水的管理人员层级进行管理的大型企业（Chandler，1984）。公司法律形式的特定结构（包含鼓励投资和长期合同的条款）最初是为了支持大型企业，如银行或铁路公司。这些早期的公司通常被认为不仅服务于其投资者，还服务于更广泛的社区和社会（Dodd，1932；Stout，2003）。20世纪初，那些开创商学院和商业教育的人也呼应了这种双重导向，他们旨在赋予管理以服务社会的道德合法性和权威（Khurana，2007）。
It was the 1950s that marked the beginning of the proliferation of “management science,” with technical capabilities meant to be the basis for moral legitimacy. This trend spearheaded a broader change from professional ideals to professional knowledge in management thought and practice. As a result, “managerialism”—the reliance on professional managers and the concepts and methods they use— became the new norm for companies. By the 1970s, “managers with little or no equity in the enterprises administered made decisions about present production and distribution and the allocation of resources for future production and distribution” in the advanced industrial economies (Chandler, 1984: 503). The rise of managerialism coincided with the rise of the finance conception of control in large companies based on the use of financial tools to evaluate product lines and divisions. This led to the proliferation of diversified multidivisional companies as managers pursued growth by diversifying on the basis that “financial performance was all that mattered” (Fligstein, 1990: 226). 20世纪50年代标志着“管理科学”的普及开始，当时技术能力被视为道德合法性的基础。这一趋势推动了管理思想和实践从专业理想向专业知识的更广泛转变。结果，“管理主义”——即依赖专业管理者及其使用的概念和方法——成为了企业的新规范。到20世纪70年代，在发达工业经济体中，“在其管理的企业中持有很少或没有股权的管理者决定当前的生产和分配，以及未来生产和分配的资源配置”（Chandler, 1984: 503）。管理主义的兴起与大公司中基于金融工具评估产品线和部门的“金融控制观念”的兴起同时发生。这导致了多元化多部门公司的普及，因为管理者通过基于“财务绩效才是唯一重要的”（Fligstein, 1990: 226）这一理念进行多元化来追求增长。
The increased dominance of the finance conception of control was associated with the growing influence of the field of economics (Fourcade, 2006). Economists’ “increased, if contested, interpenetration” into business life became especially prominent with the ascendancy of neoclassical economics that shaped managers’ and shareholders’ view of what effective management was supposed to look like (Fourcade & Khurana, 2013: 123). The fundamental approximation behind neoclassical economics was that an average individual is rational, makes choices based on full and relevant information, and maximizes utility (Weintraub, 2007). Building on this set of assumptions, in the 1970s and 1980s, some economists ushered free-market economics into academia, as well as into popular culture and the legal landscape. This view was foreshadowed in Milton Friedman’s (1970) widely discussed New York Times Magazine article entitled “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its Profits.” 对控制的金融概念的日益主导，与经济学领域影响力的不断增长有关（Fourcade，2006）。经济学家“即便存在争议，但其渗透程度不断加深”进入商业生活，在新古典经济学崛起后变得尤为突出，这种经济学塑造了管理者和股东对“什么才是有效的管理”的看法（Fourcade & Khurana，2013：123）。新古典经济学背后的基本假设是，普通个体是理性的，会基于充分且相关的信息做出选择，并实现效用最大化（Weintraub，2007）。基于这一系列假设，在20世纪70年代和80年代，一些经济学家将自由市场经济学引入学术界，同时也带入了大众文化和法律领域。米尔顿·弗里德曼（1970）在《纽约时报杂志》上发表的广受讨论的文章《企业的社会责任是增加利润》预示了这种观点。
Friedman’s statement became a dictum over time, and one that few managers could publicly question until recently (Davis, 2009). Support for his argument was largely provided by the emergence of agency theory in the 1970s as the main lens through which to evaluate corporations and corporate governance. In a strong rebuke of managerialism, financial economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling (1976) cautioned against the conflicting interests of owners and managers, who, in principle, were assumed to have little interest in anyone’s gains but their own. By understanding companies as a nexus of contracts, agency theory scholars created the conceptual tools underpinning the emergence of the interests of shareholders onto center stage in the following decades (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). They also cautioned managers that a lack of full commitment to shareholder value creation (and associated higher market valuation) would likely result in a greater cost of capital for their companies and a greater chance of failure or being taken over (Jensen & Ruback, 1983), thus further reinforcing the focus on this sole performance criterion. Indeed, agency theory “underlies the entire intellectual edifice in support of shareholder value maximization” (Ghoshal, 2005: 80). 随着时间的推移，弗里德曼的言论逐渐成为一条箴言，直到最近，很少有管理者还能公开质疑这一点（Davis，2009）。20世纪70年代，代理理论的出现为他的观点提供了主要支持，成为评估公司和公司治理的主要视角。金融经济学家迈克尔·詹森（Michael Jensen）和威廉·梅克林（William Meckling）（1976）对管理主义进行了强烈抨击，警告所有者和管理者之间存在利益冲突——原则上，他们被认为只关心自己的利益，而对他人的收益漠不关心。通过将公司理解为一系列契约的集合，代理理论学者构建了概念工具，为接下来几十年中股东利益的凸显奠定了基础（Lazonick & O’Sullivan，2000）。他们还告诫管理者，如果不能完全致力于创造股东价值（以及相关的更高市场估值），公司的资本成本可能会更高，失败或被收购的可能性也更大（Jensen & Ruback，1983），这进一步强化了对这一单一绩效标准的关注。事实上，代理理论“构成了支持股东价值最大化的整个知识体系的基础”（Ghoshal，2005：80）。
Over the second half of the 20th century, this understanding was reinforced by the introduction and diffusion of practices and tools that infused shareholder value maximization inside the companies and their ecosystems (Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005). For instance, much of the workings of the contemporary financial markets have been informed by option pricing models developed by Black, Scholes, and Merton in the early 1970s (Taleb, 1998). The development of these models and the introduction of a listed options exchange in 1973 moved options from obscurity to “an expansion unprecedented in American securities markets” (Cox, Ross, & Rubinstein, 1979). Interestingly, what became known as the BlackScholes formula used to fit the data rather poorly in its early days. Over time, however, the model began to fit the data much better (Rubinstein, 1985) and option pricing became “the most successful theory .. in all of economics … when judged by its ability to explain the empirical data” (Ross, 1987: 332). This remarkable precision did not come from improvements made to the model or from relaxing its assumptions. Rather, it came from the markets’ increasing adoption of model’s assumptions as truths and the formula as a guide in trading practice (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003). Thus, the model became a self-fulfilling prophecy, further legitimizing the dominance of the shareholder value maximization paradigm. 在20世纪后半叶，这种认知因引入和推广将股东价值最大化理念融入公司及其生态系统的实践与工具而得到强化（Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005）。例如，当代金融市场的诸多运作都受到20世纪70年代初由Black、Scholes和Merton开发的期权定价模型的启发（Taleb, 1998）。这些模型的发展以及1973年上市期权交易所的推出，使期权从默默无闻走向“美国证券市场前所未有的扩张”（Cox, Ross, & Rubinstein, 1979）。有趣的是，早期的Black-Scholes公式与数据的拟合度相当差。然而，随着时间推移，该模型对数据的拟合度显著提升（Rubinstein, 1985），期权定价也成为“所有经济学领域中……最成功的理论……当以其解释经验数据的能力来评判时”（Ross, 1987: 332）。这种非凡的精确性并非来自模型的改进或对其假设的放宽，而是源于市场对模型假设的认可度不断提高，将其视为真理，并将公式作为交易实践的指南（MacKenzie & Millo, 2003）。因此，该模型成为了一个自我实现的预言，进一步巩固了股东价值最大化范式的主导地位。
The strength of the paradigm was such that it also shaped the use of new tools. Consider the adoption of the balanced scorecard as an accounting measurement process in the 1990s. Popularized by Kaplan and Norton (1996), the initial premise of the “balanced scorecard” was overcoming limitations of traditional performance measurement tools based solely on financial metrics by including additional metrics for dimensions such as customer satisfaction or, improvement of internal processes. It also provided managers with tools to quantify the relative importance of various metrics for overall firm performance. Over time, the balanced scorecard has become “the tool of choice for evaluating how managers are performing in the pursuit of various corporate social responsibility (CSR) goals and for motivating them in the pursuit of these goals” (Bento, Mertins, & White, 2017: 769). However, the subjectivity allowed in setting weights to different performance measures favored an increasing focus on short-term financial goals (Ittner, Larcker, & Meyer, 2003). As a result, the widespread adoption of the balanced scorecard further reinforced the shareholder value maximization paradigm by aligning the incentives of management with those of the owners (Budde, 2007).2 该范式的影响力巨大，甚至塑造了新工具的使用方式。以20世纪90年代作为会计计量流程的平衡计分卡（balanced scorecard）的采用为例。由卡普兰和诺顿（Kaplan and Norton, 1996）推广，“平衡计分卡”的最初前提是通过纳入客户满意度或内部流程改进等维度的额外指标，克服传统绩效衡量工具仅基于财务指标的局限性。它还为管理者提供了量化各种指标对企业整体绩效相对重要性的工具。随着时间的推移，平衡计分卡已成为“评估管理者在追求各种企业社会责任（CSR）目标时表现如何以及激励他们追求这些目标的首选工具”（本托、默廷斯和怀特，2017：769）。然而，在为不同绩效指标设置权重时允许的主观性，助长了对短期财务目标日益增长的关注（伊特纳、拉克和迈耶，2003）。因此，平衡计分卡的广泛采用通过将管理层的激励与所有者的激励对齐，进一步强化了股东价值最大化的范式（布德，2007）。
Overall, shareholder value maximization, which was recognized as an “import” from the United States, springing, in large part, from neoliberal economic theories (Djelic & Etchanchu, 2017; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010), became the norm for companies not only in the United States but across the globe (Dobbin & Zorn, 2005; Fligstein, 1990). As a result of this evolution, the world economy has become increasingly controlled by financial markets (Battilana, 2015; Davis, 2009). This further shaped the perceived divide between financial and social values within companies. Financial and social values came to be perceived as belonging to radically different institutional spheres. Companies were now expected to focus on financial goals, while not-for-profits and public organizations would focus on social goals. On top of this, despite overwhelming empirical evidence that most companies concurrently pursue multiple goals (Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Obloj & Sengul, 2020), organizations were expected to prioritize a single objective since any other alternative would lead to “confusion and lack of purpose” (Jensen, 2002: 238; see also Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004).³ As a result, financial and social goals have become increasingly perceived as incompatible (Brown, 2015). 总体而言，股东价值最大化被视为从美国“引进”的理念，很大程度上源于新自由主义经济理论（Djelic & Etchanchu, 2017；Meyer & Höllerer, 2010），它不仅在美国，而且在全球范围内都成为了企业的准则（Dobbin & Zorn, 2005；Fligstein, 1990）。由于这种演变，世界经济越来越受到金融市场的控制（Battilana, 2015；Davis, 2009）。这进一步塑造了企业内部金融价值与社会价值之间的认知鸿沟。金融价值和社会价值逐渐被认为属于截然不同的制度领域。企业现在被期望专注于财务目标，而非营利组织和公共机构则专注于社会目标。除此之外，尽管有大量实证证据表明大多数企业同时追求多个目标（Meyer & Gupta, 1994；Obloj & Sengul, 2020），但组织仍被期望优先考虑单一目标，因为任何其他选择都会导致“混乱和目标缺失”（Jensen, 2002: 238；另见Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004）³。因此，财务目标和社会目标越来越被视为不相容（Brown, 2015）。
This overview of the evolution of the social construction of companies’ goals over the past centuries suggests that the distinction between financial and social goals is mainly a “vocabulary of motive” (Mills, 1940), which reflects the dominant norms and values of a given context at a particular point in time. This vocabulary directly translates into different perceptions of how compatible financial and social goals are (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Smith & Besharov, 2019). As appeals to make both goals central for companies become ubiquitous today, a fundamental question emerges: How can these calls translate into an actual change of norms and values that would make dual-purpose companies legitimate and accountable to both their owners and the society in which they operate? This shift is particularly challenging in a context where financial and social goals have become increasingly perceived as disconnected and conflicting. This overview of the evolution of companies’ goal social construction over the past centuries shows that the distinction between financial and social goals is mainly a “motive vocabulary” (Mills, 1940), reflecting the dominant norms and values of a specific context at a particular moment. This vocabulary directly translates into different perceptions of the compatibility between financial and social goals (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Smith & Besharov, 2019). As calls to make both goals central to companies have become widespread today, a fundamental question arises: How can these calls translate into an actual change in norms and values that would make dual-purpose companies legitimate and accountable to both their owners and the society they operate in? This shift is particularly challenging in a context where financial and social goals have become increasingly perceived as disconnected and conflicting.
The Salience of Financial/Social Trade-Offs
金融/社会权衡的显著性
In contemporary Western societies, the joint pursuit of financial and social goals exposes companies to multiple and potentially conflicting demands because these goals are perceived to belong to distinct institutional spheres (Brown, 2015). In the absence of agreement on whether such dual goals are legitimate, different stakeholders hold different views on what goals should be embraced, which results in the experience of intense trade-offs for companies. Take the example of the company Veja, which sells sneakers made with organic material (mainly rubber and cotton) sourced under fair trade and environmentally friendly conditions from small cooperatives in Brazil (Battilana, Pache, Sengul, & Kimsey, 2019). As Veja decides the price it will pay for the organic rubber and cotton that it purchases from the local cooperatives, it faces the difficult choice of satisfying the demand for better revenues from poor Brazilian producers that constitute these cooperatives (which were set up to serve as part of the company’s social goal) or satisfying the demand for higher profits from the shareholders of the company and for lower end prices from customers. 在当代西方社会，企业为追求财务和社会目标而共同努力，这使它们面临多重且可能相互冲突的要求，因为这些目标被认为属于不同的制度领域（Brown, 2015）。由于对于这种双重目标是否合理尚未达成共识，不同的利益相关者对应该追求哪些目标持有不同看法，这导致企业面临激烈的权衡取舍。以Veja公司为例，该公司销售采用有机材料（主要是橡胶和棉花）制成的运动鞋，这些材料来自巴西小型合作社，其采购遵循公平贸易和环保条件（Battilana, Pache, Sengul, & Kimsey, 2019）。当Veja决定向当地合作社采购有机橡胶和棉花的价格时，它面临着艰难的选择：是满足这些合作社（作为公司社会目标的一部分而设立）中贫困巴西生产商对更高收入的需求，还是满足公司股东对更高利润的需求以及客户对更低终端价格的需求。
Any company engaging today in the dual pursuit of financial and social goals is likely to experience such financial/social trade-offs. Satisficing the demands of some stakeholders may undermine the demands of others, which may be crucial to their survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This experience of financial/social trade-offs has important consequences for dual-purpose companies. Research suggests that, when faced with contradictions between financial and social demands, companies often end up prioritizing financial demands (Grimes et al., 2019). When this is the case, a dualpurpose company is less likely to be perceived as an appropriate vehicle to achieve social goals. In addition, the experience of financial/social tradeoffs may make the achievement of high levels of financial (or social) performance more difficult than it is for companies focusing only on financial (or social) goals. As such, companies that experience financial/social trade-offs are likely to be perceived as less legitimate than their single-purpose counterparts (Pache & Santos, 2013b). Moreover, even if a dual-purpose company manages to reach satisfactory levels of performance on both goals, the presence of trade-offs creates a higher risk for the company to be perceived by external or internal stakeholders as illegitimate (Hsu, 2006; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2005), because it deviates from the dominant template of what a company “should” be. The resulting perception of illegitimacy may translate into a higher risk of losing access to important resources, such as investments, talent, or authorization to operate. 任何今天同时追求财务和社会目标的公司都可能面临此类财务/社会权衡。满足部分利益相关者的要求可能会损害对公司生存至关重要的其他利益相关者的要求（Pfeffer & Salancik，1978）。这种财务/社会权衡的经历对双重目标公司有重要影响。研究表明，当面临财务和社会需求之间的矛盾时，公司往往会优先考虑财务需求（Grimes等人，2019）。在这种情况下，双重目标公司不太可能被视为实现社会目标的合适载体。此外，财务/社会权衡的经历可能会使公司更难实现高水平的财务（或社会）绩效，相比只专注于财务（或社会）目标的公司。因此，经历财务/社会权衡的公司可能会被认为不如单一目标公司合法（Pache & Santos，2013b）。此外，即使双重目标公司能够在两个目标上都达到令人满意的绩效水平，权衡的存在也会增加公司被外部或内部利益相关者视为不合法的风险（Hsu，2006；Rao、Monin & Durand，2005），因为它偏离了公司“应该”是什么的主导模板。由此产生的不合法性感知可能会转化为失去重要资源（如投资、人才或运营授权）的更高风险。
In the past decades, some scholars and business leaders have attempted to promote two alternative conceptions of dual-purpose companies to address the perceived incompatibility of financial and social goals.4 The first line of thinking has advocated that companies can alleviate societal ills by explicitly incorporating social goals into their objective function, such as shareholder welfare (Hart & Zingales, 2017) or enlightened shareholder value (Jensen, 2002). To do so, companies need to define clearly the “exchange rates” between the objectives and specify a corresponding aggregation rule (Obloj & Sengul, 2020). For example, a company producing sugar-rich products such as carbonated soft drinks needs to specify their internal exchange rates between lost profitability resulting from decreasing sugar content in their products and the possible beneficial impact of such change for youth obesity. However, this approach requires unrealistic levels of rationality and ignores the descriptive reality that organizations (and individuals) are incapable of integrating multiple goals into one composite metric (Simon, 1972). 在过去几十年中，一些学者和商业领袖试图推广双重目标公司的两种替代概念，以解决财务目标和社会目标之间明显的不兼容问题。4 第一种思路主张，公司可以通过明确将社会目标纳入其目标函数（例如股东福利（Hart & Zingales，2017）或开明股东价值（Jensen，2002））来缓解社会弊病。为此，公司需要明确定义目标之间的“汇率”并指定相应的汇总规则（Obloj & Sengul，2020）。例如，一家生产含糖产品（如碳酸饮料）的公司需要明确其产品中减少糖分含量导致的利润损失与这种变化对青少年肥胖可能产生的有益影响之间的内部汇率。然而，这种方法要求不切实际的理性水平，并且忽视了这样一个描述性现实：组织（和个人）无法将多个目标整合为一个综合指标（Simon，1972）。
The second line of thinking has suggested that companies can focus on win—win scenarios to overcome financial/social trade-offs (Freeman et al., 2020; Porter & Kramer, 2011). This line of thinking takes a positive (as opposed to normative) approach, considering when and how it may “pay to do good”—that is, when the achievement of social goals enhances a company’s financial performance (e.g., Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2013; Flammer, 2015; for reviews, see Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003). This stream thus suggests that CSR actions can lead companies to realize increased financial gains (Baron, 2001). There are circumstances in which this is the case. For example, employee wellness programs frequently both increase employee welfare and contribute to the company’s bottom line by reducing health care costs and absenteeism and increasing productivity (Porter & Kramer, 2011). However, as noted above, it is often impossible to make financial/social trade-offs disappear because these trade-offs are often inescapable (Hahn et al., 2010; Kaplan, 第二种思维方式认为企业可以通过关注双赢场景来克服财务/社会权衡（Freeman et al., 2020; Porter & Kramer, 2011）。这种思维方式采取积极（而非规范）的方法，考虑何时以及如何“行善有利可图”——即实现社会目标如何提升企业的财务业绩（例如，Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2013; Flammer, 2015; 综述见Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003）。因此，这一研究流认为企业社会责任行动可以带来更高的财务收益（Baron, 2001）。在某些情况下确实如此。例如，员工健康计划通常既能提高员工福利，又能通过降低医疗成本、减少缺勤和提高生产率来增加公司的利润（Porter & Kramer, 2011）。然而，如前所述，由于这些权衡往往不可避免（Hahn et al., 2010; Kaplan,
2019). Taken together, the existing approaches offer little guidance with respect to lessening the experience of financial/social trade-offs. 2019年）。综合来看，现有的方法对于减轻金融/社会权衡的体验几乎没有提供指导。
In this paper, we take a different approach. We posit that the key challenge for dual-purpose companies is to understand the conditions that shape the intensity of financial/social trade-offs that they experience and to find ways to mitigate them. As such, our theorizing departs from approaches that assume the presence of win—win scenarios and focus on making a business case for sustainability (Kaplan, 2020). Instead, our conceptualization of the challenges faced by dual-purpose companies is akin to the protagonist of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s (17951796) Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship and his efforts to embrace, in James March’s (2015: 34) words, “contradictory values wholeheartedly enough to discover ways of maintaining them, rather than simply determining their exchange rates.” Accordingly, we offer a perspective to understand the degree to which dual-purpose companies experience these trade-offs. 在本文中，我们采用了一种不同的方法。我们认为，双重目标公司面临的核心挑战在于理解形成其经历的财务/社会权衡强度的条件，并找到减轻这些权衡的方法。因此，我们的理论构建不同于那些假设存在双赢场景并专注于为可持续性建立商业案例的方法（Kaplan, 2020）。相反，我们对双重目标公司面临的挑战的概念化类似于约翰·沃尔夫冈·冯·歌德（1795-1796）的《威廉·迈斯特的学习时代》中的主人公，正如詹姆斯·马奇（2015: 34）所言，他“全心全意地拥抱相互矛盾的价值观，以发现维持这些价值观的方法，而不是简单地确定它们的交换率”。因此，我们提供了一个视角来理解双重目标公司经历这些权衡的程度。
IDENTIFYING THE CONDITIONS THAT AFFECT DUAL-PURPOSE COMPANIES’ EXPERIENCE OF FINANCIAL/SOCIAL TRADE-OFFS
识别影响双用途公司财务/社会权衡体验的条件
Institutional Conditions Affecting the Intensity of Financial/Social Trade-Offs 影响金融/社会权衡强度的制度条件
The experiences of financial/social trade-offs in dual-purpose companies are likely to be driven in important ways by the norms and values of the environments in which they operate (Wry & Zhao, 2018). Decades of research in institutional theory has shown that organizations are, in large part, the product of common understandings and shared interpretations of acceptable behavior in the social context in which they are embedded (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As such, companies tend to “reflect the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 341). Some of their core features are, at least in part, a reflection of the prevailing norms and values in their environments, enforced by public opinion and important institutional referents, such as regulatory bodies, schools, universities, and professional organizations (Scott, 2013). Complying with the dominant prescriptions in their environment is a way for companies to gain legitimacy and garner the resources that they need to operate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When it comes to defining what goals companies should pursue as well as how to get organized to pursue them, different environments thus come to take different behaviors for granted and prescribe different organizational templates (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). 双用途公司在财务/社会权衡方面的经验，在很大程度上可能受到其运营环境中的规范和价值观的驱动（Wry & Zhao, 2018）。制度理论数十年的研究表明，组织在很大程度上是其所处社会环境中可接受行为的共同理解和共享解释的产物（DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977）。因此，公司往往“反映其制度环境的神话，而非其工作活动的需求”（Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 341）。它们的一些核心特征，至少部分地，是其环境中盛行的规范和价值观的反映，这些规范和价值观由公众舆论以及重要的制度参照点（如监管机构、学校、大学和专业组织）所强化（Scott, 2013）。遵守其环境中的主导规范是公司获得合法性并获取运营所需资源的一种方式（DiMaggio & Powell, 1983）。当定义公司应该追求什么目标以及如何组织起来实现这些目标时，不同的环境会将不同的行为视为理所当然，并规定不同的组织模式（Greenwood & Hinings, 1996）。
The level of economic liberalism of societies plays a critical role in shaping the organizational templates that are considered as legitimate (Polanyi, 1944). Societies differ greatly regarding their level of economic liberalism as characterized by the nature and the extent of organization of private interests, their relation to the central state, and the manner and degree of interest concertation achieved (Scott & Meyer, 1991). This spurs considerable variation across nation states in the form and role of markets and companies (Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997). Accordingly, we focus on the level of economic liberalism of the institutional context in which dualpurpose companies operate. 社会的经济自由主义水平在塑造被视为合法的组织模式方面发挥着关键作用（Polanyi，1944）。不同社会的经济自由主义水平存在巨大差异，这种差异体现在私人利益组织的性质和程度、与中央国家的关系以及利益协调的方式和程度上（Scott & Meyer，1991）。这导致各国在市场和公司的形式与作用上存在相当大的差异（Hollingsworth & Boyer，1997）。因此，我们关注的是双重目标公司运营所处制度环境的经济自由主义水平。
Three key characteristics of liberal economies are pertinent to the experiences of financial/social trade-offs in dual-purpose companies. First, when it comes to organizing private interests, they primarily depend on market relationships that “are characterized by the arm’s-length exchange of goods or services in a context of competition and formal contracting” to coordinate their activities and build competencies (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 8). Non-market modes of coordination that entail more collaborative relationships and incomplete contracting are largely sidelined. Second, regarding the relation between the society and the state, non-state actors (including market actors) have a significant influence over the public realm (Dyson, 1980; Jepperson, 2002; see also Jepperson & Meyer, 1991).5 As a result, access to the public realm is less restricted to the state and more open to market actors in liberal economies (Cassirer, 1966). Finally, when it comes to the way in which interest concertation is achieved, the social organization of liberal economies is more emergent than planned (epperson, 2002), with emphasis being placed on the system of actions that stems from commitments and capacities of individual actors. 自由市场经济的三个关键特征与双重目标公司在金融/社会权衡方面的经验密切相关。首先，在组织私人利益方面，它们主要依赖市场关系，这些市场关系“以竞争和正式契约背景下的商品或服务独立交易为特征”，以协调活动并构建能力（Hall & Soskice, 2001: 8）。需要更具协作性和契约不完整的非市场协调模式在很大程度上被边缘化。其次，关于社会与国家的关系，非国家行为体（包括市场行为体）对公共领域有重大影响（Dyson, 1980; Jepperson, 2002; 另见 Jepperson & Meyer, 1991）。5 因此，在自由市场经济中，进入公共领域对国家的限制较少，而对市场行为体更为开放（Cassirer, 1966）。最后，在实现利益协调的方式上，自由市场经济的社会组织更多是自发形成而非计划的（Epperson, 2002），强调源于个体行为体的承诺和能力的行动体系。
We argue that the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by dual-purpose companies increases with the level of economic liberalism in the institutional setting in which they operate, for four main reasons. First, the reliance of liberal economies on markets for coordination directly implies a lesser role for other actors (such as regulatory agencies or trade associations) in their functioning. In the absence of involvement and negotiation of such coordinating actors, liberal economies are more likely to be fragmented institutional environments (Scott & Meyer, 1991). Demands and expectations of diverse stakeholders remain disparate, exposing companies to multiple and potentially conflicting demands, thus increasing the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs that they experience. 我们认为，出于四个主要原因，两用公司所面临的财务/社会权衡的强度会随着其运营所处制度环境中的经济自由主义程度的提高而增加。首先，自由经济体对市场协调的依赖直接意味着其他行为体（如监管机构或行业协会）在其运作中的作用较小。在缺乏此类协调行为体的参与和协商的情况下，自由经济体更可能是碎片化的制度环境（Scott & Meyer，1991）。不同利益相关者的需求和期望仍然参差不齐，使公司面临多重且可能相互冲突的要求，从而增加了它们所经历的财务/社会权衡的强度。
Second, and relatedly, non-market actors, such as regulatory agencies, NGOs, social movement organizations, and the press, are relatively less powerful in liberal economies and play a less salient role in monitoring companies’ actions. This is consequential for the experience of financial/social trade-offs because non-market actors can play an important role in counterbalancing the demands of market forces on the behavior of companies (Campbell, 2007; Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001), thereby reducing the perceived contradiction between financial and social demands for dual-purpose companies. In liberal economies, the relative weakness of these counter powers leaves market forces more dominant, thereby enhancing the perception of contradictions between financial and social goals, and in turn strengthening the experience of trade-offs by dual-purpose companies. 其次，与此相关的是，在自由市场经济体中，监管机构、非政府组织、社会运动组织和媒体等非市场行为体的权力相对较弱，在监督企业行为方面发挥的作用也不够显著。这对金融/社会权衡的体验具有重要影响，因为非市场行为体可以在平衡市场力量对企业行为的要求方面发挥重要作用（Campbell, 2007; Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001），从而减少企业在金融和社会需求之间的感知矛盾。在自由市场经济体中，这些制衡力量的相对弱势使得市场力量更占主导地位，从而增强了金融目标与社会目标之间的矛盾感知，进而强化了双重目标企业对权衡的体验。
Third, normative pressures for companies to comply with the financial goals promoted by market logic are stronger in liberal economies. In general, organizational solutions to organizational problems are affected by the norms institutionalized in business elite networks as well as through academic institutions, professional groups (e.g., trade or employer associations), workers’ responses (including unions), and/or broader community groups (Campbell, 2007; Guillén, 1994). In more liberal economies, the combination of fragmentation and weaker influence of non-market actors is likely to make market forces particularly salient. For example, the state’s ability to push for a greater emphasis on societal goals, like reducing unemployment, improving the environment, and increasing equality, is diminished. In these contexts, companies embracing social goals in addition to financial ones are thus more likely to be perceived as deviating from the dominant norms and to be sanctioned for that deviance. In turn, they are likely to experience financial/ social trade-offs with more intensity. 第三，在自由市场经济体中，企业遵守市场逻辑所倡导的财务目标的规范性压力更大。一般而言，组织问题的组织解决方案会受到商业精英网络中制度化的规范的影响，同时也会通过学术机构、专业团体（例如行业或雇主协会）、工人的回应（包括工会）和/或更广泛的社区团体（Campbell, 2007; Guillén, 1994）产生影响。在更自由的经济体中，分散化和非市场行为体影响力较弱的结合，可能会使市场力量变得尤为突出。例如，国家推动更强调社会目标（如减少失业、改善环境和增进平等）的能力有所减弱。在这些背景下，企业在追求财务目标的同时兼顾社会目标，更有可能被视为偏离主流规范，并因此受到制裁。反过来，它们更有可能更强烈地面临财务/社会方面的权衡。
Finally, the belief in well-functioning and efficient free market mechanisms, which provides the ideological foundation for economic liberalism, has come to be associated with the norm of maximizing shareholder value by companies. The process of financialization of companies has been backed by the taken-for-granted beliefs that rational action requires “a single-valued objective” and that maximizing shareholder value is the best way to “enhance the well-being of society” (Davis & Kim, 2015: 2009). Accordingly, the greater embeddedness in economic liberalism characterized by arm’slength transactions and dependence on contractual relationships has led to a stronger salience of financial motives (Polanyi, 1944; Epstein, 2005). This, in turn, intensifies the experience of financial/social tradeoffs by dual-purpose companies. Taken together, we thus propose: 最后，对运作良好且高效的自由市场机制的信念——它为经济自由主义提供了意识形态基础——已与企业最大化股东价值的准则联系在一起。企业金融化进程得到了一些理所当然的信念的支持，即理性行动需要“单一目标”，而最大化股东价值是“增进社会福祉”的最佳途径（Davis & Kim，2015：2009）。因此，以臂长交易（arm’slength transactions）和依赖契约关系为特征的经济自由主义的更深嵌入，导致了金融动机的更显著凸显（Polanyi，1944；Epstein，2005）。这反过来又加剧了兼具双重目标的企业的金融/社会权衡体验。综上所述，我们因此提出：
Proposition 1. The intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by dual-purpose companies increases with the level of the economic liberalism of the institutional setting in which they operate. 命题1. 兼具双重目标的公司所面临的金融/社会权衡强度，随着其运营所处制度环境的经济自由主义程度的提高而增加。
The Role of Organizational-Level Factors in Mitigating the Experience of Financial/Social Trade-Offs in Dual-Purpose Companies
组织层面因素在减轻双重目标公司金融/社会权衡体验中的作用
Organizations do not experience the environmental demands of a given context in a uniform fashion, since institutional processes are filtered and enacted differently by different organizations (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Lounsbury, 2001). Organizations are not mere instantiations of environmental demands, but, rather, are “places where people and groups (agentic actors, not ‘institutional dopes’) make sense of, and interpret, institutional ‘vocabularies of motive’” (Binder, 2007: 551). Thus, organizations can be seen as a set of attributes that filter institutional pressures (Greenwood et al., 2011). These filters include a variety of organizational attributes, such as hiring policies, incentives, or board structures, whose forms have been shown to vary greatly across organizations (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996). In turn, these differences influence how organizational members experience and respond to environmental demands, thereby shaping organizations’ internal dynamics, including interests, values, power dependencies, and capacity for action (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). 组织不会以统一的方式体验特定环境的需求，因为不同的组织会以不同的方式过滤和施行制度性过程（Greenwood & Hinings，1996；Hallett & Ventresca，2006；Lounsbury，2001）。组织不仅仅是环境需求的简单体现，相反，它们是“人们和群体（能动的行动者，而非‘制度傀儡’）理解和解读制度‘动机词汇’的场所”（Binder，2007：551）。因此，组织可以被视为一组过滤制度压力的属性（Greenwood et al.，2011）。这些过滤包括各种组织属性，例如招聘政策、激励机制或董事会结构，其形式已被证明在不同组织中存在巨大差异（Kraatz & Zajac，1996）。反过来，这些差异会影响组织成员体验和应对环境需求的方式，从而塑造组织的内部动态，包括利益、价值观、权力依存关系以及行动能力（Greenwood & Hinings，1996）。
Building on these observations, we propose that specific organizational attributes filter the influence of the institutional context on the experience of financial/social trade-offs in dual-purpose companies. With this inquiry, we do not aim to depict a world where certain organizational attributes could make trade-offs disappear or allow dual-purpose companies to avoid them. As we noted earlier, financial/social trade-offs are often unescapable, especially in more economically liberal economies. We instead argue that dual-purpose companies that operate in the same institutional setting but have different sets of organizational attributes are likely to experience these trade-offs with varying degrees of intensity. 基于这些观察，我们提出，特定的组织属性会过滤制度环境对兼具双重目标的公司在财务/社会权衡经验的影响。通过这项研究，我们并非旨在描绘一个特定组织属性能够消除权衡或让双重目标公司避免权衡的世界。正如我们之前所指出的，财务/社会权衡往往是难以避免的，在经济更为自由的经济体中尤其如此。相反，我们认为，在相同制度环境下运营但具有不同组织属性组合的双重目标公司，可能会以不同程度的强度经历这些权衡。
Out of the organizational attributes that participate in filtering environmental pressures, governance arrangements play a critical role (Greenwood et al., 2011) because they are concerned with questions of organizational purpose and control (Selznick, 1992). They define three essential pillars of the organization: (1) the ends toward which the organization is directed, (2) the people who make key decisions in the organization, and (3) the means employed to achieve the desired ends (Kraatz & Block, 2008). As such, they inscribe value commitments into organizational features (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), where “value commitments” refers to widely shared assumptions about “the nature of the enterprise—its distinct aims, methods, and role in the community” (Selznick, 1957: 55). In the context of dual-purpose companies, which, by definition, embrace both financial and social purposes at their core, these value commitments serve as a compass as these companies navigate competing conceptions about what goals they should pursue and how these goals should be achieved. Governance arrangements thus play a critical role when it comes to shaping the experience of trade-offs by organizational members because, by assigning value to specific goals and means, they can help lessen internally tensions that are unsettled within the broader environment. 在参与过滤环境压力的组织属性中，治理安排发挥着关键作用（Greenwood等人，2011），因为它们涉及组织目标和控制的问题（Selznick，1992）。它们定义了组织的三个基本支柱：（1）组织所指向的目标，（2）在组织中做出关键决策的人员，以及（3）实现预期目标所采用的手段（Kraatz & Block，2008）。因此，它们将价值承诺纳入组织特征中（Greenwood & Hinings，1996），其中“价值承诺”指的是关于“企业的本质——其独特目标、方法以及在社区中的作用”的广泛共识（Selznick，1957：55）。在双重目标公司的背景下——这类公司根据定义，其核心同时包含财务和社会目标——这些价值承诺充当着指南针的作用，帮助这些公司在关于应追求何种目标以及如何实现目标的不同观念之间进行抉择。因此，治理安排在塑造组织成员的权衡经验方面发挥着关键作用，因为通过为特定目标和手段赋予价值，它们可以帮助减轻组织内部的紧张关系，而这些紧张关系在更广泛的环境中可能尚未得到解决。
Accordingly, we theorize that governance arrangements filter the influence of the institutional context on the experience of financial/social trade-offs in dual-purpose companies. More specifically, we focus on the three governance pillars that we defined above. Below, we highlight the ways in which each of these pillars and corresponding arrangements can contribute to strengthening the commitment of a company to its dual purpose. In doing so, they may filter some of the tensions that are imposed on the company by its external environment and thereby reduce the experience of trade-offs. 因此，我们提出理论认为，治理安排会过滤制度背景对双重目标公司在金融/社会权衡经验中的影响。更具体地说，我们聚焦于上述定义的三大治理支柱。下文将重点阐述这些支柱及其相应安排如何有助于增强公司对其双重目标的承诺。通过这样做，它们可能会过滤掉公司外部环境施加的部分张力，从而减轻权衡的体验。
Goal setting. Governance arrangements defining organizational ends pertain to the way in which organizational goals are set. Organizational goals communicate what the organization stands for and help clarify whether an organization’s actions and choices are aligned with its objectives, for both those inside and outside the company—employees, customers, contractors, investors, regulators, and shareholders alike. When goals are specific and explicit, they affect actions and choices through multiple mechanisms, including directing thinking and behavior to relevant activities and away from irrelevant ones, energizing people to exert more effort, directing attention and resource allocations, and increasing persistence in prolonged efforts (see Locke & Latham, 2002, for a review). 目标设定。定义组织目标的治理安排涉及组织目标的设定方式。组织目标传达了组织的立场，并有助于明确组织的行动和选择是否与其目标一致，这对公司内外的所有人——员工、客户、承包商、投资者、监管机构和股东——都是如此。当目标具体明确时，它们会通过多种机制影响行动和选择，包括将思维和行为引导至相关活动而非无关活动、激励人们付出更多努力、引导注意力和资源分配，以及增强持续长期努力的毅力（有关综述，见Locke & Latham, 2002）。
The way in which organizational goals are set is particularly important and challenging for dualpurpose companies. This is because, more than their single-purpose peers, they attempt to embrace both financial and social purposes at their core, which introduces complexity inside the organization and exposes organizational members to multiple and potentially conflicting demands. Hence, translating organizational purpose into specific organizational goals is a daunting task for dual-purpose companies. To address this challenge, some dual-purpose companies set specific financial and social goals, some set specific financial goals similar to many of their competitors and limit the statement of their social goals to a mere aspiration, and others state a general intention to embrace a dual purpose, without setting specific financial and social goals. 对于双重目标公司而言，组织目标的设定方式尤为重要且具有挑战性。这是因为，与单一目标公司相比，它们更试图将财务目标和社会目标作为核心予以兼顾，这会在组织内部引入复杂性，并使组织成员面临多种甚至可能相互冲突的要求。因此，将组织使命转化为具体的组织目标对双重目标公司而言是一项艰巨的任务。为应对这一挑战，一些双重目标公司会设定具体的财务和社会目标，一些公司则设定与许多竞争对手相似的具体财务目标，并将社会目标的表述仅限制为一种愿望，还有一些公司只是表明拥抱双重目标的总体意向，而不设定具体的财务和社会目标。
Research in organizational studies suggests that the absence of specific social goals alongside financial ones is consequential for dual-purpose companies because, when this is the case, they are likely to give priority to their financial goals (Battilana, 2018). Prioritization of financial targets may result from the “cult of efficiency,” which leads organizations to overemphasize the actions, operational procedures, and technologies that increase financial outcomes (Selznick, 1957). In a company where organizational members predominantly adhere to financial logic because of their training or past experience, prioritization of financial targets may also result from perception of financial outcomes as more legitimate and deserving more attention (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Alternatively, dual-purpose companies may give priority to social outcomes through their goal setting, thereby lose sight of financial outcomes, and run the risk of bankruptcy. This may happen when organizational members predominantly adhere to the social logic and emphasize the social purpose of the company (Pache, Battilana, & Spencer, 2019). 组织研究领域的研究表明，对于兼具双重目标的公司而言，若缺乏特定的社会目标，仅关注财务目标会产生严重后果，因为在这种情况下，它们很可能会优先考虑财务目标（Battilana，2018）。对财务目标的优先考虑可能源于“效率崇拜”，这种观念会促使组织过度强调那些能提升财务成果的行动、操作流程和技术（Selznick，1957）。在一个组织成员因培训或过往经验而主要遵循财务逻辑的公司中，对财务目标的优先考虑也可能源于将财务成果视为更具合法性且更值得关注（Friedland & Alford，1991；Thornton & Ocasio，1999）。此外，双重目标公司也可能通过目标设定优先考虑社会成果，从而忽视财务成果，并面临破产的风险。当组织成员主要遵循社会逻辑，强调公司的社会目标时，这种情况就可能发生（Pache，Battilana，& Spencer，2019）。
We argue that the presence of specific and explicit financial and social goals serves as an important factor that filters the influence of the institutional setting on the experience of the financial/social trade-offs by dual-purpose companies. This is because the presence of such specific and explicit goals helps challenge the taken-for-grantedness of a sole institutional logic promoting and drawing attention to a single purpose. By infusing values aligned with the company’s dual purpose, the setting of dual goals affects the “distinctive outlooks, habits, and other commitments” of the company, and may color “all aspect of organization life and [lend] it a social integration that goes well beyond formal coordination and command” (Selznick, 1957: 40). Furthermore, by explicitly setting both types of goals, a company commits publicly to pursuing both of them (Battilana et al., 2019). In doing so, it reduces the ambiguity and risk of decoupling that may be associated with such a joint pursuit (Crilly, Zollo, & Hansen, 2012). Thus, setting specific and explicit financial and social goals clearly states to both internal and external stakeholders the organization’s value commitments, thereby mitigating the financial/social trade-offs experienced by dual-purpose companies. Accordingly, we propose: 我们认为，特定且明确的财务和社会目标的存在，是过滤制度环境对双重目标公司在财务/社会权衡经验中产生影响的重要因素。这是因为，这类特定且明确的目标有助于挑战单一制度逻辑的想当然性——这种逻辑会推动并吸引对单一目标的关注。通过融入与公司双重目标一致的价值观，双重目标的设定会影响公司的“独特视角、习惯和其他承诺”，并可能“为组织生活的各个方面着色，赋予其一种远超出正式协调与指挥的社会整合”（塞尔兹尼克，1957：40）。此外，通过明确设定这两类目标，公司会公开承诺同时追求这两个目标（巴蒂拉纳等人，2019）。通过这样做，它减少了与这种联合追求相关的模糊性和脱钩风险（克illy、佐洛和汉森，2012）。因此，设定特定且明确的财务和社会目标，能向内部和外部利益相关者清晰传达组织的价值承诺，从而减轻双重目标公司所经历的财务/社会权衡。因此，我们提出：
Proposition 2a. Holding the level of economic liberalism constant, the more specific and explicit the financial and social goals of a dual-purpose company are, the lower the intensity of the financial/social tradeoffs experienced by the company. 命题2a。在经济自由主义水平保持不变的情况下，双重目标公司的财务和社会目标越具体明确，公司所经历的财务/社会权衡强度就越低。
A distinct and equally important aspect of goal setting in dual-purpose companies is its “time horizon,” which encompasses “that distance into the future to which a decision-maker looks when evaluating the consequences of a proposed action” (Ebert & Piehl, 1973: 35). Mirroring individual-level biases such as hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Dasgupta & Maskin, 2005), studies suggest that managers tend to excessively discount projects with long time horizons (Levinthal & March, 1993). This resonates with the propensity to overvalue instant gratification, which is particularly strong in dynamic decisionmaking contexts (Herrnstein, Loewenstein, Prelec, & Vaughan, 1993), such as those faced by dualpurpose companies. 在双重目标公司的目标设定中，一个截然不同且同样重要的方面是其“时间跨度”，即“决策者在评估一项拟议行动的后果时所展望的未来距离”（Ebert & Piehl，1973：35）。正如个体层面的偏差（如双曲线贴现，例如Dasgupta & Maskin，2005）所反映的，研究表明管理者往往会过度贴现具有较长时间跨度的项目（Levinthal & March，1993）。这与过度重视即时满足的倾向相呼应，而这种倾向在动态决策环境（如双重目标公司面临的情况）中尤为强烈（Herrnstein，Loewenstein，Prelec，& Vaughan，1993）。
Although focusing on long-term outcomes has become a general recommendation for any type of organization, consideration of time horizon is especially important for dual-purpose companies because, as Geradts, Battilana, and Kimsey (2018) documented in the context of a large multinational, adopting a longer time horizon may result in a lessened experience of financial/social trade-offs. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the trade-offs inherent to the pursuit of dual goals are likely to be stronger in the short term than in the long term. This is because social performance tends to be less amenable to shortterm influencing than financial performance, particularly if it involves behavioral or environmental changes (Kim, Bansal, & Haugh, 2019). For example, substantial changes in the condition of the beneficiaries of a social intervention may take time, whether they involve an improvement in their health, in their economic situation, or in their mastery of new skills. Similarly, many changes in environmental conditions—such as reductions in carbon emissions—can only occur over long periods of time. As investments leading to increased social performance may involve short-term financial costs (and vice versa), companies that operate with a short-term horizon may be more liable to decision-making stalemates and mission drift. Slawinski and Bansal (2015) documented that, in Canada, as oil sands companies attempted to respond to growing pressures to address climate change, those that treated its long-term implications as separate from their short-term decision-making focused on lowering costs, even when this led to more greenhouse gas emissions. 尽管关注长期成果已成为对任何类型组织的普遍建议，但时间跨度的考量对双重目标型企业尤为重要，因为正如Geradts、Battilana和Kimsey（2018）在大型跨国企业背景下所记录的那样，采用更长的时间跨度可能会减轻财务/社会权衡的感受。这有至少两个原因。首先，追求双重目标所固有的权衡在短期内可能比长期内更为强烈。这是因为社会绩效往往比财务绩效更难以在短期内受到影响，特别是如果它涉及行为或环境变化（Kim、Bansal和Haugh，2019）。例如，社会干预受益人的状况发生实质性变化可能需要时间，无论这些变化涉及他们的健康改善、经济状况改善还是新技能掌握。同样，许多环境条件的变化——如碳排放减少——只能在很长一段时间内发生。由于导致社会绩效提升的投资可能涉及短期财务成本（反之亦然），采用短期时间跨度运营的公司可能更容易陷入决策僵局和使命漂移。Slawinski和Bansal（2015）记录称，在加拿大，当油砂公司试图应对日益增长的应对气候变化压力时，那些将长期影响与短期决策分开对待的公司专注于降低成本，即使这导致了更多的温室气体排放。
Second, and relatedly, the commitment value of organizational goals increases with their time horizon. When organizational goals of a dual-purpose company have a short time horizon, organizational members are likely to anticipate that the priorities of the company may shift in the near future. When this is the case, the company’s ability to build its dualpurpose into its social structure will be reduced. Furthermore, a dual-purpose company that adopts a short time horizon in its goal setting is more likely to be assessed by the dominant norms and values of its institutional environment, rather than its own distinct competencies and position. This exposes the company to conflicting demands, especially in settings where the pursuit of social goals is considered illegitimate. However, as Kraatz and Block (2008: 248) noted, organizational legitimacy problems that a pluralistic organization (such as a dual-purpose company) faces “may be mitigated, transformed, or even eliminated” if it is able to forge a durable identity of its own and emerge as an institution in its own right. This is only possible if the company credibly commits to its unique identity by adopting a long time horizon in its goal pursuit, because each organization is held “hostage to [its] own history” (Selznick, 1992: 232). Hence, the presence of specific and explicit financial and social organizational goals is further reinforced in mitigating legitimacy concerns that underlie the financial/social trade-offs when they have a long time horizon. Accordingly, we propose: 其次，相关地，组织目标的承诺价值会随着其时间跨度的增加而提升。当一家双重目标公司的组织目标时间跨度较短时，组织成员可能会预期公司的优先级在不久的将来可能会发生转变。在这种情况下，公司将其双重目标融入社会结构的能力将会降低。此外，在目标设定中采用短时间跨度的双重目标公司，更有可能受到其制度环境中主导规范和价值观的评估，而非其自身独特的能力和地位。这会使公司面临相互冲突的要求，尤其是在追求社会目标被视为不合法的环境中。然而，正如Kraatz和Block（2008：248）所指出的，如果多元化组织（如双重目标公司）能够塑造自身持久的身份并以自身的身份成为一个机构，那么它所面临的组织合法性问题“可能会得到缓解、转变甚至消除”。只有当公司通过在目标追求中采用较长的时间跨度来可靠地承诺其独特身份时，这才有可能实现，因为每个组织都被“其自身的历史所束缚”（Selznick，1992：232）。因此，当具有较长时间跨度时，特定且明确的财务和社会组织目标的存在，进一步强化了对缓解财务/社会权衡背后的合法性担忧的作用。因此，我们提出：
Proposition 2b. Holding the level of economic liberalism constant, the longer the time horizon of financial and social goals of a dual-purpose company, the lower the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by the company. 命题2b。在经济自由主义水平保持不变的情况下，双重目标公司的财务和社会目标的时间跨度越长，公司所面临的财务/社会权衡强度越低。
Composition of leadership. The people who make key decisions in an organization play a critical part in its governance. Accordingly, research on governance arrangements has traditionally focused on the profiles and roles of people at the apex of the organization. The importance of the top management team was reflected in the title of the catalytic work of Hambrick and Mason (1984) on strategic leadership, “Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers.” A rich body of research has since explored when and how corporate executives influence organizational choices and outcomes (see Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009, for a review). 领导团队构成。在组织中做出关键决策的人员在其治理中发挥着关键作用。因此，关于治理安排的研究传统上侧重于组织高层人员的背景和角色。高层管理团队的重要性在Hambrick和Mason（1984）关于战略领导的开创性著作《高层梯队：作为其高层管理者反映的组织》的标题中得到了体现。此后，大量研究探索了企业高管何时以及如何影响组织选择和结果（Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009的综述）。
In dual-purpose companies, top executives may be especially consequential, for two main reasons. First, top executives play a central role in filtering separate and often conflicting demands stemming from the company’s various stakeholders. It is their responsibility to mobilize support from a wide range of external stakeholders that may help the company achieve its dual goals, such as investors, suppliers, and business partners, as well as governments and NGOs. Depending on the degree to which the external environment supports dual goals, top executives may also make the case for the legitimacy of their company’s dual purpose to key external stakeholders (regulators, investors, etc.) to obtain favorable evaluations. Second, they play a central role in channeling the company’s resources to both financial and social goals. Top executives can thus translate the company’s dual purpose into actionable activities, and, when financial and social goals come into conflict in the enactment of these activities, they can ensure that neither goal is abandoned. 在兼具双重目标的公司中，高管层可能尤为关键，原因主要有两点。首先，高管层在过滤来自公司不同利益相关者的各种独立且常相互冲突的诉求方面发挥着核心作用。他们有责任动员广泛外部利益相关者的支持，这些利益相关者可能助力公司实现双重目标，例如投资者、供应商、商业伙伴，以及政府和非政府组织。根据外部环境对双重目标的支持程度，高管层还可能向关键外部利益相关者（如监管机构、投资者等）阐述其公司双重目标的合法性，以获得有利评价。其次，高管层在将公司资源调配至财务目标和社会目标方面也发挥着核心作用。因此，高管层能够将公司的双重目标转化为可执行的行动，并且当在执行这些行动时财务目标与社会目标出现冲突时，他们能够确保两个目标都不被放弃。
This complex role can be enacted more or less aptly depending on the profile of top executives. More specifically, we argue that “hybrid” top executives (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; McGivern, Currie, Ferlie, Fitzgerald, & Waring, 2015), who have been socialized in both financial and social logic through prior experience and/or training, are more able to deal with the multiple external demands that dualpurpose company face, compared with those managers who have been solely exposed to one type of logic. “Socialization” consists of the transmission of work skills, norms, and values that characterize the various organizational settings in which people have worked throughout their career (Feldman, 1981). As such, it shapes individuals’ perspectives (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). A recent study of a cooperative bank showed that, following the acquisition of a typical commercial bank, an influx of new organizational members who had not been socialized in both the financial and social logics threatened the cooperative’s ability to pursue its dual purpose. It was able to overcome this challenge by putting decisionmaking power in the hands of managers who had been socialized into both logics (Bacq, Battilana, & Bovais, 2018). This suggests that hybrid executives are more attune to the norms and vocabularies associated with both the financial and social logics (Pache & Santos, 2013a; Lee & Battilana, 2020), enabling them to interact in an intelligible way with organizational members and external stakeholders who may predominantly adhere to one of the two logics. As such, hybrid top executives play a valuable bridging role (Besharov, 2014), enabling them to mitigate financial/social trade-offs as they emerge. We therefore propose: This complex role can be enacted more or less aptly depending on the profile of top executives. More specifically, we argue that “hybrid” top executives (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; McGivern, Currie, Ferlie, Fitzgerald, & Waring, 2015), who have been socialized in both financial and social logic through prior experience and/or training, are more able to deal with the multiple external demands that dual-purpose companies face, compared with those managers who have been solely exposed to one type of logic. “Socialization” consists of the transmission of work skills, norms, and values that characterize the various organizational settings in which people have worked throughout their career (Feldman, 1981). As such, it shapes individuals’ perspectives (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). A recent study of a cooperative bank showed that, following the acquisition of a typical commercial bank, an influx of new organizational members who had not been socialized in both the financial and social logics threatened the cooperative’s ability to pursue its dual purpose. It was able to overcome this challenge by putting decision-making power in the hands of managers who had been socialized into both logics (Bacq, Battilana, & Bovais, 2018). This suggests that hybrid executives are more attuned to the norms and vocabularies associated with both the financial and social logics (Pache & Santos, 2013a; Lee & Battilana, 2020), enabling them to interact in an intelligible way with organizational members and external stakeholders who may predominantly adhere to one of the two logics. As such, hybrid top executives play a valuable bridging role (Besharov, 2014), enabling them to mitigate financial/social trade-offs as they emerge. We therefore propose:
Proposition 3a. Holding the level of economic liberalism constant, the more that top executives of a dualpurpose company are socialized in both financial and social logics, the lower the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by the company. 命题3a。在经济自由主义水平不变的情况下，兼具金融和社会逻辑社会化特征的双重目标公司高管越多，公司经历的金融/社会权衡强度越低。
In addition to top executives, board members also play a key role in filtering institutional pressures in companies that have a board of directors, including most large and all publicly traded companies. The board helps the company to balance its goals by mitigating agency problems caused by the separation of ownership and control and by providing resources such as advice, counsel, legitimacy, information, or support from external actors (see Hillman & Dalziel, 2003, for a review). Moreover, by articulating for what a company is accountable as well as to whom it is primarily accountable (Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014), the board helps the company set some of its fundamental value commitments. 除了高管之外，在设有董事会的公司（包括大多数大型公司和所有上市公司）中，董事会成员也在过滤机构压力方面发挥着关键作用。董事会通过缓解因所有权与控制权分离而产生的代理问题，并通过提供建议、咨询、合法性、信息或来自外部行为者的支持等资源，帮助公司平衡其目标（Hillman & Dalziel, 2003 的综述）。此外，董事会通过明确公司对谁负责以及主要对谁负责（Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014），帮助公司确立一些基本的价值承诺。
As the guardians of organizational purpose, board members help the company maintain these commitments through their role in the allocation of the requisite attention to a limited number of critical organizational issues (Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & 作为组织目标的守护者，董事会成员通过在有限的关键组织问题上分配必要的注意力这一角色，帮助公司维持这些承诺（Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, &
Bierman, 2010). Decision-makers’ sustained attention to organizational goals is a requirement for their successful execution. This is because, according to the attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997), organizational attention affects firm behavior and strategy by establishing which issues and pressures decision-makers perceive and prioritize, and their corresponding actions. Hence, the board serves as a conduit through which pressures from the institutional environment are represented, interpreted, and examined. Bierman, 2010）。决策者对组织目标的持续关注是其成功执行的必要条件。这是因为，根据基于注意力的企业观（Ocasio，1997），组织注意力通过确定决策者感知和优先考虑的问题及压力，以及他们相应的行动，来影响企业行为和战略。因此，董事会作为一个渠道，通过它，制度环境的压力得以体现、解读和审视。
Board members play a key role in enabling or inhibiting the pursuit of financial and social goals in dual-purpose companies (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). The extent to which board members focus on various dimension of performance, how they attribute weights to financial and social outcomes, and how they prioritize their internal and external relationships is likely to affect the extent to which the institutional environment in which a dualpurpose company operates shapes its experience of financial/social trade-offs. Furthermore, boards play a crucial role in structuring the representation of the interests of all stakeholders, through providing resources and access that enable pursuit of financial and social performance and subsequently monitoring that the interests of multiple stakeholders are represented. 董事会成员在推动或阻碍双重目标公司（Forbes & Milliken，1999）追求财务和社会目标方面发挥着关键作用。董事会成员对绩效各个维度的关注程度、对财务和社会结果的权重分配方式，以及对内部和外部关系的优先排序，都可能影响双重目标公司所处的制度环境塑造其财务/社会权衡经验的程度。此外，董事会通过提供资源和获取途径来支持追求财务和社会绩效，并随后监督多方利益相关者的利益得到代表，在构建所有利益相关者利益的代表性方面发挥着至关重要的作用。
Thus, board members’ sustained attention to dual organizational goals is essential in the process of arbitrating the financial/social trade-offs inherent to most strategic decisions (Wry & Zhao, 2018). Dual-purpose companies are better shielded from institutional pressures when board members are committed to both financial and social goals, allocate the requisite attention to both, and hold the company accountable for both. Indeed, a comparative study on French work integration social enterprises suggested that, in organizations where board members manage to maintain their attention on both social and financial goals because they collectively represent both financial and social logics, the experience of financial/social trade-offs may be lessened (Pache et al., 2019). We thus propose: 因此，在仲裁大多数战略决策中固有的财务/社会权衡过程中，董事会成员对双重组织目标的持续关注至关重要（Wry & Zhao，2018）。当董事会成员同时致力于财务和社会目标、对两者都投入必要的关注，并要求公司对两者都负责时，兼具双重目标的公司能更好地抵御制度压力。事实上，对法国工作整合社会企业的一项比较研究表明，在董事会成员能够通过集体代表财务和社会逻辑而保持对社会和财务目标的关注的组织中，财务/社会权衡的影响可能会减轻（Pache et al.，2019）。因此，我们提出：
Proposition 3b. Holding the level of economic liberalism constant, the more the attention of the board is focused on the achievement of both financial and social goals, the lower the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by dualpurpose companies. 命题3b。在经济自由主义水平保持不变的情况下，董事会对财务和社会目标实现的关注程度越高，兼具双重目标的公司所经历的财务/社会权衡强度就越低。
Compensation of organizational members. Governance arrangements defining means to achieve organizational ends build fundamentally on organizational members—in particular, how they are selected and incentivized. This is because organizational ends are ultimately achieved through the actions and choices of organizational members who execute the activities required for the organization to exist and function as intended. In addition to the technological aspects of the task environment, the alignment of organizational members throughout the organizational hierarchy with the goals and values of the organization is thus consequential as a means to achieve organizational ends. Such an alignment reduces not only monitoring costs by complementing formal control mechanisms but also the intensity of the tradeoffs experienced inside the organization. 组织成员的薪酬。定义实现组织目标的治理安排，从根本上建立在组织成员的基础上——特别是他们如何被选拔和激励。这是因为组织目标最终是通过组织成员的行动和选择来实现的，这些成员执行组织存在和按预期运作所需的活动。除了任务环境的技术方面外，组织成员在整个组织层级中与组织目标和价值观的对齐，因此作为实现组织目标的一种手段，具有重要意义。这种对齐不仅通过补充正式的控制机制来降低监控成本，还减少了组织内部经历的权衡的强度。
Dating at least back to Barnard (1938), monetary incentives (such as pay for performance) and nonmonetary incentives (such as awards, promotions, and status-granting perks) have long been recognized to play a key role in socializing and setting direction, and hence contribute to creating and fostering shared goals and values for organizational members (see Gibbons, 2005, for a review). Through their sorting properties (e.g., affecting who joins and who stays with a focal organization), incentive systems also affect organizational identity and intraorganizational dynamics. As such, incentives act as a buffer to environmental influences, as they clearly state internal expectations and potentially decouple them from external ones when they are in conflict. 至少可以追溯到巴纳德（1938年），货币激励（如绩效薪酬）和非货币激励（如奖励、晋升和赋予地位的福利）长期以来被认为在社会化和设定方向方面发挥关键作用，因此有助于为组织成员创造和培养共同目标和价值观（Gibbons，2005年的综述）。通过其筛选特性（例如，影响谁加入和谁留在核心组织中），激励系统还会影响组织认同和组织内部动态。因此，激励机制充当了环境影响的缓冲器，因为它们明确地阐述了内部期望，并在与外部期望冲突时可能将其与外部期望分离。
Dual-purpose companies that set incentives tying rewards to performance on both financial and social dimensions may thus be better shielded from the experience of financial/social trade-offs than those companies that do not set explicit incentives or that tie rewards solely to financial or social performance (Flammer, Hong, & Minor, 2019). However, while setting such dual incentives is intuitive, their desired level of “power,” which refers to the strength of the link between performance and rewards, is not straightforward.6 Building on a growing literature that argues that an excessive reliance on incentives as a motivating device may offset the incentives’ potential benefits (e.g., Gubler, Larkin, & Pierce, 因此，那些将激励措施与财务和社会两个维度的绩效挂钩的两用型公司，可能比那些不设置明确激励措施或仅将奖励与财务或社会绩效挂钩的公司，更好地避免了财务/社会权衡的困境（Flammer, Hong, & Minor, 2019）。然而，尽管设置此类双重激励措施看似直观，但它们期望的“力度”（即绩效与奖励之间联系的强度）并不明确。6 基于越来越多的文献认为过度依赖激励作为一种激励手段可能抵消激励的潜在益处（例如，Gubler, Larkin, & Pierce,
2016; Obloj & Sengul, 2012), we contend that the experience of financial/social trade-offs may be attenuated when organizational members are rewarded for the attainment of financial and social goals with moderate, instead of strong (i.e., highpowered), incentives, for two main reasons: (1) multi-task distortion and (2) crowding out. 2016; Obloj & Sengul, 2012），我们认为，当组织成员因实现财务和社会目标而获得适度而非强烈（即高激励）的奖励时，财务/社会权衡的体验可能会减弱，原因有二：（1）多任务扭曲和（2）挤出效应。
Multi-task distortions, which arise due to asymmetry in the extent to which different tasks or metrics associated with goals can be measured (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991), are particularly strong for dual-purpose companies. This is because financial metrics are often perceived to be more easily measurable than social ones (Delmas & Blass, 2010). Such asymmetry in measurability distorts the focus of organizational members toward financial metrics as the basis of their compensation. As a result, strong incentives, even ones that put equal weights on financial and social metrics, may actually backfire. In parallel, crowding out, which arises when extrinsic rewards lead to dampened intrinsic motivation for a particular course of action, is also a highly salient issue in dual-purpose companies. There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that intrinsic motivation may be crowded out by monetary incentives (e.g., Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009; Gubler et al., 2016). This implies that strong financial rewards toward achieving social goals may result in organizational members’ sense of purpose being crowded out by the perceived prevalence of financial logic inside their company. Taken together, these mechanisms suggest that both the absence of explicit rewards and the presence of high-powered incentives are likely to lead to an increased experience of financial/social trade-offs. Accordingly, we propose: 多任务扭曲（由于不同任务或与目标相关的指标在可衡量程度上存在不对称性而产生，Holmstrom & Milgrom，1991）在双重目标公司中尤为强烈。这是因为财务指标通常被认为比社会指标更容易衡量（Delmas & Blass，2010）。这种可衡量性的不对称性会使组织成员的关注点偏向财务指标，将其作为薪酬的基础。因此，即使是对财务和社会指标赋予同等权重的强烈激励，也可能适得其反。同时，挤出效应（当外在奖励导致对特定行动的内在动机减弱时产生）也是双重目标公司中一个非常突出的问题。越来越多的证据表明，内在动机可能会被货币激励挤出（例如，Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009；Gubler et al., 2016）。这意味着，针对实现社会目标的高额财务奖励可能会导致组织成员的目标感被公司内部普遍存在的财务逻辑挤出。综合来看，这些机制表明，无论是缺乏明确的奖励还是存在高强度激励，都可能导致财务/社会权衡的体验增加。因此，我们提出：
Proposition 4. Holding the level of economic liberalism constant, the more organizational members of a dual-purpose company are incentivized to attain both financial and social goals with moderate powered incentives, the lower the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by the company. 命题4. 在经济自由主义水平保持不变的情况下，一个兼具双重目标的公司中，组织成员获得适度激励以实现财务和社会目标的动力越强，公司所经历的财务/社会权衡的强度就越低。
DISCUSSION
讨论
The historical evolution of the institutional divide between the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors— two spheres characterized by their own institutions—has reinforced the belief, and associated practices, that businesses should focus on economic value creation, whereas not-for-profits should focus on social value creation. Yet, recent developments have challenged this assumed dichotomy. A growing number of companies are attempting to embrace both financial and social purposes at their core, and these dual-purpose companies are becoming more and more visible and influential in contemporary economies. Even traditional publicly traded forprofit companies are openly questioning assumptions and redefining the goals that they pursue, incorporating social goals alongside their financial ones. Regulators are part of this trend as well, introducing, in some countries, laws and regulations that facilitate this joint pursuit (Marquis, 2020). However, many of these dual-purpose organizations are still struggling to achieve legitimacy for such a dual pursuit of goals. They experience strong trade-offs in their day-to-day operations as different stakeholders hold competing expectations regarding what goals they should pursue and what means they should use to achieve these goals (Pache & Santos, 2010). 营利部门和非营利部门之间的制度性分野的历史演变——这两个领域由各自的机构所界定——强化了这样一种信念和相关做法：企业应专注于创造经济价值，而非营利组织则应专注于创造社会价值。然而，近期的发展挑战了这种假定的二分法。越来越多的公司正试图将财务目标和社会目标纳入其核心，这些兼具双重目标的公司在当代经济中变得越来越可见和有影响力。甚至传统的公开上市营利公司也在公开质疑这些假设，并重新定义它们所追求的目标，将社会目标与财务目标并列。监管机构也参与了这一趋势，在一些国家出台了法律和法规，以促进这种双重追求（Marquis, 2020）。然而，许多这类兼具双重目标的组织仍在努力为这种双重目标追求争取合法性。它们在日常运营中面临着强烈的权衡，因为不同的利益相关者对它们应该追求什么目标以及应该用什么手段来实现这些目标有着相互竞争的期望（Pache & Santos, 2010）。
In this paper, we begin to address this gap by building on the central premise that dual-purpose companies inevitably face financial/social tradeoffs. This premise echoes Rangan’s (2015: 279) observation that “any reconciliation of business performance with societal progress will require tradeoffs between competing objectives.” Achieving both financial and social goals, we argue, crucially depends on the intensity of these financial/social trade-offs: as the intensity of the trade-offs increases, companies are likely to prioritize one goal over the other. Accordingly, such companies are condemned to “confusion and lack of purpose” (Jensen, 2002: 238), and may experience mission drift or bankruptcy. We theorize that the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by dual-purpose companies increases with the level of economic liberalism of the institutional setting in which they operate, and that the influence of the institutional setting on the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by dual-purpose companies is filtered and mitigated by specific governance arrangements. Our theory development, and its boundary conditions, present several opportunities for future theoretical and empirical work. 在本文中，我们通过构建一个核心前提来填补这一空白，即双重目标公司不可避免地面临财务/社会权衡。这一前提呼应了兰加（Rangan，2015：279）的观察，即“任何将企业绩效与社会进步相调和的努力都需要在相互竞争的目标之间进行权衡”。我们认为，实现财务和社会目标这两者，关键取决于这些财务/社会权衡的激烈程度：随着权衡的激烈程度增加，企业可能会优先考虑其中一个目标而非另一个。因此，这类公司会陷入“困惑和目标缺失”（詹森，2002：238）的境地，并可能经历使命漂移或破产。我们的理论认为，双重目标公司所经历的财务/社会权衡的激烈程度，会随着其所处制度环境的经济自由主义水平的提高而增加；并且，制度环境对双重目标公司所经历的财务/社会权衡激烈程度的影响，会受到特定治理安排的过滤和缓解。我们的理论构建及其边界条件，为未来的理论和实证研究提供了若干机会。
The Institutional Context
制度背景
While there may be many practices within a company’s control to sustain the pursuit of dual goals (Battilana et al., 2019), the institutional environment in which a company operates can either facilitate or hinder these practices. If the institutional environment supports the joint pursuit of financial and social goals, the trade-offs that dual-purpose companies experience will be less intense. Ecosystems that encourage the development of dualpurpose companies thus play an important enabling function. Consequently, our theory offers some guidance with respect to the impact of the intensity of trade-offs on the relative prevalence and longevity of dual-purpose companies in the population of organizations. The decision of an entrepreneur to create a dual-purpose company is endogenous to the intensity of trade-offs that she expects to experience and that she has been socialized to perceive. The ability of the company to sustain its operations is also likely to be strongly impacted by these pressures. Thus, we suspect that institutional environments that are characterized by relatively less intense experience of trade-offs will also be the ones that will be home to the largest concentration of dual-purpose companies. 虽然一家公司可以通过多种内部实践来持续追求双重目标（Battilana等人，2019），但其所处的制度环境可能会促进或阻碍这些实践。如果制度环境支持对财务目标和社会目标的共同追求，那么双重目标公司所面临的权衡将不会那么激烈。因此，鼓励双重目标公司发展的生态系统发挥着重要的推动作用。因此，我们的理论对权衡强度对组织群体中双重目标公司相对流行度和存续时间的影响提供了一些指导。企业家决定创建双重目标公司，是由她预期会经历的权衡强度以及她被社会化感知到的权衡强度内生决定的。公司维持运营的能力也可能受到这些压力的强烈影响。因此，我们推测，那些权衡经历相对不那么激烈的制度环境，也将是双重目标公司最集中的地方。
We have focused, in this paper, on the level of economic liberalism in dual-purpose companies’ institutional context, but other aspects of the institutional environment are also likely to affect the intensity of financial/social trade-offs experienced by these companies. For example, the ease of accessing financial capital, mediated by expectations and behaviors of banks and the presence of social impact investors, as well as government incentives around taxes, subsidies, and public service procurement, are all likely to be critical to support dual-purpose companies. The pool of talent available is also critical for these companies to be able to manage financial/social tensions. The available talent pool is dependent on how families and educational institutions prepare future workers, on the social status and recognition attached to different career trajectories, and on the corresponding skills and values held by potential hires. Future research could thus examine the links between the evolution (or lack thereof) of the curricula of business schools and the experience of trade-offs in companies over time and across geographies. 在本文中，我们聚焦于双重目标公司制度背景下的经济自由主义层面，但制度环境的其他方面也可能影响这些公司所经历的金融/社会权衡的强度。例如，获取金融资本的难易程度（受银行的预期和行为以及社会影响力投资者的存在影响），以及围绕税收、补贴和公共服务采购的政府激励措施，都可能对支持双重目标公司至关重要。可用的人才库对这些公司管理金融/社会紧张关系的能力也至关重要。可用人才库取决于家庭和教育机构如何培养未来的工人、不同职业轨迹所附带的社会地位和认可度，以及潜在招聘人员所具备的相应技能和价值观。因此，未来的研究可以考察商学院课程的演变（或缺乏演变）与公司随时间和地域变化的权衡经验之间的联系。
The legal context in which companies operate is another factor that may drive the intensity of financial/social trade-offs, as it plays a central part in granting or denying mandate to companies to pursue the creation of economic and social value at the same time. The legal form of a company (such as corporation, limited liability company, or benefit corporation) determines its rights and obligations, including the perceived importance of different stakeholders. Recently, new legal forms have emerged for companies around the world, such as the benefit corporation in the United States, the community interest company in the United Kingdom, the societa benefit in Italy, and the sociétés à mission in France (Levillain & Segestrin, 2019; Triponel & Agapitova, 2017). Future research will need to examine whether the inclusion of a social mission in the legal foundation of a company is associated with a lower intensity of trade-offs, and, in turn, a higher likelihood to achieve both financial and social goals. 企业运营所处的法律环境是可能推动财务/社会权衡强度的另一个因素，因为它在决定企业是否有权同时追求经济和社会价值创造方面起着核心作用。公司的法律形式（如股份有限公司、有限责任公司或 Benefit Corporation）决定了其权利和义务，包括不同利益相关者的重要性认知。近年来，全球范围内出现了新的公司法律形式，例如美国的 Benefit Corporation、英国的社区利益公司、意大利的 società benefit 以及法国的 sociétés à mission（Levillain & Segestrin, 2019；Triponel & Agapitova, 2017）。未来的研究需要考察将社会使命纳入公司法律基础是否与较低的权衡强度相关，进而是否会提高同时实现财务和社会目标的可能性。
Another consequential aspect of the institutional environment, besides the availability of resources and regulatory frameworks, is the nature of external standards and associated monitoring. Longstanding research has noted that companies frequently react to new institutional demands with symbolic compliance, whereby they take action to appear to comply—distinct from fundamentally doing so (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Shared standards and certifications can prevent such decoupling. Governments play a central role here, and so can other third parties. The emergence of shared norms like the Sustainable Development Goals set by the United Nations (Griggs et al., 2013) and external standards like those developed by B Lab (Marquis, 2020), the Global Reporting Initiative, and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board are also part of a wider movement (Battilana et al., 2019). By developing metrics that companies, investors, and public authorities alike can use to measure both financial and social performance of companies, these new standards could play a crucial role in reshaping the institutional environment and the experience of trade-offs in companies therein. 制度环境的另一个重要方面，除了资源的可获得性和监管框架外，还包括外部标准的性质以及相关的监督机制。长期以来的研究表明，企业经常以象征性合规来应对新的制度要求，即它们采取行动以显得合规，而非真正地合规（Bromley & Powell, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 1977）。共享标准和认证可以防止这种脱节现象。政府在此扮演核心角色，其他第三方也是如此。联合国制定的《可持续发展目标》（Griggs et al., 2013）等共享规范的出现，以及B Lab（Marquis, 2020）、全球报告倡议组织和可持续发展会计准则委员会制定的外部标准，也属于更广泛的运动的一部分（Battilana et al., 2019）。通过制定企业、投资者和公共当局都能用来衡量公司财务和社会绩效的指标，这些新标准可能在重塑制度环境以及企业在其中面临的权衡体验方面发挥关键作用。
Changing the accounting rules is also important to systematically account for both financial and social performance (Serafeim & Trinh, 2020). Such a change would also allow governments to account for these different aspects of performance as they reform their tax systems. Such initiatives are presently being launched across the world. Future research will need to track the development of these methodologies across countries, the ways in which they will contribute to changing the institutional environment, and the impact they will have on the companies’ experience of trade-offs. 改变会计规则对于系统地核算财务和社会绩效也很重要（Serafeim & Trinh，2020）。这种变革还将使各国政府在改革税收制度时能够核算这些不同的绩效方面。目前，全球各地都在开展此类举措。未来的研究需要跟踪这些方法在各国的发展情况、它们将如何促进制度环境的改变，以及它们将对企业的权衡经验产生何种影响。
The Organizational Context
组织背景
We theorize that the influence of the institutional setting on the intensity of the financial/social tradeoffs experienced by dual-purpose companies is filtered by specific organizational features. While we have focused in this paper on various governance arrangements, other organizational factors are also likely to play a role. One key characteristic that we abstract away from in this paper, but that has been extensively studied by scholars of institutional complexity, is an organization’s structural position within its institutional field (Greenwood et al., 2011). More central actors are often exposed to a different set of institutional demands than their more peripheral counterparts. Thus, centrality may affect the intensity with which companies experience financial/social trade-offs, in various ways. On the one hand, it may increase the intensity of the financial/social trade-offs experienced by dual-purpose companies, holding the level of economic liberalism constant. This is because central actors may be more connected to other entities experiencing strong institutional expectations and may thus be more embedded in existing institutional arrangements (Davis, 1991). On the other hand, central organizations may have more leeway when it comes to diverging from the dominant institutional pressures (Zuckerman, 1999). We leave for future work a full investigation of this fascinating question. 我们认为，制度环境对兼具双重目标的企业所面临的金融/社会权衡强度的影响，会受到特定组织特征的过滤。虽然本文聚焦于各种治理安排，但其他组织因素也可能发挥作用。本文中我们暂不考虑的一个关键特征，即组织在其制度场域中的结构性位置（Greenwood et al., 2011），已被制度复杂性学者广泛研究。通常，处于更核心位置的行为体所面临的制度要求与处于边缘位置的行为体不同。因此，中心性可能会以多种方式影响企业体验金融/社会权衡的强度。一方面，在经济自由主义水平不变的情况下，中心性可能会增加兼具双重目标的企业所经历的金融/社会权衡的强度。这是因为中心行为体可能与其他面临强烈制度期望的实体联系更紧密，因此可能更嵌入现有的制度安排中（Davis, 1991）。另一方面，中心组织在偏离主导性制度压力时可能拥有更多灵活性（Zuckerman, 1999）。对于这一有趣的问题，我们留待未来研究进行全面调查。
Future research will also need to more systematically account for the role of a company’s organizational culture. Companies that have developed and maintained a dual culture committed both to financial and social purposes may not experience the same intensity of trade-offs as others (Battilana et al., 2019). Relatedly, companies that are characterized by a more inclusive and democratic culture, in which workers have the power to participate in the decision-making process together with the top management and the representatives of the shareholders, may face a lesser intensity of trade-offs. This is because the involvement of a more diverse set of decision-makers combined with more democratic decision-making processes is likely to facilitate a sustained pursuit of multiple goals (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2015; Davis, 2021; Ferreras, Battilana, & Méda, 2020). However, in some instances, companies with democratic cultures could also experience more intense trade-offs, as participation may exacerbate fault lines between diverse organizational members and lead to polarization (Pache & Santos, 2010). Future research should thus pay closer attention to the evolution of power distribution within dual-purpose companies to examine the conditions under which more democratic ways of organizing help lessen the trade-offs that they experience. 未来的研究还需要更系统地考虑公司组织文化的作用。那些已经发展并维持了一种既致力于财务目标又致力于社会目标的双重文化的公司，可能不会像其他公司那样面临同样程度的权衡（Battilana等人，2019）。同样，具有更具包容性和民主性文化的公司——在这种文化中，员工有权与高层管理和股东代表共同参与决策过程——可能面临的权衡程度更小。这是因为更多样化的决策者参与以及更民主的决策过程可能有助于持续追求多重目标（Battilana、Sengul、Pache和Model，2015；Davis，2021；Ferreras、Battilana和Méda，2020）。然而，在某些情况下，具有民主文化的公司也可能经历更激烈的权衡，因为参与可能会加剧不同组织成员之间的分歧并导致极化（Pache和Santos，2010）。因此，未来的研究应该更密切地关注双重目标公司内部权力分配的演变，以研究在何种条件下更民主的组织方式有助于减轻它们所经历的权衡。
Finally, another potentially promising line of future research is to distinguish between “born” dual-purpose companies that are established with a dual purpose and companies that are transitioning from a more traditional single-purpose form to a dual-purpose one. Born dual-purpose companies are more likely to position themselves in an ecosystem that supports and legitimizes their dual identity. In contrast, transitioning companies are likely to be more deeply embedded in a web of stakeholders that have expectations in line with their initial, singlepurpose form. Consequently, in a given institutional setting, transitioning companies are likely to experience more intense financial/social trade-offs. Future research could investigate the factors that may enable them to overcome this challenge. 最后，未来研究另一个潜在有前景的方向是区分“天生”的双重目标型公司（即成立之初就兼具双重目的的公司）和从更传统的单一目标形式向双重目标转型的公司。天生双重目标型公司更有可能将自身定位在一个支持并认可其双重身份的生态系统中。相比之下，转型中的公司可能更深地嵌入在利益相关者网络中，这些利益相关者的期望与其最初的单一目标形式一致。因此，在特定的制度环境中，转型公司可能会面临更激烈的财务/社会权衡。未来的研究可以调查可能帮助它们克服这一挑战的因素。
Empirical Examination of Financial/Social Trade-Offs in Dual-Purpose Companies
双用途公司中财务/社会权衡的实证检验
Taken-for-granted assumptions, like the ones on which agency theory is based, continue to reinforce a world in which they have become self-fulflling prophesies, with very little empirical support (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). Incorporating an understanding that trade-offs are an enduring part of dualpurpose companies’ reality, rather than an obstacle to be solved, implies a fundamentally different perspective. All of the propositions we have put forward are meant to be tested and, potentially, falsified. 被视为理所当然的假设（如代理理论所依据的那些假设），继续强化着一个它们已成为自我实现预言的世界，而这类假设几乎没有实证支持（Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003）。认识到权衡（trade-offs）是兼具双重目的公司现实中持久存在的一部分，而非需要解决的障碍，这意味着一种根本性不同的视角。我们提出的所有命题均旨在接受检验，并可能被证伪。
To do so, future studies will need to develop measures that capture the intensity with which organizations experience financial/social tradeoffs. Although decision-makers in organizations act on their subjective (interpreted) perceptions of trade-offs, they also experience feedback from the actual strength of trade-offs that their institutional fields embody. Accordingly, we propose that there are at least two complementary approaches to measure the intensity of trade-offs that organizations experience. The first approach consists of measuring perceptions (either at the company level or at a higher level of aggregation) of financial/social trade-offs. Here, researchers could use a variety of methods, such as text analysis (see also more on this method below), qualitative insights, and survey methodology. Development and testing of specific scales measuring subjective perceptions of such tensions await future research. The second approach relies on an assumption that the intensity of the experience of trade-offs is reflected, to some degree, in the patterns of realized outcomes across financial and social dimensions of performance. This implies that the intensity of experienced trade-offs can be partially inferred from the context- and company-specific temporal covariance of performance metrics (Obloj & Sengul, 2020). For example, measures of financial and social performance are readily available in the context of work integration social enterprises (Battilana et al., 2015). Changes in intensity of financial/ social trade-offs could thus be inferred from patterns of covariance in these metrics. 为实现这一目标，未来的研究需要制定能够衡量组织经历财务/社会权衡强度的指标。尽管组织中的决策者基于其对权衡的主观（解读后的）感知采取行动，但他们也会从其所在制度领域所体现的权衡实际强度中获得反馈。因此，我们认为至少存在两种互补的方法来衡量组织所经历的权衡强度。第一种方法包括衡量对财务/社会权衡的感知（无论是在公司层面还是在更高的聚合层面）。在这里，研究人员可以使用多种方法，例如文本分析（下文还会进一步讨论该方法）、定性见解和调查方法。针对此类张力的主观感知的特定量表的开发和测试有待未来研究。第二种方法基于这样一种假设：权衡体验的强度在一定程度上反映在财务和社会绩效维度上已实现结果的模式中。这意味着，所经历的权衡强度可以部分地从绩效指标的情境和公司特定的时间协方差中推断出来（Obloj & Sengul, 2020）。例如，在工作整合社会企业的背景下，财务和社会绩效的衡量指标很容易获得（Battilana et al., 2015）。因此，财务/社会权衡强度的变化可以从这些指标的协方差模式中推断出来。
Future empirical work will also have to link the experience of trade-offs with resulting performance on multiple dimensions, including financial and social. Without maximization as a guiding principle and without setting exchange rates across metrics, the exact demarcation of what constitutes high (as opposed to low) levels of performance may be imperfectly defined and may differ across organizations. This is because companies may vary in how they perceive trade-offs and set satisficing performance levels for their goals in alignment with the expectations of their key stakeholders. Adequately measuring performance on multiple dimensions and the associated trade-offs will thus constitute a formidable empirical challenge for the future generation of scholars, and yet a critically important one (Ebrahim, 2019; Nason, Bacq, & Gras, 2018). 未来的实证研究还必须将权衡经验与多维度（包括财务和社会维度）的绩效结果联系起来。如果没有最大化作为指导原则，也没有在不同指标间设定汇率，那么对构成高（而非低）绩效水平的具体界定可能会不明确，并且不同组织之间可能存在差异。这是因为公司在权衡感知以及根据关键利益相关者的期望为目标设定满意绩效水平方面可能存在差异。因此，在多维度上充分衡量绩效及相关权衡将构成下一代学者面临的一项艰巨实证挑战，同时也是一项至关重要的挑战（Ebrahim, 2019；Nason, Bacq, & Gras, 2018）。
What’s Next for the Field of Management?
管理领域的未来发展方向是什么？
The field of management is uniquely positioned to study the joint pursuit of financial and social objectives. Yet, most management research on firm performance has continued to focus exclusively on the factors affecting financial performance only. Some vibrant pockets of research have diverged from this approach, including research on stakeholder theory (for a review, see Parmar, Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Purnell, & de Colle, 2010), CSR and corporate sustainability (for a review, see Bansal & Song, 2017), and hybrid organizations (for a review, see Battilana, Besharov, & Mitzinneck, 2017). However, even the studies that account for both financial and social outcomes often tend to focus on win—win scenarios, thereby failing to account for the prevalence of financial/social trade-offs that are part of these companies’ everyday experience (Kaplan, 2019). As a result, we lack theories that accounts for the experience of these trade-offs and the factors that mitigate it. 管理学领域具有独特的优势来研究金融目标与社会目标的共同追求。然而，大多数关于企业绩效的管理研究仍然专门聚焦于仅影响财务绩效的因素。一些充满活力的研究领域偏离了这一方法，包括利益相关者理论研究（相关综述见Parmar, Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Purnell, & de Colle, 2010）、企业社会责任与企业可持续性研究（相关综述见Bansal & Song, 2017）以及混合组织研究（相关综述见Battilana, Besharov, & Mitzinneck, 2017）。然而，即使是那些同时考虑财务和社会成果的研究，也往往侧重于双赢场景，从而未能解释这些公司日常运营中普遍存在的财务/社会权衡（Kaplan, 2019）。因此，我们缺乏能够解释这些权衡经验以及缓解这些权衡的因素的理论。
It is time for scholars to account for these tradeoffs and, in doing so, to revisit the very foundations of research and teaching in management. In a posthumously published article entitled “Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices,” the late Sumantra Ghoshal (2005) emphasized that ideas emerging from business school academics have a significant influence on managers and their companies, and the worst managerial excesses, such as the Enron scandal, have their roots in such ideas. His assessment was based on the observation that some of the fundamental theories taught in business schools (agency theory and shareholder value maximization being the primary examples) are based on, at best, questionable assumptions, and are often detached from reality. As a result, both the research and teaching of business school academics have increasingly been “separate from the practical needs of their students or the positive needs of the society” (Ghoshal, 2005: 89). We agree with this observation. The increasing salience of the joint pursuit of financial and social goals over the past decade has laid bare the urgency and need for renewed thinking about management research and education. What is at stake for the field is using and refining our conceptual apparatus and methods to contribute to recasting capitalism as we know it. 现在是学者们解释这些权衡的时候了，同时也应该重新审视管理学研究和教学的根本基础。在一篇死后发表的文章《糟糕的管理理论正在摧毁良好的管理实践》中，已故的苏曼特拉·戈沙尔（Sumantra Ghoshal，2005）强调，商学院学者提出的理念对管理者及其公司有重大影响，而安然（Enron）丑闻等最严重的管理失当行为，其根源就在于这些理念。他的评估基于这样的观察：商学院教授的一些基本理论（以代理理论和股东价值最大化为主要例子）即便在最好的情况下，其假设也值得商榷，并且常常脱离现实。因此，商学院学者的研究和教学越来越“脱离学生的实际需求或社会的积极需求”（Ghoshal，2005：89）。我们认同这一观点。过去十年中，同时追求财务目标和社会目标的重要性日益凸显，这凸显了重新思考管理研究和教育的紧迫性与必要性。该领域面临的关键问题是，如何运用和完善我们的概念工具与方法，为重塑我们所熟知的资本主义体系做出贡献。
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Julie Battilana (jbattilana@hbs.edu) is Joseph C. Wilson professor of business administration at Harvard Business 朱莉·巴蒂拉纳（jbattilana@hbs.edu）是哈佛商学院约瑟夫·C·威尔逊工商管理教授
School and the Alan L. Gleitsman professor of social innovation at Harvard Kennedy School. She is the founder and faculty chair of the Social Innovation and Change Initiative. Her research examines the politics of change in organizations and in society. 哈佛大学肯尼迪学院的艾伦·L·格莱茨曼社会创新教授。她是社会创新与变革倡议的创始人兼学院主任。她的研究考察组织和社会中的变革政治。
Tomasz Obloj (obloj@hec.fr) is associate professor of strategy at HEC Paris. He received his PhD from INSEAD. His research interests include behavioral and competitive strategy, inequity in organizations, the economic theory of incentives, and organization design. Tomasz Obloj (obloj@hec.fr) 是巴黎高等商学院（HEC Paris）的战略学副教授。他从欧洲工商管理学院（INSEAD）获得博士学位。他的研究兴趣包括行为与竞争战略、组织中的不公平现象、激励的经济理论以及组织设计。
Anne-Claire Pache (pache@essec.edu) is a professor of social innovation at ESSEC Business School and holder of the ESSEC Chair in Philanthropy. She received her doctorate in organizational behavior from INSEAD. Her research lies at the intersection of organizational theory and social innovation, with a particular emphasis on pluralistic environments, hybrid organizations, and scaling-up processes in organizations. Anne-Claire Pache (pache@essec.edu) 是 ESSEC 商学院的社会创新教授，同时担任 ESSEC 慈善事业讲席教授。她在 INSEAD 获得组织行为学博士学位。她的研究领域是组织理论与社会创新的交叉点，尤其侧重于多元环境、混合组织以及组织中的规模化进程。
Metin Sengul (metin.sengul@bc.edu) is an associate professor of strategy at Boston College. He received his PhD from INSEAD. His research explores the drivers of organization design choices in complex organizations, focusing on multiunit-multimarket firms—such as diversified firms, business groups, and multinationals— and dual-purpose companies. 梅廷·森古尔（metin.sengul@bc.edu）是波士顿学院的战略学副教授。他获得了欧洲工商管理学院（INSEAD）的博士学位。他的研究探索复杂组织中组织设计选择的驱动因素，重点关注多单位多市场企业——如多元化企业、企业集团和跨国公司——以及双用途公司。
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