DIALOGUE

对话

MUTABLE REALITY AND UNKNOWABLE FUTURE: REVEALING THE BROADER POTENTIAL OF PRAGMATISM

可变现实与不可知未来：揭示实用主义的更广泛潜力

In this dialogue paper, we consider Zellweger and Zenger’s (Forthcoming) conceptualization, rooted in pragmatism, of entrepreneurs as scientists. While we agree that pragmatism provides a useful but neglected foundation for studying the entrepreneurial journey, we maintain that entrepreneurs are more than scientists—in addition, they are engineers, artists, and designers. Our view is predicated on enfolding considerations of time, emergence, and the associated unsurmountable epistemological barrier of unknowability, which enable entrepreneurs to not only describe (predict) the world as scientists do but also actively shape the future to fit their “mind.” 在这篇对话论文中，我们考虑了Zellweger和Zenger（待发表）基于实用主义将企业家概念化为科学家的观点。虽然我们认同实用主义为研究创业历程提供了一个有用但被忽视的基础，但我们认为企业家不仅仅是科学家——此外，他们还是工程师、艺术家和设计师。我们的观点基于对时间、涌现性以及相关的不可知论这一无法逾越的认识论障碍的考量，这些因素使企业家不仅能够像科学家那样描述（预测）世界，还能积极塑造未来以符合他们的“思维”。

In their recent paper, Zellweger and Zenger (Forthcoming) provided a pragmatist perspective on entrepreneurial action to suggest that entrepreneurs act as scientists, pursuing “inquiries” hinged on beliefs about opportunities. Based on their theories of the world, entrepreneurs generate beliefs about opportunities, transform uncertainty into risk, test these beliefs in action to learn about their value, and update the probabilities associated with them. Zellweger and Zenger’s thoughtful analysis yields theoretically insightful recommendations that can guide entrepreneurial action. 在他们最近的论文中，策尔韦格（Zellweger）和曾格（Zenger）（待发表）从实用主义视角探讨了创业行动，认为创业者扮演科学家的角色，基于对机会的信念开展“探究”。基于他们对世界的理论，创业者生成关于机会的信念，将不确定性转化为风险，通过行动检验这些信念以了解其价值，并更新与这些信念相关的概率。策尔韦格和曾格的深入分析得出了具有理论洞察力的建议，能够指导创业行动。

We applaud the use of pragmatist thinking in the study of entrepreneurship, and sincerely hope that other scholars will follow suit in their inquiries pertaining to entrepreneurial reasoning and action. To that end, we see in this response an “opportunity” to shed light on some aspects of pragmatist thought that are relevant to entrepreneurship research but remain obscure in Zellweger and Zenger (Forthcoming) due to their focus on learning anchored on a determinate future. Illuminating these additional connections to reveal the broader potential of pragmatism holds the promise to enrich the study of entrepreneurship and provide a foundation for developing a robust research program within the field. 我们赞赏在创业研究中运用实用主义思维，并真诚希望其他学者在探究创业推理与行动时也能效仿。为此，我们认为本回应中存在一个“机会”，即阐明实用主义思想中与创业研究相关但在Zellweger和Zenger（待刊）中因聚焦于锚定确定未来的学习而未被充分揭示的某些方面。阐明这些额外联系以揭示实用主义的更广泛潜力，有望丰富创业研究，并为该领域发展坚实的研究项目奠定基础。

Our response is structured along three interconnectedthemes:limitations ofthe"scientists" analogy, the ontological difference between the present and future, and the implications of this difference for epistemic barriers and the creative agency of entrepreneurs. 我们的回应围绕三个相互关联的主题展开：“科学家”类比的局限性、当下与未来之间的本体论差异，以及这种差异对认知障碍和企业家创新能动性的影响。

ENTREPRENEURS AS SCIENTISTS: BOTH YES AND NO

创业者作为科学家：既是也不是

Pragmatism originated, in part, as a reaction to a dogmatic religious worldview and empiricist epistemology that seeks objective truth (Misak, 2013). Two cornerstones of the pragmatist revolution were, first, admitting that all beliefs are inevitably fallible, and second, evaluating the provisional veracity of beliefs based on their practical consequences (Putnam, 1994: 152). James (1907/2017: 19) famously noted that “the whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference [emphasis added] it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our time, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one.” Stated differently, for pragmatists, belief is held provisionally true when acting upon it brings about the desired difference to the world. In this focus on practical consequences lies not only the similarity between scientists and entrepreneurs highlighted by Zellweger and Zenger (Forthcoming), but also a significant difference between the two. 实用主义的起源，部分是对教条主义宗教世界观和寻求客观真理的经验主义认识论的回应（Misak，2013）。实用主义革命的两大基石，一是承认所有信念不可避免地具有可错性，二是根据信念的实际后果评估其临时真实性（Putnam，1994：152）。詹姆斯（1907/2017：19）著名地指出，“哲学的全部功能应当是弄清楚，如果这个或那个世界公式是真实的，它会在我们时间的特定瞬间给你我带来什么明确的差异[强调添加]。”换句话说，对实用主义者而言，当依据信念行动能给世界带来期望的差异时，该信念就被暂时视为真。在这种对实际后果的关注中，不仅存在 Zellweger 和 Zenger（待刊）所强调的科学家与企业家之间的相似性，也存在两者之间的重大差异。

Like scientists, entrepreneurs generate beliefs to reduce their doubt, but their reasons for doing so differ. Scientists seek to reduce doubt in order to bring about the desired difference of describing (predicting) the world more accurately. Entrepreneurs also seek to reduce doubt and obtain a more accurate description of the world, but for them this information is not the end in itself. Rather, entrepreneurs seek to shape the world by fitting their ventures into it—that is, to steer the world from what it is to what it could be (Wood, Bakker, & Fisher, 2021; see also Joas, 1996). Thus, the analogy between entrepreneurs and scientists is only partially true — while it is useful for shedding light on how entrepreneurs learn from feedback to update their beliefs, it obscures other equally, if not more important, activities they engage in to shape the future in line with their intentions (e.g., Alvarez, Young, & Woolley, 2015; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Zott & Huy, 2007). Fortunately, pragmatism contains within it the conceptual tools that can aid in accounting for these other entrepreneurial activities. The key here is that pragmatism, though it acknowledges that an independent, objective reality exists, treats it as mutable (James, 1907/2017: 83), and the future as ultimately unknowable (Haack, 1976: 243).1 像科学家一样，企业家也会产生信念以减少疑虑，但他们这样做的原因有所不同。科学家寻求减少疑虑，以便更准确地描述（预测）世界，从而带来期望的变化。企业家同样寻求减少疑虑并获得对世界更准确的描述，但对他们而言，这种信息本身并非最终目的。相反，企业家试图通过将自己的企业融入世界来塑造世界——也就是说，将世界从现状引导至可能的未来（Wood, Bakker, & Fisher, 2021；另见 Joas, 1996）。因此，企业家与科学家之间的类比仅部分成立——虽然这有助于阐明企业家如何从反馈中学习以更新信念，但它掩盖了他们为了按照自身意图塑造未来而进行的其他同样重要（甚至更为重要）的活动（例如 Alvarez, Young, & Woolley, 2015；Hargadon & Douglas, 2001；Zott & Huy, 2007）。幸运的是，实用主义本身包含了能够帮助解释这些其他创业活动的概念工具。关键在于，实用主义虽然承认存在独立的客观现实，但将其视为可变的（James, 1907/2017: 83），并且认为未来本质上是不可知的（Haack, 1976: 243）。1

OBJECTIVE REALITY EXISTS, BUT THE FUTURE DOES NOT

客观现实存在，但未来不存在

As Zellweger and Zenger (Forthcoming) rightly noted, pragmatists do believe that there exists an independent, objective reality. However, unlike pragmatists, Zellweger and Zenger (Forthcoming) assumed that if an independent, objective reality exists, then so do future opportunities. From such a perspective, future success is marked by a pathway that is gradually revealed, thereby constituting objective conditions for the possibility of that success. Crucially, Zellweger and Zenger (Forthcoming) see these conditions as determinate and existing at the start (now); they are simply unknown to the entrepreneur. An entrepreneur’s journey, then, is about finding that invisible path to success via a gradual calibration of their roadmap. 正如策尔韦格和赞格（即将出版）正确指出的那样，实用主义者确实相信存在一个独立的、客观的现实。然而，与实用主义者不同的是，策尔韦格和赞格（即将出版）认为，如果存在一个独立的、客观的现实，那么未来的机会也会存在。从这种观点来看，未来的成功以一条逐渐显现的路径为标志，从而构成了该成功可能性的客观条件。至关重要的是，策尔韦格和赞格（即将出版）将这些条件视为确定的，并在一开始（现在）就存在；只是创业者对此并不知晓。因此，创业者的旅程就是通过逐步校准他们的路线图，找到那条通往成功的无形路径。

The question of whether the future exists can be turned into the question of whether something exists before it happens. For example, if success ultimately depends on the failure of a major competitor, the passing of certain legislation following a radical change in political power, or the change in climate conditions in a region, can these future events be taken to exist now (in some preactualized form) so as to be deemed part of the reality about which an entrepreneur calibrates their beliefs $\grave { a }$ la scientist)? The pragmatist answer to this question is no. It can be illustrated with the arguments ofa prominent pragmatist philosopher, Willard van Orman Quine, who, in his seminal paper, “On what there is” (1948: 22) discussed the nature of existence of Pegasus (the mythical flying horse): 未来是否存在的问题可以转化为某件事在发生之前是否存在的问题。例如，如果成功最终取决于主要竞争对手的失败、政治权力发生根本性变化后通过的某些立法，或某个地区气候条件的变化，那么这些未来事件现在（以某种未实现的形式）是否可以被视为存在，从而被视为企业家像科学家一样校准其信念所依据的现实的一部分？实用主义者对这个问题的回答是否定的。这一点可以通过著名实用主义哲学家威拉德·范·奥尔曼·蒯因（Willard van Orman Quine）的论点来阐释，他在其开创性论文《论何物存在》（1948: 22）中讨论了飞马（the mythical flying horse）的存在本质：

IfPegasus were not, McX argues, we should not be talking about anything when we use the word; therefore it would be nonsense to say even that Pegasus is not. Thinking to show thus that the denial of Pegasus cannot be coherently maintained, he concludes that Pegasus is. 如果麦克斯认为，如果飞马不存在，那么当我们使用这个词时就不应该谈论任何事物；因此，说飞马不存在也是无意义的。他试图以此表明对飞马的否定无法自洽地成立，进而得出结论：飞马是存在的。

McX cannot, indeed, quite persuade himself that any region of space-time, near or remote, contains a flying horse of flesh and blood. Pressed for further details on Pegasus, then, he says that Pegasus is an idea in men’s minds. Here, however, a confusion begins to be apparent. We may for the sake of argument concede that there is an entity, and even a unique entity (though this is rather implausible), which is the mental McX 确实无法完全说服自己，任何时空区域（无论远近）都存在一匹有血有肉的飞马。当被追问关于飞马的更多细节时，他说飞马是人类头脑中的一个概念。然而，这里开始出现一种混淆。为了便于讨论，我们或许可以承认存在一个实体，甚至是一个独特的实体（尽管这相当不可信），而这个实体就是精神

Pegasus-idea; but this mental entity is not what people are talking about when they deny Pegasus. Pegasus-idea；但这种心理实体并非人们否认“Pegasus”时所指的对象。

This illustration demonstrates the difference between an idea in the mind and a thing in the world, which Quine (1948) attributed to a difference between naming and meaning. While naming is directed at objects, meaning is related to a conceptual schema (or category, set) to which something is assigned and under which it is described. When we speak of the future, we are not naming particular events or circumstances— the future is simply a category that we fill with mental content such as our expectations, aspirations, etc. In this sense, talking about the future is similar to talking about Pegasus in that they both depict a fictional world (Beckert, 2016). In other words, for pragmatists, the future (as well as opportunities belonging to it) does not exist in the mode portrayed by Zellweger and Zenger (Forthcoming)—that is, as a determinate object against which to calibrate fit. At the same time, pragmatists acknowledge that it is fully meaningful to talk and form expectations about the future. Indeed, such expectations are what inspire (entrepreneurial) action, in the hope that (unlike Pegasus) they could become a reality one day. 这张图展示了心中的想法与世界中的事物之间的区别，奎因（1948）将这种区别归因于命名与意义的差异。命名指向具体对象，而意义则与一个概念模式（或类别、集合）相关，某物被归属于该模式并在其之下被描述。当我们谈论未来时，我们并非在命名特定的事件或情况——未来只是一个我们用诸如期望、愿望等心理内容填充的类别。从这个意义上说，谈论未来类似于谈论飞马座，因为它们都描绘了一个虚构的世界（贝克特，2016）。换句话说，对于实用主义者而言，未来（以及属于它的机会）并不像策尔韦格和赞格（待刊）所描述的那样存在——即作为一个确定的对象，我们可以以此校准契合度。同时，实用主义者承认，谈论未来并对其形成期望是完全有意义的。事实上，正是这些期望激发了（创业）行动，希望它们有朝一日能成为现实（与飞马座不同）。

A simple example would serve to clarify the sense in which pragmatists deem the future not to exist. Imagine the start of a tennis match, a championship final. We know that one of the two players will win the match and become champion, except that we do not know who, and cannot know until the match is complete. But does that champion exist now, before the match is completed? Although the set of possible champions has finite members that exist now, “champion” is currently an empty set to which one of the players will be assigned, but not until the match is over. Therefore, we cannot say that the champion exists now, for there is no champion yet. In addition, ifthe match were stopped and never completed, there might never be a champion. Nevertheless, like Pegasus, the champion-idea (the meaning) exists now and is real. Before the match, it agitates our beliefs, expectations, and predictions as spectators. For the players, it is a focal point of aspirations: they each seek to shape the world by gaining entry into the champion set. But there is nothing objective in the world now that can serve as a determinate point for calibration. In this sense, the conditions of possibility of winning the championship (e.g., shots missed and made) is also an empty set now—it will be filled in the course of the game. To claim otherwise is to attempt to step outside of time and treat the finished match as a fact. However, there are no future facts (Brumbaugh, 一个简单的例子可以说明实用主义者认为未来不存在的含义。想象一场网球比赛的开始，一场冠军决赛。我们知道两位选手中有一位会赢得比赛并成为冠军，只是我们不知道是谁，而且要等到比赛结束才会知道。但在比赛完成之前，那个冠军现在存在吗？虽然可能的冠军集合现在有有限的成员，但“冠军”目前是空集，其中一名球员将在比赛结束后被归入该集合，但在此之前并非如此。因此，我们不能说冠军现在存在，因为还没有冠军。此外，如果比赛中途停止且永远无法完成，可能就永远不会有冠军。然而，就像飞马座一样，“冠军”的概念（即意义）现在是存在且真实的。比赛前，它会搅动我们作为观众的信念、期望和预测。对球员们来说，它是一个愿望的焦点：他们各自试图通过进入“冠军”集合来塑造世界。但现在世界上没有任何客观事物可以作为校准的确定点。从这个意义上说，赢得冠军的可能性条件（例如，错过和成功的击球）现在也是一个空集——它将在比赛过程中被填充。否则就试图超越时间，将已完成的比赛视为一个事实。然而，不存在未来的事实（Brumbaugh,

1966)—like the horizon, the future can never be reached. 1966年)—就像地平线一样，未来永远无法抵达。

THE FUTURE IS NOT JUST UNKNOWN BUT UNKNOWABLE

未来不仅未知，而且不可知

Admitting the fact that the future does not exist in the pragmatist sense described above has tremendous implications for recognizing entrepreneurship as a complex, competitive, open-ended process (Fisher, 2020). It is because the future does not yet exist that entrepreneurs can shape it according to their intentions. Such shaping is possible because the future is not just unknown but emerges as a result of actions of, and interactions between, a multitude of economic agents. In our tennis match example, winning the match is an emergent outcome following from the actions of both players, judgments of the referee, cheering or booing by the audience, vagaries of the weather, etc. 承认未来在上述实用主义意义上并不存在这一事实，对于将创业视为一个复杂、竞争性、开放式的过程具有重大意义（Fisher，2020）。正是因为未来尚未存在，创业者才能根据自己的意愿塑造它。这种塑造之所以可能，是因为未来不仅是未知的，而且是众多经济主体的行动及其互动的结果。在我们的网球比赛例子中，赢得比赛是一个新兴结果，它来自双方球员的行动、裁判的判罚、观众的欢呼或嘘声、天气的变化等。

Admitting emergence means recognizing that patterns or structures arise from interactive processes and cannot be reduced to their constituent parts (Waldrop, 1994). Essentially, “the whole [that emerges] is substantively different from the totality of the parts from which it is composed, [ ..] we simply do not know how much, or how [each] part contributes to the whole” (Anderson, Dodd, & Jack, 2012: 963). From an ontological perspective, emergence also implies a possibility of unanticipated newness, unknown unknowns—no amount of informationgathering at the level of the constituent elements in the present can foretell the “emergent” level as it remains beyond the horizon. For example, it is impossible to predict the new market category that will emerge from the complex web of interactions of entrepreneurs, consumers, media, etc. (e.g., Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Navis & Glynn, 2010). To recognize that there will be such unknowable markets is not the same as being able to say anything determinate about them. Simply put, the market is more than an information discovery process: 承认涌现意味着认识到模式或结构源于互动过程，且无法简化为其组成部分（Waldrop, 1994）。本质上，“涌现的整体”与构成它的部分的总和“在本质上截然不同，……我们根本不知道每个部分对整体的贡献有多大”（Anderson, Dodd, & Jack, 2012: 963）。从本体论的角度来看，涌现还意味着存在未预料到的新事物、未知的未知——仅通过当前构成要素层面的信息收集，无法预知“涌现”层面的情况，因为它超出了认知范围。例如，无法预测从企业家、消费者、媒体等复杂互动网络中会涌现出何种新的市场类别（例如，Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010；Navis & Glynn, 2010）。认识到会存在这样不可知的市场，并不等同于能够对其做出任何确定性的描述。简而言之，市场不仅仅是一个信息发现过程：

Future parts of a market simply do not exist; they are by definition not present. There are, at any point in time, many potential futures imaginable, based on more or less informed reflections. Yet, which future will come into existence will depend on choices yet to be made. (Buchanan & Vanberg, 1991: 176) 市场的未来部分根本不存在；根据定义，它们并不存在。在任何时间点，基于或多或少有根据的思考，都可以想象出许多潜在的未来。然而，哪个未来会成为现实，将取决于尚未做出的选择。（Buchanan & Vanberg，1991：176）

The implication here is that entrepreneurs are more than scientists—they do not merely seek to describe (predict), but are, in addition, engineers, designers, and artists (see Oxman, 2016), who seek to shape the future to “fit” their mind via their actions (Sergeeva, 这里的含义是，企业家不仅仅是科学家——他们不仅寻求描述（预测），而且还是工程师、设计师和艺术家（见Oxman，2016），他们试图通过自身的行动塑造未来，使其“契合”自己的理念（Sergeeva，

Bhardwaj, & Dimov, 2021).2 Therefore, to claim that feedback from the world can be divided into Type I and Type II error may, in itself, be a Type III error (Mitroff & Featheringham, 1974) of sorts—for the pragmatist entrepreneur, the question is not merely whether “beliefs fit the market” (Zellweger & Zenger, Forthcoming) but what action can be taken to make the yet nonexistent future market to fit their beliefs. It is within this framework that recognizes the manipulative function of entrepreneurs in interacting with other market participants (Soros, 2013) that “fixing beliefs” provides an impetus for action (Peirce, 1923). Here, learning from errors is one way of fixing beliefs, and the scientist function is subservient to the larger impetus for action toward fulfilling an entrepreneurial journey. Bhardwaj, & Dimov, 2021).2 因此，声称来自市场的反馈可分为I型和II型错误，这本身可能是一种III型错误（Mitroff & Featheringham, 1974）——对于实用主义企业家而言，问题不仅在于“信念是否符合市场”（Zellweger & Zenger, 待刊），而在于采取何种行动使尚未存在的未来市场符合其信念。正是在这种框架下，认识到企业家在与其他市场参与者互动中的操纵性作用（Soros, 2013），“修正信念”为行动提供了动力（Peirce, 1923）。在这里，从错误中学习是修正信念的一种方式，而科学功能从属于实现创业旅程的更大行动动力。

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?

这有什么区别？

In the spirit of pragmatism, we ask: What difference do our descriptions of entrepreneurs make? These descriptions can not only deject or inspire future entrepreneurs but also signal the skills we find valuable. To say that entrepreneurs are scientists is to say they get things right. To say they are engineers is to say they make things work. To say they are artists is to say they make things new. And to say they are designers is to say they make things practical. It is intuitive that, faced with an open future, they are all of these. 本着实用主义的精神，我们要问：我们对企业家的描述会带来什么影响？这些描述不仅会让未来的企业家感到沮丧或受到鼓舞，还会表明我们认为哪些技能是有价值的。说企业家是科学家，意味着他们能把事情做对；说他们是工程师，意味着他们能让事情运转起来；说他们是艺术家，意味着他们能创造新事物；说他们是设计师，意味着他们能让事物变得实用。面对充满可能性的未来，他们兼具这些特质，这是很直观的。

With their study, Zellweger and Zenger (Forthcoming) were among the first to place a pragmatist perspective front and center in our inquiries about entrepreneurship (see also Sergeeva et al., 2021). Their work matters in opening up a new conversation and we invite other entrepreneurship scholars to join it—after all, good science is good conversation (Mahoney, 1993). 通过他们的研究，Zellweger 和 Zenger（即将发表）是首批将实用主义视角置于创业研究核心的学者之一（另见 Sergeeva 等人，2021）。他们的研究成果有助于开启一场新的讨论，我们邀请其他创业学者加入其中——毕竟，优秀的科学源于良好的对话（Mahoney，1993）。

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Anastasia Sergeeva Erasmus University 阿纳斯塔西娅·谢尔盖耶娃 伊拉斯谟大学

Akhil Bhardwaj Tilburg University 阿希尔·巴拉德瓦吉 蒂尔堡大学

Dimo Dimov University of Bath Reykjavik University https://doi.org/AMR_2021.0488 迪莫·迪莫夫 巴斯大学 雷克雅未克大学 https://doi.org/AMR_2021.0488

Anastasia Sergeeva (sergeeva@rsm.nl) is an Assistant Professor in Rotterdam School of Management (Erasmus University). Her research focuses on an interpretative understanding of entrepreneurial reasoning and valueladen aspects of innovating and organizing. Anastasia Sergeeva (sergeeva@rsm.nl) 是鹿特丹管理学院（伊拉斯谟大学）的助理教授。她的研究重点是对创业推理以及创新和组织中价值相关方面的解释性理解。

Akhil Bhardwaj (A.Bhardwaj@tilburguniversity.edu) is an Assistant Professor in Tilburg School of Economics and Management (Tilburg University). He studies how to discover, formulate, and mitigate organizational failures. His research also explores how thinking can be improved. 阿基尔·巴拉德瓦杰（A.Bhardwaj@tilburguniversity.edu）是蒂尔堡大学蒂尔堡经济与管理学院的助理教授。他研究如何发现、阐述和减轻组织失败。他的研究还探索如何改善思维。

Dimo Dimov (dpd24@bath.ac.uk) is Professor of Entrepreneurship and Innovation at University of Bath, UK and visiting professor at Reykjavik University, Iceland. His research focuses on entrepreneurial thinking, processes, and practice. Dimo Dimov（dpd24@bath.ac.uk）是英国巴斯大学的创业与创新教授，同时也是冰岛雷克雅未克大学的客座教授。他的研究重点是创业思维、过程和实践。

ENTREPRENEURS AS SCIENTISTS: A PRAGMATIST ALTERNATIVE TO THE CREATION-DISCOVERY DEBATE

企业家作为科学家：对创造-发现辩论的实用主义替代方案

In a thoughtful comment on our paper (Zellweger & Zenger, Forthcoming), Sergeeva, Bhardwaj, and Dimov (2022) joined us in advocating for a pragmatist perspective on entrepreneurship. The authors, however, offered two closely related critiques of our pragmatist perspective. They suggested that entrepreneurs are more than scientists seeking to understand their world, but rather are engineers, designers, and artists who act to produce value within it. They also situate our pragmatist perspective within the epistemological creation versus discovery debate, and cast us into the discovery camp where entrepreneurs merely seek to discover a future that already objectively exists in the present. In our comments below, we develop two responses. First, while we wholeheartedly agree that entrepreneurs act to create value as they solve problems, in doing so, all humans, including entrepreneurs, engineers, and artists, act as scientists. Second, while we reject the placement of our perspective in the discovery camp, we argue that our entrepreneur-asscientist perspective, and pragmatism more generally, find little use for the made versus found distinction. 在对我们的论文（Zellweger & Zenger，待刊）的一篇有见地的评论中，Sergeeva、Bhardwaj和Dimov（2022）与我们一同倡导对创业精神采取实用主义视角。然而，作者对我们的实用主义视角提出了两个密切相关的批评。他们认为，创业者不仅仅是试图理解世界的科学家，更是工程师、设计师和艺术家，他们的行动是为了在世界中创造价值。他们还将我们的实用主义视角置于认识论的“创造”与“发现”之争中，并将我们归入“发现”阵营，认为创业者只是寻求发现一个在当下已客观存在的未来。在下面的评论中，我们提出两点回应。首先，虽然我们完全同意创业者在解决问题时是为了创造价值而行动，但在此过程中，所有人类（包括创业者、工程师和艺术家）都在扮演科学家的角色。其次，虽然我们反对将我们的视角归入“发现”阵营，但我们认为，我们的“创业者-科学家”视角以及更广泛意义上的实用主义，对“创造”与“发现”的区分几乎没有应用价值。

ENTREPRENEURS AS(PRAGMATIST) SCIENTISTS

企业家作为（实用主义者）科学家

First, we wholeheartedly agree with Sergeeva et al. (2022) that entrepreneurs are more than scientists who only seek to understand their world, but rather are individuals who act within it to create value through new products or services (Casson, 1982; Shane & Venkataraman, 200o). In Zellweger and Zenger (Forthcoming) we highlighted a broad scope of actions through which entrepreneurs seek to produce value under uncertainty. Entrepreneurs find and frame problems that surround them. They compose theories to solve them. They test assumptions related to these theories. They compose preliminary solutions and evaluate feedback. Overal, they explore fit and the usefulness of their beliefs in guiding these actions (Bremner & Eisenhardt, 2022). Given our heavy focus on action throughout our paper, we must assume that the real objection here is to our analogy and characterization of entrepreneurs as scientists—individuals who seek to understand problems and create solutions in a science-like manner. 首先，我们完全同意Sergeeva等人（2022）的观点，即企业家不仅仅是那些只寻求理解世界的科学家，而是那些在世界中采取行动，通过新产品或服务创造价值的个体（Casson，1982；Shane & Venkataraman，2000）。在Zellweger和Zenger（待发表）的研究中，我们强调了企业家在不确定性下寻求创造价值的广泛行动范围。企业家发现并界定他们周围的问题，构建理论来解决这些问题，检验与这些理论相关的假设，提出初步解决方案并评估反馈。总体而言，他们探索自身信念在指导这些行动中的适配性和有用性（Bremner & Eisenhardt，2022）。鉴于我们在整篇论文中都高度关注行动，我们必须假设这里的真正异议是针对我们将企业家类比为科学家——即那些以类科学的方式寻求理解问题并创造解决方案的个体的描述。

In Sergeeva et al.’s (2022) framing, scientists only learn, while engineers and designers do and act. Therefore, by associativelogic, because entrepreneurs act, they cannot be scientists, or at least not solely scientists. Yet, for us and for pragmatism, the label “scientist” is not a role but an approach—a set of both cognitive and physical actions focused on solving the problems at hand. Our paper’s original working title was actually “Entrepreneurs as pragmatist scientists,” adding the modifier “pragmatism” to ensure readers did not view our entrepreneur-as-scientist analogy as suggesting that entrepreneurs are only ivory-tower scientists seeking to understand the world. A reviewer, however, correctly noted that the word “pragmatism” here was redundant, as scientists are pragmatists who use the scientific method to act and problem-solve. In fact, for pragmatists all humans behave as scientists as they seek to address the problems that surround them. All humans frame problems, compose theories, test hypotheses, recalibrate those hypotheses, and ultimately generate refined beliefs that are useful in guiding action (Dewey, 1938). Even infants and young children act as scientists as they seek to solve problems in their world (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 1999). Thus, not only are entrepreneurs scientists, but engineers and designers are scientists as well. They are pragmatist scientists, who adopt a quasi-scientific process to produce value under uncertainty. In fact, it is precisely in settings of uncertainty—in settings of “unknown unknowns”—that a scientific approach is of particular value. Here, both entrepreneurs and scientists select problems with unknown solutions, advance conjectures or theories about how to compose them, and then seek evidence that tests what they form. Consistent with pragmatist thinking, we simply reject any real distinction between the average individual, the entrepreneur, or the scientist in their mode of scientific inquiry and problem-solving. In fact, for pragmatists, even real scientists “are better thought ofas solving puzzles than as gradally disclosing thetruenatureof things” (Rorty, 2007b: 77). Consequently, any difference between 在Sergeeva等人（2022）的框架中，科学家仅进行学习，而工程师和设计师则进行学习并付诸行动。因此，通过关联逻辑，由于企业家会行动，他们就不可能是科学家，或者至少不能仅仅是科学家。然而，对我们而言，从实用主义的角度来看，“科学家”这一标签并非一种角色，而是一种方法——一套既包含认知行为又包含物理行动的集合，其核心是解决眼前的问题。我们论文最初的工作标题实际上是“作为实用主义科学家的企业家”，添加“实用主义”这一修饰词是为了确保读者不会将我们提出的“企业家即科学家”的类比误解为暗示企业家只是象牙塔中的科学家，一心只想理解世界。然而，一位审稿人正确地指出，此处的“实用主义”一词是多余的，因为科学家本身就是实用主义者，他们运用科学方法来行动和解决问题。事实上，对实用主义者而言，所有人类都在扮演科学家的角色，因为他们都在努力解决身边的问题。所有人都会构建问题框架、提出理论、检验假设、重新校准这些假设，并最终生成有助于指导行动的完善信念（杜威，1938）。即使是婴儿和幼儿，在试图解决他们世界中的问题时，也表现得像科学家一样（Gopnik & Meltzoff，1997；Gopnik，Meltzoff，& Kuhl，1999）。因此，不仅企业家是科学家，工程师和设计师也是科学家。他们是实用主义科学家，采用准科学的流程在不确定性环境中创造价值。事实上，正是在不确定性的环境中——在“未知的未知”情境中——科学方法才具有特殊价值。在这里，企业家和科学家都会选择具有未知解决方案的问题，提出关于如何解决这些问题的猜想或理论，然后寻求证据来检验他们的构想。与实用主义思维一致，我们完全不认同普通个体、企业家或科学家在科学探究和解决问题的方式上存在本质区别。事实上，对实用主义者而言，即便是真正的科学家，“更应该被视为在解谜，而非逐步揭示事物的真实本质”（罗蒂，2007b：77）。因此，任何差异

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