SYNERGY IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: TYPOLOGY, LIFE CYCLES, AND VALUE

并购中的协同效应：类型、生命周期与价值

EMILIE R. FELDMAN EXEQUIEL HERNANDEZ The Wharton School EMILIE R. FELDMAN EXEQUIEL HERNANDEZ 沃顿商学院

Value in mergers and acquisitions derives from the synergistic combination of an acquirer and a target. We advance the existing conceptualization of synergy in three ways. First, we develop a theoretically motivated, parsimonious typology of five distinct sources of synergy based on two underlying dimensions: the level of analysis at which valuable activities occur and the orientation by which those activities are governed. The typology uncovers three novel synergy sources (relational, network, and nonmarket) arising from acquisition-induced changes in firms’ external cooperative environments and classifies two other well-known synergies (internal and market power). Second, we introduce the concept of synergy life cycles to explore how the timing of initial realization and the duration of gains vary across the five synergies based on differences in the post-merger integration required and in the control the acquirer has over the assets and activities combined by the merger. Third, we consider how the synergy types interact, yielding co-synergies when they complement each other and dis-synergies when they substitute for one another. This enables us to expand the traditional conceptualization of the total value created by mergers and acquisitions as the sum of each of the synergy types, their co-synergies, and their dis-synergies. 并购中的价值来源于收购方与目标方的协同组合。我们从三个方面推进了对协同效应的现有概念化。首先，我们基于两个潜在维度（有价值活动发生的分析层面以及这些活动的管理方向），构建了一个理论驱动、简约的五种不同协同来源的类型学。该类型学揭示了三种新的协同来源（关系型、网络型和非市场型），这些来源源于收购导致的企业外部合作环境的变化，并将另外两种众所周知的协同效应（内部型和市场力量型）进行了分类。其次，我们引入协同生命周期的概念，基于合并后整合所需的差异以及收购方对合并资产和活动的控制权差异，探讨五种协同效应在初始实现时机和收益持续时间上的变化。第三，我们考虑协同类型之间的相互作用，当它们相互补充时产生协同效应，当它们相互替代时产生非协同效应。这使我们能够扩展传统的并购总价值概念化，将其视为每种协同类型、协同效应以及非协同效应的总和。

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a typology of synergies that broadens our understanding of the sources of value creation and advances a dynamic notion of value realization in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Defined as a combination of two firms’ assets that are more valuable together than they are separately, synergy has been invoked by scholars from multiple disciplines (e.g., management, financial economics, and accounting) using multiple theoretical lenses (e.g., resource-based view, IO economics, and behavioral theory) (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Shaver, 2006). The broad appeal of the concept lies in its generality: any two assets joined via an acquisition can potentially create synergistic value. But this generality has also led to a lack of systematic development and synthesis, which hinders theoretical progress and limits the usefulness of the concept for scholars and managers. 本文的目的是介绍一种协同效应的类型学，以拓宽我们对价值创造来源的理解，并推进并购（M&A）中价值实现的动态概念。协同效应被定义为两家公司资产的组合，其共同价值大于各自单独的价值。来自多个学科（如管理学、金融经济学和会计学）的学者已从多个理论视角（如资源基础观、产业组织经济学和行为理论）对其进行了探讨（Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991；Shaver, 2006）。该概念的广泛吸引力在于其通用性：任何通过收购结合的两项资产都有可能创造协同价值。但这种通用性也导致了缺乏系统性的发展和综合，这阻碍了理论进展，并限制了该概念对学者和管理者的实用性。

One reason for these limitations is that the M&A literature has not kept pace with theoretical advancements pertaining to the sources of value creation for firms. Two dominant paradigms—IO economics and the resource-based view (RBV)—have led M&A scholarship to focus inordinately on two kinds of synergies: “market power” and “operational” (Chatterjee, 1986; Devos, Kadapakkam, & Krishnamurthy, 2009; Kaul & Wu, 2016; Rabier, 2017). These paradigms assume that the firm must own and control valuable assets (Lavie, 2006), and that it must interact competitively with external parties to appropriate value (Porter, 1980). Yet, for several years, other research traditions have shown that additional sources of economic value can arise from sharing valuable assets by interacting cooperatively with external partners in the firm’s environment. The relational view demonstrates that collaborative exchanges with individual partners create partner-specific value (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). The social networks perspective goes one step further, showing that value exists in the structure of a firm’s direct and indirect ties (e.g., Gulati, 1998). And stakeholder theory reveals that good relations with nonmarket actors enhance the ability of firms to appropriate value from their environments (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014). 这些局限性的一个原因是，并购文献未能跟上与企业价值创造来源相关的理论进展。两种主要范式——产业组织经济学（IO economics）和基于资源的观点（RBV）——导致并购研究过度关注两种协同效应：“市场力量”和“运营”（Chatterjee, 1986；Devos, Kadapakkam, & Krishnamurthy, 2009；Kaul & Wu, 2016；Rabier, 2017）。这些范式假设企业必须拥有和控制有价值的资产（Lavie, 2006），并且必须与外部方进行竞争性互动以获取价值（Porter, 1980）。然而，多年来，其他研究传统表明，通过与企业环境中的外部合作伙伴合作共享有价值的资产，还可以产生额外的经济价值来源。关系视角表明，与单个合作伙伴的协作交流能够创造特定于合作伙伴的价值（Dyer & Singh, 1998；Lavie, 2006）。社会网络视角更进一步，表明价值存在于企业直接和间接关系的结构中（例如，Gulati, 1998）。利益相关者理论则揭示，与非市场参与者的良好关系能够增强企业从其环境中获取价值的能力（例如，Freeman, 1984；Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014）。

The effects of M&A on these external cooperative sources of value, and the theoretical perspectives that underpin them, have not systematically made their way into our understanding of synergy. But research is starting to show that acquisitions affect more than the competitive landscape and internal resources of firms. They also affect their external cooperative environments by reformatting relationships with individual contractual partners (e.g., Rogan & Greve, 2015), restructuring external networks (e.g., Hernandez & Menon, 2018; Hernandez & Shaver, 2019), and modifying coalitions with nonmarket stakeholders (e.g., Deng, Kang, & Low, 2013). 并购对这些外部合作价值来源的影响，以及支撑这些影响的理论视角，尚未系统地融入我们对协同效应的理解中。但研究开始表明，收购不仅影响企业的竞争格局和内部资源，还通过重新调整与个别合同伙伴的关系（例如，Rogan & Greve，2015）、重组外部网络（例如，Hernandez & Menon，2018；Hernandez & Shaver，2019）以及调整与非市场利益相关者的联盟（例如，Deng, Kang, & Low，2013），来影响企业的外部合作环境。

We incorporate these external cooperative perspectives into M&A research in three ways. First, we develop a theoretically parsimonious typology of five sources of potential synergy based on two underlying dimensions: the level of analysis at which valuable activities occur (firm, dyad, network, industry, or institutional context) and the governance orientation by which those activities are managed (fiat, cooperation, or market competition). This allows us to introduce three new synergy types—relational, network, and nonmarket—and to put the two long-considered in the literature (internal, also known as operational, and market power) into a systematic framework. The five synergies map onto distinct theories of economic rent: RBV theories, IO economics, the relational view, social networks theory, and stakeholder theory. This results in a classification focused on sources of synergy rather than their manifestations (e.g., abnormal returns, revenues, and costs), which has been the focus of most prior research (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001; Capron & Pistre, 2002). 我们通过三种方式将这些外部合作视角纳入并购研究。首先，我们基于两个潜在维度，构建了一个理论上简洁的五种潜在协同来源类型学：有价值活动发生的分析层面（企业、二元组、网络、行业或制度背景），以及管理这些活动的治理导向（命令控制、合作或市场竞争）。这使我们能够引入三种新的协同类型——关系型、网络型和非市场型，并将文献中长期研究的两种协同类型（内部型，也称为运营型，以及市场力量型）纳入一个系统框架。这五种协同效应对应不同的经济租金理论：资源基础观（RBV）理论、产业组织（IO）经济学、关系观、社会网络理论和利益相关者理论。这一分类侧重于协同效应的来源而非其表现形式（例如，异常回报、收入和成本），而这正是大多数先前研究的焦点（Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001；Capron & Pistre, 2002）。

Second, we introduce a dynamic notion of value realization in M&A by developing the concept of synergy life cycles. We explore heterogeneity across the five synergies in the timing of two post-merger phases: the initial realization of the gain and the length of its duration before it fades away. Research on post-merger integration has provided insights primarily on the drivers of value realization for internal (or operational) synergies (e.g., Graebner, 2004; Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy, 2003; Sherman & Rupert, 2006). We know less about post-merger processes involving the external assets and relationships that give rise to the other four synergy types. We argue that the activities at different levels of analysis (one of the dimensions underlying our typology) are associated with differences in the extent to which postmerger integration is required. The more integration is required, the longer the initial realization of synergy takes. We further argue that differences in the orientation by which resources and activities are governed (the second dimension of our typology) leads to variance in the control the combined firm has over the sources of synergy. The greater the control, the longer the duration of synergies. Based on these ideas, we develop testable empirical predictions explaining relative differences in synergy realization and duration timing across the five synergy types and about the unique factors that create variance in realization and duration timing within types. 其次，我们通过发展协同生命周期的概念，引入并购中价值实现的动态概念。我们探讨了五个协同效应在两个并购后阶段时间安排上的异质性：收益的初始实现以及其在消失前的持续时长。关于并购后整合的研究主要提供了内部（或运营）协同效应价值实现驱动因素的见解（例如，Graebner，2004；Meyer & Lieb-Dóczy，2003；Sherman & Rupert，2006）。我们对涉及外部资产和关系（这些资产和关系产生其他四种协同效应类型）的并购后流程了解较少。我们认为，不同分析层面的活动（我们分类法的基础维度之一）与并购后整合所需程度的差异相关。整合需求越高，协同效应的初始实现所需时间越长。我们进一步认为，资源和活动管理方向的差异（我们分类法的第二个维度）会导致合并企业对协同效应来源的控制力存在差异。控制力越强，协同效应的持续时间越长。基于这些观点，我们提出可检验的实证预测，解释五种协同效应类型之间协同实现和持续时间的相对差异，以及在类型内部导致实现和持续时间差异的独特因素。

Third, we explore how the five synergy types interact with one another, potentially creating cosynergies and dis-synergies. Co-synergies arise when two distinct sources of value complement each other, and dis-synergies arise when they substitute one another. Accounting for interactions across distinct synergy sources yields a more comprehensive notion of the total value created by an acquisition as the sum of (a) the value created by each individual synergy type, (b) the co-synergies across types, and (c) the dis-synergies across types. This expansive conceptualization involving new synergy types, their distinct life cycles, and their interactions raises several implications for the theory and practice of M&A that would not otherwise become apparent. We explore these implications throughout the paper. 第三，我们探讨五种协同类型之间如何相互作用，可能产生协同增效（cosynergies）和协同减效（dis-synergies）。协同增效发生在两种不同的价值来源相互补充时，而协同减效发生在它们相互替代时。考虑不同协同来源之间的相互作用，能更全面地理解收购所创造的总价值，这一总价值由（a）每种单独协同类型创造的价值、（b）不同类型之间的协同增效，以及（c）不同类型之间的协同减效之和构成。这种涉及新协同类型、其独特生命周期及相互作用的广泛概念化，为并购的理论和实践带来了若干启示，而这些启示在其他情况下是不会显现的。我们将在本文中探讨这些启示。

BACKGROUND

背景

Synergy in M&A arises when the value of the acquirer and target as a single entity exceeds the summed value of the two firms operating individually: Value $[ \mathrm { A } + \mathrm { T } ] > \mathrm { V a l u e } [ \mathrm { A } ] + \mathrm { V a l u e } [ \mathrm { T } ] .$ Acquirers profit from synergies through higher revenues or lower costs (Shaver, 2006), conditional on paying a price that does not exceed the value created (Barney, 1988). But revenues and costs are only manifestations of synergies, not the underlying sources, as are other common metrics like abnormal stock returns and accounting profits (for an insightful discussion of this issue, see Sheen, 2014). Extant literature has focused on understanding and measuring synergy manifestations, which is important because it helps us know whether synergy exists. However, in virtually all the peer-reviewed work we evaluated, the concept of synergy is not developed in a systematic theoretical framework that explains where economic rents come from. As noted in the most highly cited article we reviewed, “we hope that … research will move beyond the basic issue of measuring and assigning gains and losses to tackle the more fundamental question of how mergers actually create or destroy value” (Andrade et al., 2001: 104). 并购中的协同效应产生于收购方和目标方作为一个整体的价值超过两家公司各自独立运营时的价值总和：价值 $[ \mathrm{A} + \mathrm{T} ] > \mathrm{Value} [ \mathrm{A} ] + \mathrm{Value} [ \mathrm{T} ]$。收购方通过更高的收入或更低的成本从协同效应中获利（Shaver, 2006），但前提是支付的价格不超过创造的价值（Barney, 1988）。然而，收入和成本只是协同效应的表现形式，而非根本来源，其他常见指标如异常股票回报率和会计利润也是如此（关于这一问题的深入讨论，参见Sheen, 2014）。现有文献侧重于理解和衡量协同效应的表现形式，这一点很重要，因为它能帮助我们判断协同效应是否存在。然而，在我们评估的几乎所有同行评审研究中，协同效应的概念都没有在一个系统的理论框架中得到发展，而该框架能够解释经济租金的来源。正如我们所评审的被引用次数最多的文章中所指出的：“我们希望……研究将超越衡量和分配收益与损失这一基本问题，转而解决并购实际上如何创造或破坏价值这一更根本的问题”（Andrade et al., 2001: 104）。

Consistent with this call, we focus on a less wellunderstood issue: what are the sources of synergy? A source-focused view fits better with the essence of the concept: the complementary combination of two firms’ pre-existing assets (broadly defined) can produce gains through economies of scale or scope or other mechanisms that enhance profits (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Milgrom & Roberts, 1995; Shaver, 2006).1 But multiple types of asset combinations could lead to profitable acquisitions, and the literature has not systematically explored that issue. A natural starting point is thus to ask what kinds of assets are being combined by an acquisition, why that combination is valuable, and what it takes to successfully achieve it given the nature of the assets involved. Our first step is to develop a parsimonious, theoretically grounded typology of synergies based on distinct sources of value. We then explore how this typology affects the dynamics of synergy realization, as well as how different synergy types may reinforce or undermine one another. 与这一研究思路一致，我们聚焦于一个尚未得到充分理解的问题：协同效应的来源是什么？一种以来源为导向的视角更契合该概念的本质：两家企业既有资产（广义定义）的互补性组合，可通过规模经济、范围经济或其他提升利润的机制产生收益（Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004；Milgrom & Roberts, 1995；Shaver, 2006）¹。但多种类型的资产组合都可能带来盈利性收购，而现有文献尚未系统地探讨这一问题。因此，一个自然的出发点是询问收购中究竟是哪些类型的资产在被组合，这种组合为何具有价值，以及考虑到所涉及资产的特性，实现这种组合需要具备哪些条件。我们的第一步是基于不同的价值来源，构建一个简约且有理论依据的协同效应类型学。随后，我们将探讨这一类型学如何影响协同效应实现的动态过程，以及不同类型的协同效应可能如何相互强化或相互削弱。

Systematic Review of Research on Value in M&A

并购价值研究系统综述

As a basis for developing our typology, we conducted a systematic review of peer-reviewed research on value and synergy in M&A using the methodology in Crossan and Apaydin (2010). To keep this paper focused on the more novel aspects of our theorizing, the full details of the review can be found in online Appendix A, including a deep dive into how our ideas relate to prior work. Here we touch only upon key issues necessary to build our ideas. 作为构建我们类型学的基础，我们采用Crossan和Apaydin（2010）的方法论，对并购中价值与协同效应的同行评审研究进行了系统性综述。为了使本文专注于我们理论化中更具创新性的方面，综述的全部细节可在在线附录A中找到，其中包括对我们的观点如何与先前研究相关的深入探讨。在此，我们仅涉及构建我们观点所必需的关键问题。

Types of synergy mentioned in prior research. Prior work has discussed several different types of 先前研究中提到的协同作用类型。先前的研究讨论了几种不同的

M&A gains (see Figure A1-2 of online Appendix A). The two most commonly mentioned in all fields studying M&A have been internal operational or efficiency improvements $( 4 7 . 1 %$ and increases in firms’ market power $\left( 1 6 . 5 % \right)$ . Studies in finance and accounting have also considered financial or tax benefits $\left( 7 . 6 % \right)$ . Another common view has emphasized agency-governance misalignments as constraints to value creation and appropriation $\left( 1 6 . 2 % \right)$ .2 并购收益（见在线附录A的图A1-2）。在所有研究并购的领域中，最常被提及的两个因素是内部运营或效率提升（47.1%）以及企业市场力量的增强（16.5%）。金融和会计领域的研究也考虑了财务或税收收益（7.6%）。另一种常见观点强调代理-治理错位是价值创造和获取的制约因素（16.2%）。

External cooperative sources of value have been overlooked. The emphasis on operational or efficiency improvements and on market power synergies can be traced to the influence of two dominant theories of value creation: IO economics and the RBV (Porter, 1980; Wernerfelt, 1984). Montgomery (1994) offered an excellent summary of their relevance to acquisitions. Those theories emphasize economic rents stemming from assets owned by the merging firms and managed through competitive interactions. 外部合作价值来源被忽视了。对运营或效率提升以及市场力量协同效应的强调，可以追溯到两种占主导地位的价值创造理论的影响：产业组织经济学（IO经济学）和资源基础观（RBV）（Porter, 1980；Wernerfelt, 1984）。Montgomery（1994）对它们与收购的相关性进行了出色的总结。这些理论强调，经济租金源于合并企业所拥有的资产，并通过竞争性互动进行管理。

Yet in the broader management field, several major theoretical advances since at least the 1980s have demonstrated that economic value also arises from assets shared with other organizations and managed through cooperative interactions. These theoretical advances have not systematically made their way into the M&A literature. External cooperative relationships were mentioned as sources of value in fewer than $5 %$ of the M&A studies we reviewed (e.g., Deng et al., 2013; Hernandez & Menon, 2018; Krishnan, Joshi, & Krishnan, 2004; Rogan & Greve, 2015). 然而，在更广泛的管理领域，至少自20世纪80年代以来，几项重大理论进展表明，经济价值也来自于与其他组织共享并通过合作互动进行管理的资产。这些理论进展尚未系统地进入并购文献。在我们回顾的并购研究中，外部合作关系被提及为价值来源的情况不到5%（例如，Deng等人，2013；Hernandez & Menon，2018；Krishnan、Joshi & Krishnan，2004；Rogan & Greve，2015）。

We argue that three broad literatures reflecting sources of external cooperative value, at different levels of analysis, can help provide a more comprehensive understanding of where gains come from in M&A. First, the relational view shows that value can arise from repeated exchanges with individual partners outside the boundaries of the firm (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). Second, the social networks perspective demonstrates that the structure created by multiple dyadic ties (including direct and indirect connections) has value beyond any individual tie (e.g., Gulati, 1998; Zaheer, Gözübüyük, & Milanov, 2010). Third, stakeholder theory emphasizes that relations with nonmarket actors (e.g., governments, communities, and NGOs) play a distinct role in firms’ ability to appropriate value from their environments (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Henisz et al., 2014).3 We explain how each perspective relates to M&A synergies in this paper. 我们认为，从不同分析层面反映外部合作价值来源的三大类文献，有助于更全面地理解并购中收益的来源。首先，关系视角表明，价值可能来自与企业边界之外的个体合作伙伴的重复交流（例如，Dyer & Singh，1998；Lavie，2006）。其次，社会网络视角证明，由多个二元关系（包括直接和间接联系）形成的结构，其价值超越了任何单一关系（例如，Gulati，1998；Zaheer、Gözübüyük & Milanov，2010）。第三，利益相关者理论强调，与非市场行为体（例如政府、社区和非政府组织）的关系在企业从环境中获取价值的能力中发挥着独特作用（例如，Freeman，1984；Henisz等人，2014）。3 本文将解释每个视角如何与并购协同效应相关联。

The effect of M&A on “hybrid” governance structures needs to be reconsidered. The transaction cost economics (TCE) focus on markets versus hierarchies accounted for traditional views of M&A (Schilling & Steensma, 2002; Williamson, 1975), but research on alliances led TCE scholars to consider governance solutions that are neither market nor hierarchy. While some scholars have objected to the “hybrid” characterization and its application to M&A (Powell, 1990; Schilling & Steensma, 2002), the firms versus markets dichotomy is insufficient to explain the total value created by M&A. The corporate strategy literature has studied hybrid organizational forms by exploring alliances (e.g., Gulati, 1998), delineating the choice between M&A and alliances (e.g., Villalonga & McGahan, 2005), and considering how pre-acquisition alliances affect subsequent acquisitions (e.g., Zaheer, Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010). Of course, from a TCE perspective, all acquisitions involve a decision to govern activities internally. To this, we add a crucial and overlooked point: not all the valuable assets and activities associated with the target are governed through hierarchy (ownership and control) post-acquisition. The acquirer also inherits and recombines other valuable interactions located outside the boundaries of the acquirer or the target, some of which will be governed by “hybrid” modes (e.g., alliances) and others through “market” modes, resulting in various new channels of potential gains beyond those governed through hierarchy. 并购对“混合”治理结构的影响需要重新审视。交易成本经济学（TCE）关注市场与层级组织的对比，这解释了并购的传统观点（Schilling & Steensma, 2002；Williamson, 1975），但联盟研究促使TCE学者考虑既非市场也非层级的治理方案。尽管一些学者反对“混合”这一表述及其在并购中的应用（Powell, 1990；Schilling & Steensma, 2002），但企业与市场的二分法不足以解释并购创造的全部价值。企业战略文献通过研究联盟（例如Gulati, 1998）、阐述并购与联盟的选择（例如Villalonga & McGahan, 2005），以及考察收购前联盟对后续收购的影响（例如Zaheer, Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010），来研究混合组织形式。当然，从TCE视角来看，所有收购都涉及内部治理活动的决策。在此基础上，我们补充一个关键且被忽视的观点：并非所有与目标公司相关的有价值资产和活动在收购后都通过层级（所有权和控制）进行治理。收购方还继承并重组了收购方或目标公司边界之外的其他有价值互动，其中一些将通过“混合”模式（例如联盟）治理，另一些通过“市场”模式治理，从而产生超越层级治理的各种新潜在收益渠道。

A TYPOLOGY OF SYNERGIES

协同作用的类型学

To address the foregoing issues, we propose a typology of synergies that rests on the two underlying dimensions depicted in Figure 1: (a) the governance orientation of the assets, activities, and relationships that create value for the merging firms; and (b) the level of analysis at which those assets, activities, and relationships operate. The governance orientation ranges from fiat, where the merging firms 为解决上述问题，我们提出一种协同效应的类型学，该类型学基于图1中描绘的两个基本维度：(a) 创造价值的资产、活动和关系的治理导向，这些资产、活动和关系为合并后的企业创造价值；以及 (b) 这些资产、活动和关系运作的分析层面。治理导向的范围从命令控制（fiat）开始，在这种情况下，合并后的企业

FIGURE 1 Typology of Synergies

图1 协同作用类型学

institutional nonmarket
机构非市场

environment synergy industry/ market market power synergy network network synergy dyad relational synergy firm internal synergy governance orientation fiat cooperative market competition 环境协同 产业/市场 市场力量 协同网络 网络协同 二元关系协同 企业内部协同 治理导向 命令型合作 市场竞争

Notes: The juxtaposition of governance orientation and level of analysis define five distinct potential sources of synergy created by M&A. The white space in the figure reflects intersections that are undefined (e.g., governance by fiat only applies at the level of the firm but not at the other levels). The two dimensions (level of analysis and governance orientation) directly affect synergy life cycles. Different levels of analysis are associated with different post-acquisition integration requirements, affecting the timing of initial synergy realization. Different governance orientations are associated with varying levels of post-acquisition control, affecting synergy duration. See Table 3 and the main text for a full explanation. 注：治理导向与分析层面的并置定义了并购创造的五种不同潜在协同来源。图中的空白区域反映了未定义的交叉点（例如，命令式治理仅适用于企业层面，而不适用于其他层面）。这两个维度（分析层面和治理导向）直接影响协同生命周期。不同的分析层面对应不同的收购后整合要求，影响初始协同实现的时间。不同的治理导向对应不同程度的收购后控制，影响协同持续时间。完整解释见表格3和正文。

exercise full authority over the internal factors that generate synergies, to cooperation, where the merging firms collaborate with external parties to generate value, to market competition, where the merging firms engage in competitive interactions to extract gains from rivals. The three orientations come directly from the TCE distinctions among hierarchy (fiat), market (competition), and hybrid (cooperation) (Williamson, 1991). We use labels focused on the governance orientation rather than the organizational solution because it is more appropriate for explaining the sources of value, as will become apparent later. 对产生协同效应的内部因素拥有完全控制权，到合作，即合并企业与外部方协作以创造价值，再到市场竞争，即合并企业参与竞争性互动以从竞争对手那里获取收益。这三种导向直接源于交易成本经济学（TCE）对层级（权威）、市场（竞争）和混合（合作）的区分（Williamson，1991）。我们使用侧重于治理导向而非组织解决方案的标签，因为这更适合解释价值的来源，这一点将在后面变得明显。

The governance orientation is insufficient to identify the sources of value because the activities involved in value creation post-acquisition occur at distinct levels of analysis. Activities governed by fiat occur within firm boundaries. Every other activity occurs outside the boundaries of the combined firm. The most immediate level beyond the firm is the dyad, which refers to contractual cooperative partnerships with individual third parties (e.g., an alliance partner). The next level is the network, comprising the structure of the combined firms’ direct and indirect cooperative ties (e.g., multiple alliances). Beyond the network are interactions with other actors not necessarily contractually involved with the focal firm but that affect the value it can create and capture. Some of those interactions (e.g., with rivals or suppliers) are competitive, occurring at the level of the industry or market, whereas other interactions (e.g., with communities or the media) are noncompetitive and occur in the institutional environment (the highest level of analysis). Figure 2 depicts the variety and complexity of interactions among actors at different levels of analysis that give rise to potential synergies. 治理方向不足以识别价值来源，因为收购后创造价值所涉及的活动发生在不同的分析层面。由命令控制的活动发生在企业边界内。其他所有活动都发生在合并后企业的边界之外。企业之外最直接的层面是二元关系，指与单个第三方的契约合作关系（例如，联盟伙伴）。下一个层面是网络，由合并后企业的直接和间接合作关系的结构组成（例如，多个联盟）。在网络之外的是与其他参与者的互动，这些参与者不一定与核心企业有契约关系，但会影响其创造和获取价值的能力。其中一些互动（例如，与竞争对手或供应商）是竞争性的，发生在行业或市场层面，而其他互动（例如，与社区或媒体）是非竞争性的，发生在制度环境中（分析的最高层面）。图2描绘了不同分析层面的参与者之间互动的多样性和复杂性，这些互动可能产生协同效应。

FIGURE 2 Locus of Value for Different Synergy Types
图2 不同协同类型的价值轨迹

dotted line. 虚线。

Juxtaposing the two dimensions allows us to parsimoniously classify five synergy types: internal, market power, relational, network, and nonmarket.4 将这两个维度并列，可以让我们简洁地将五种协同类型分类：内部协同、市场力量协同、关系协同、网络协同和非市场协同。4

We elaborate on each of them in the following sections. To aid in this exercise, Table 1 summarizes the main attributes of each synergy type, and Table 2 articulates key distinctions between pairs of synergy types. 我们将在以下各节中详细阐述每一种。为便于这一工作，表1总结了每种协同类型的主要属性，表2阐明了不同协同类型对之间的关键区别。

Internal Synergies

内部协同

As noted earlier, the dominant perspective on M&A comes from studies that have conceptualized economic rents as arising from efficiency (vs. power). Synergies in this tradition are based on resources and capabilities that merging firms legally own and control and thus can be governed through fiat (Kaul & Wu, 2016). This encompasses many kinds of internal asset recombinations (e.g., machinery, R&D pipelines, employees, and teams), as long as common ownership is more valuable than separate ownership. We call these internal synergies.5 Figure 2 depicts internal gains as the combination of A (acquirer) and T (target) only; they do not require the combination of any of the external elements of the firms’ environment such as suppliers, buyers, alliance partners, or stakeholders. These external elements may be affected by the merger (e.g., the combined technologies of A and T increase demand from buyers), but the underlying source of value lies within the boundaries of the combined firm. This will become clearer as we discuss the other synergy types and their key differences (see Table 2). 如前所述，关于并购的主流观点来自那些将经济租金概念化为源于效率（而非权力）的研究。在这一传统中，协同效应基于合并企业合法拥有和控制的资源与能力，因此可以通过命令（Kaul & Wu，2016）进行管理。这包括多种内部资产重组（例如，机器、研发管线、员工和团队），只要共同所有权比单独所有权更有价值。我们将这些称为内部协同效应。5 图 2 仅将内部收益描绘为收购方（A）和目标方（T）的组合；它们不需要合并企业环境中的任何外部要素（如供应商、买家、联盟伙伴或利益相关者）。这些外部要素可能会受到合并的影响（例如，A 和 T 的组合技术增加了买家的需求），但价值的根本来源在于合并后企业的边界内。随着我们讨论其他协同效应类型及其关键差异，这一点将变得更加清晰（见表 2）。

TABLE 1 Typology of Acquisition Synergies
表1 收购协同效应类型

Market Power Synergies

市场力量协同效应

The literature on M&A has drawn heavily from I0 economics, which emphasizes competitive interactions through “vertical” exchanges with suppliers and buyers or “horizontal” exchanges with rivals. Economic rents arise from reducing the power of counterparties in competition-governed interactions. As Williamson (1975) noted, an acquisition is often the only way to gain market power (instead of “legal collusion”) because the costs of coordinating and contracting oligopolistic activities are higher than the costs of internalizing them.6 Acquisitions facilitate vertical integration to gain buying or pricing power, horizontal integration to eliminate or control industry rivals, and other changes that enhance market influence. Figure 2 depicts how market power gains arise from changes in the competitive relations of the acquirer and target. 关于并购的文献大量借鉴了产业组织经济学（I0 economics），该理论强调通过与供应商和买家的“纵向”交易或与竞争对手的“横向”交易来实现竞争互动。经济租金产生于在竞争主导的互动中削弱交易对手的议价能力。正如威廉姆森（1975）所指出的，收购往往是获得市场力量的唯一途径（而非“合法合谋”），因为协调和签订寡头垄断活动的成本高于将其内部化的成本。6 收购有助于实现纵向整合以获得采购或定价权，横向整合以消除或控制行业竞争对手，以及其他增强市场影响力的变革。图2描述了市场力量的获得如何源于收购方和目标方竞争关系的变化。

TABLE 2 Distinctions Between Synergy Types
表2 协同类型的区别

Notes: The rows explain the differences with respect to the types in the columns. 注：这些行解释了与列中类型的差异。

Internal and market power synergies are well known, so we have covered them briefly. The next three types are novel and require lengthier exposition, including examples to illustrate some of their main features. 内部和市场力量的协同效应是众所周知的，因此我们已简要介绍过。接下来的三种类型是新颖的，需要更详细的阐述，包括举例说明其部分主要特征。

Relational Synergies

关系协同效应

While resource-based theories emphasize the ownership of internal assets, research on inter-firm relationships has recognized that value can arise from assets collaboratively shared with other firms (Lavie, 2006). Such value involves partner-specific assets such as mutual trust, governance routines, contracting capabilities, or knowledge-exchange capacity (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002; Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Figure 2 depicts relational synergies by showing how the combination of the acquirer and target $\left( \mathrm { A } + \mathrm { T } \right)$ may help them create more value with other individual partners, like p1, p3, or p5, that are affected by the deal (Rogan, 2013; Rogan & Greve, 2015; Wiles, Morgan, & Rego, 2012). Such partners could be vertical (suppliers or buyers) or horizontal (alliance partners or other collaborators). 虽然基于资源的理论强调对内部资产的所有权，但对企业间关系的研究已认识到，价值可以来自与其他企业合作共享的资产（Lavie, 2006）。这种价值涉及特定于合作伙伴的资产，例如相互信任、治理惯例、契约能力或知识交流能力（Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002; Elfenbein & Zenger, 2013; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998）。图2通过展示收购方和目标方（A + T）的组合如何帮助它们与其他受交易影响的个体合作伙伴（如p1、p3或p5）创造更多价值，来描绘关系协同效应（Rogan, 2013; Rogan & Greve, 2015; Wiles, Morgan, & Rego, 2012）。此类合作伙伴可以是纵向的（供应商或买方）或横向的（联盟伙伴或其他合作者）。

Table 2 contrasts relational synergies with other types. Internal synergies are driven only by the combination of assets owned by the acquirer and target, not partner-specific assets. For example, if two firms combine their alliance management capabilities (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002) to better manage any collaborative project, that would be an internal synergy. In contrast, relational synergies involve the creation or improvement of partner-specific assets that allow the combined firm to derive more value from specific external partners (e.g., p3 in Figure 2). Like market power synergies, relational gains make interactions with other firms more profitable. But they are distinct in two ways. First, the exchange producing relational rents is governed cooperatively, not competitively (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Second, market power synergies give the acquirer power over a counterparty (zero sum), while relational synergies allow both parties to create and appropriate more value. 表2对比了关系协同效应与其他类型协同效应。内部协同效应仅由收购方和目标方拥有的资产组合驱动，而非特定于合作伙伴的资产。例如，如果两家公司结合其联盟管理能力（Kale、Dyer和Singh，2002）以更好地管理任何合作项目，这将是一种内部协同效应。相比之下，关系协同效应涉及创建或改进特定于合作伙伴的资产，使合并后的公司能够从特定外部合作伙伴（例如图2中的p3）中获得更多价值。与市场力量协同效应类似，关系收益使与其他公司的互动更有利可图。但它们在两个方面存在区别。首先，产生关系租金的交换是通过合作而非竞争来管理的（Dyer & Singh，1998）。其次，市场力量协同效应赋予收购方对交易对手的权力（零和），而关系协同效应则允许双方创造并获取更多价值。

The acquisition of Gillette by Procter and Gamble (P&G) illustrates some aspects of relational synergies. Gillette offered a set of trade terms and incentives to its customers (e.g., retailers and distributors) 宝洁公司（P&G）收购吉列公司的案例体现了关系协同效应的某些方面。吉列向其客户（如零售商和经销商）提供了一系列贸易条款和激励措施。

that P&G had never before implemented. According to the COO of P&G, “P&G would provide the value of its broad product line and likely get favorable payment terms. It would then combine them with Gillette’s return-on-investment, pay-for-performance criteria on the demand-creation side to create an integrated trade terms model” (Kanter & Bird, 2009a: 9). Two improvements in bilateral relationships with customers emerged: attracting more customers (an internal synergy) and transacting more effectively with each of those customers by offering better terms for both sides (a relational synergy). 这是宝洁公司（P&G）从未实施过的。据宝洁公司首席运营官称：“宝洁将提供其广泛产品线的价值，并可能获得有利的付款条件。然后，它将把这些与吉列的投资回报率、按需创造方面的绩效付费标准相结合，以创建一个整合的贸易条款模型”（Kanter & Bird, 2009a: 9）。与客户双边关系的两个改进出现了：吸引更多客户（内部协同效应）以及通过为双方提供更好的条款与这些客户中的每一个进行更有效的交易（关系协同效应）。

Network Synergies

网络协同效应

Beyond the relational value of dyadic ties, the structural positions a firm occupies in the network generated by the totality of a firm’s direct and indirect ties can be valuable. These positions are manifested in metrics such as centrality, structural holes, or equivalence. From a network lens, an acquisition is a “collapse” of two nodes $\mathrm { ( A + T ) }$ in which the acquirer inherits the contractual ties of the target (see Figure 2). Recent studies have demonstrated that a firm may pursue “network synergies” by acquiring a target whose alliance network, when combined with that of the acquirer, puts the combined entity in an improved structural position (Hernandez & Menon, 2018, 2020; Hernandez & Shaver, 2019). Network synergies are driven by two kinds of changes: inheriting new ties that the target firm brings to the acquirer’s pre-existing network (additive) or eliminating redundant ties that the acquirer and target had in common (subtractive) (Hernandez & Shaver, 2019). In the first case, value comes from novel network resources (Saboo, Sharma, Chakravarty, & Kumar, 2017). In the second case, value arises from greater exclusivity in access to network resources. 除了二元关系的关系价值外，企业在其直接和间接关系总和所形成的网络中占据的结构性位置也可能具有价值。这些位置通过中心性、结构洞或等价性等指标体现。从网络视角来看，收购是两个节点（A + T）的“合并”，其中收购方继承目标公司的契约关系（见图2）。近期研究表明，企业可能通过收购目标公司来追求“网络协同效应”，即目标公司的联盟网络与收购方的联盟网络结合后，能使合并后的实体处于更优的结构性位置（Hernandez & Menon, 2018, 2020；Hernandez & Shaver, 2019）。网络协同效应由两类变化驱动：一是继承目标公司为收购方现有网络带来的新关系（加法效应），二是消除收购方与目标公司之间的冗余关系（减法效应）（Hernandez & Shaver, 2019）。在前一种情况下，价值来源于新颖的网络资源（Saboo, Sharma, Chakravarty, & Kumar, 2017）；在后一种情况下，价值则来自于对网络资源的更高排他性获取。

While value lies in cooperative external ties for both network and relational synergies, these differ in their levels of analysis (see Figure 2 and Table 2). Relational synergies enhance the gains from individual direct ties. Network synergies improve the acquirer’s position in a network encompassing all the direct ties and indirect ties of the combined firms. Market power synergies could be thought of narrowly in network terms: the acquirer gains influence by eliminating a node (e.g., a rival) or a tie from the network (e.g., a redundant supplier or buyer). But the market power scenario is based on changes in individual links (e.g., a single supplier), not on enhancing the structure of the entire ego network by combining all the ties of the acquirer and target. 虽然价值在于网络和关系协同的合作外部联系，但两者的分析层面有所不同（见图2和表2）。关系协同增强了个体直接联系带来的收益。网络协同则提升了收购方在一个包含合并后企业所有直接联系和间接联系的网络中的地位。市场力量协同可以从狭义的网络角度来理解：收购方通过消除网络中的一个节点（例如竞争对手）或一条联系（例如冗余的供应商或买家）来获得影响力。但市场力量情景是基于个体联系的变化（例如单个供应商），而非通过合并收购方和目标公司的所有联系来增强整个自我网络的结构。

The life sciences company QLT acquired Atrix Laboratories in 2004. In addition to internal gains from technology and product combinations, the press release noted that Atrix’s “strategic alliances with such pharmaceutical companies as Pfizer, Novartis, Sanofi-Synthelabo, Fujisawa and Aventis” were valuable for QLT, and that “this transaction [would] accelerate both companies’ strategic initiatives [through] multiple partnered commercial and near commercial products . . . beyond what either company might have achieved independently” (PR Newswire, 2004, emphasis added). A unique aspect of this deal was the value of combining Atrix’s full portfolio (vs. a single tie) of R&D alliances with that of QLT to generate an improved network of partnered projects. 生命科学公司QLT于2004年收购了Atrix实验室。除了技术和产品组合带来的内部收益外，新闻稿还指出，Atrix与辉瑞、诺华、赛诺菲-安万特、藤泽和安万特等制药公司的“战略联盟”对QLT具有重要价值，并且“此次交易[将]通过多个合作的商业和即将商业化的产品……加速两家公司的战略举措，其效果远超任何一家公司独立所能实现的”（PR Newswire，2004年，重点强调）。此次交易的一个独特之处在于，将Atrix完整的研发联盟组合（而非单一合作）与QLT的研发联盟组合相结合，从而形成了一个更完善的合作项目网络，这一组合的价值显著。

Nonmarket Synergies

非市场协同效应

In addition to interactions with contractual business partners, firms interact with various stakeholders in the nonmarket environment (Baron, 1995). These “secondary” stakeholders usually do not have formal contracts with the firm, but good relationships with them create economic value through legitimacy (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This source of value is nontrivial and distinct from other sources—as increasingly shown by research on stakeholder management (e.g., Henisz et al., 2014), corporate social responsibility (e.g., Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014), and social movements (e.g., King & Soule, 2007). 除了与契约商业伙伴的互动外，企业还会与非市场环境中的各类利益相关者进行互动（Baron，1995）。这些“次要”利益相关者通常与企业没有正式合同，但与他们建立良好关系可以通过合法性创造经济价值（Ahuja & Yayavaram，2011；DiMaggio & Powell，1983）。这一价值来源至关重要，并且与其他来源不同——越来越多的研究，如利益相关者管理（例如，Henisz等人，2014）、企业社会责任（例如，Eccles、Ioannou & Serafeim，2014）和社会运动（例如，King & Soule，2007），都在不断证明这一点。

Nonmarket stakeholders affect M&A synergy because “acquisitions bring multiple stakeholder[s] together” (Bosse, Harrison, & Hoskisson, 2020:13) and provide an opportunity to redefine the expectations and rules of engagement with those stakeholders (Krishnan et al., 2004). Research has distinguished between stakeholders (e.g., community, trade associations, and nonprofits) and social issues (e.g., environment, diversity, and human rights). Nonmarket synergies may arise from postacquisition combinations of stakeholders with interests in similar issues (e.g., women’s rights) or from creating novel coalitions of stakeholders with interests in dissimilar but convergent issues (e.g., women’s rights and diversity in general).7 非市场利益相关者会影响并购协同效应，因为“收购将多个利益相关者聚集在一起”（Bosse, Harrison, & Hoskisson, 2020:13），并提供了重新定义与这些利益相关者互动的期望和规则的机会（Krishnan et al., 2004）。研究区分了利益相关者（例如社区、行业协会和非营利组织）和社会问题（例如环境、多样性和人权）。非市场协同效应可能来自收购后具有相似问题利益的利益相关者的组合（例如，妇女权利），或者来自创建具有不同但趋同问题利益的利益相关者的新型联盟（例如，妇女权利和一般多样性）。7

Nonmarket synergies are similar to relational and network gains because they result from external cooperative relationships; however, the latter two arise from interactions with other firms with common economic interests (e.g., a buyer and a supplier), usually governed by a legal contract. Nonmarket synergies, in contrast, bring the combined firm $\mathrm { ( A ~ + ~ T ) }$ together with parties from the broader environment that have distinct societal roles (e.g., NGO or government) within the realm of nonmarket strategy (see Figure 2). 非市场协同效应与关系型和网络型收益相似，因为它们都源于外部合作关系；然而，后两者源于与具有共同经济利益的其他企业（例如买方和供应商）的互动，通常受法律合同约束。相比之下，非市场协同效应将合并后的企业（A + T）与更广泛环境中在非市场战略领域具有不同社会角色的各方（例如非政府组织或政府）结合在一起（见图2）。

Unilever acquired the outspoken and socially conscious ice cream maker Ben & Jerry’s in 2000. While the deal raised eyebrows among stakeholders of both companies, Unilever saw the deal as about more than gaining a valuable brand—it was an opportunity to signal its intent to take CSR seriously in the eyes of both firms’ stakeholders, which required harmonizing two distinct coalitions of nonmarket interests. Terms of the deal included pledges to preserve Ben & Jerry’s socially responsible practices. Ben Cohen, founder of Ben & Jerry’s, expressed that “what Ben & Jerry’s is in the process of becoming is an entity inside a larger business, trying to infuse [social] values in that larger business” (Bourgeois, Mariani, & Yu, 2003: 4). 联合利华在2000年收购了直言不讳且具有社会责任感的冰淇淋制造商本杰瑞（Ben & Jerry’s）。尽管这笔交易引起了两家公司利益相关者的关注，但联合利华认为这笔交易不仅仅是获得一个有价值的品牌——这是一个向双方利益相关者表明其认真对待企业社会责任（CSR）的机会，而这需要协调两个截然不同的非市场利益相关者联盟。交易条款包括承诺保留本杰瑞的社会责任感实践。本杰瑞的创始人本·科恩（Ben Cohen）表示，“本杰瑞正在成为的是一家大型企业内部的实体，试图将[社会]价值观融入这家大型企业”（Bourgeois, Mariani, & Yu, 2003: 4）。

SYNERGY LIFE CYCLES

协同生命周期

So far, we have emphasized how the five-synergy typology offers a framework to understand distinct sources of potential synergy. We now explore several important considerations arising from the typology as they pertain to the realization of synergies. 到目前为止，我们强调了五协同类型学如何为理解潜在协同效应的不同来源提供框架。现在，我们将探讨该类型学中与协同效应实现相关的几个重要考量因素。

Systematic Review of Research on Post-Merger Integration

并购后整合研究系统综述

Because research on post-merger integration has said the most about value realization, we conducted a systematic review of that literature, using the same methodology as before. The full exposition is in online Appendix B. Here, we briefly summarize the two observations most relevant to our concept of synergy life cycles (which we introduce shortly). 由于关于并购后整合的研究对价值实现的阐述最为深入，我们采用与之前相同的方法，对该领域的文献进行了系统性综述。完整的阐述见在线附录B。在此，我们简要总结与我们提出的协同生命周期概念（稍后介绍）最相关的两个观察结果。

Research emphasizes integration involving the acquirer and target, not external third parties affected by the deal. The post-merger integration literature has focused heavily on the internal fit between acquirers and targets, especially on employee-, cultural-, and human resource-related dimensions. A small handful of the papers we reviewed (mainly from marketing) also considered customers or suppliers as part of the integration process (Anderson, Havila, & Salmi, 2001; Briscoe & Tsai, 2011; Kato & Schoenberg, 2014; Öberg, 2014; Palmatier, Miao, & Fang, 2007), and none contemplated network partners or nonmarket stakeholders. Some of the papers we reviewed linked the type of synergy pursued to variation in post-merger integration processes, but those that did only considered internal or market power synergies (e.g., Graebner, 2004; Rabier, 2017). We found no studies linking relational, network, or nonmarket gains to variation in post-merger integration. 研究强调整合涉及收购方和目标公司，而非受交易影响的外部第三方。合并后整合的相关文献大量聚焦于收购方与目标公司之间的内部契合度，尤其关注员工、文化及人力资源相关维度。我们回顾的少数几篇论文（主要来自市场营销领域）也将客户或供应商纳入整合过程（Anderson, Havila, & Salmi, 2001；Briscoe & Tsai, 2011；Kato & Schoenberg, 2014；Öberg, 2014；Palmatier, Miao, & Fang, 2007），但均未考虑网络合作伙伴或非市场利益相关者。我们回顾的部分论文将所追求的协同效应类型与合并后整合流程的差异联系起来，但这些研究仅考虑了内部或市场力量协同效应（例如，Graebner, 2004；Rabier, 2017）。我们未发现任何将关系、网络或非市场收益与合并后整合差异联系起来的研究。

The timing of synergy realization and duration are overlooked. The notion of integration implies that synergy gains take some time to materialize and, if realized, that gains should fade eventually.8 The integration literature has often considered the extent to which merger objectives were accomplished, but it has not considered timing as it pertains to the speed with which firms initially realize gains from M&A nor, especially, to the duration of time over which gains persist. Only three of the papers we reviewed raised the issue of time, but in the context of how the speed of the post-merger integration process itself affects value realization (Maire & Collerette, 2011; Schweizer & Patzelt, 2012; Uzelac, Bauer, Matzler, & Waschak, 2016). 协同实现的时机和持续时间被忽视了。整合的概念意味着协同收益需要一定时间才能显现，并且如果实现，这些收益最终应该会逐渐消失。8 整合文献经常考虑合并目标实现的程度，但它没有考虑与企业最初从并购中实现收益的速度相关的时机问题，尤其是收益持续的时间长度。我们回顾的论文中只有三篇提到了时间问题，但这是在合并后整合过程本身的速度如何影响价值实现的背景下（Maire & Collerette, 2011; Schweizer & Patzelt, 2012; Uzelac, Bauer, Matzler, & Waschak, 2016）。

We see an opening to address these issues in the post-merger integration literature. First, research has implicitly defined post-merger integration as the bringing together of resources or activities within the boundaries of the combined firm. Yet our typology suggests that assets at different levels of analysis outside the boundaries of the combined firm may also need to be integrated after acquisition completion. 我们看到在并购后整合文献中存在解决这些问题的契机。首先，研究隐含地将并购后整合定义为在合并企业边界内整合资源或活动。然而，我们的类型学表明，在收购完成后，合并企业边界外不同分析层面的资产也可能需要整合。

This idea broadens the scope and heterogeneity of the concept of post-merger integration. Second, research has seemed agnostic about the timing of what happens between deal completion and synergy disappearance, which we label the synergy life cycle. A life cycle consists of a series of sequential stages from origin to demise that describe a process (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). We consider two stages relevant to M&A synergies. The first, synergy realization, starts when the deal is completed and lasts until the acquirer begins to accrue benefits from the combination. The second stage, synergy duration, is the period during which the firm accrues the gains of the acquisition, which eventually erode over time. This provides a more dynamic notion of post-merger integration. 这一观点拓宽了并购后整合概念的范围和异质性。其次，研究似乎对交易完成与协同效应消失之间发生的事情的时间安排持不可知态度，我们将其称为协同效应生命周期。生命周期由从起源到消亡的一系列连续阶段组成，描述一个过程（Van de Ven & Poole，1995）。我们考虑与并购协同效应相关的两个阶段。第一个阶段是协同效应实现，从交易完成开始，一直持续到收购方开始从整合中获得收益。第二个阶段是协同效应持续，即公司获得收购收益的时期，这些收益最终会随着时间的推移而侵蚀。这为并购后整合提供了一个更具动态性的概念。

We explore how the five synergy types exhibit heterogeneous life cycle shapes by differing in the timing of value realization and duration. We consider differences across synergy types first, and then we consider variance within synergy types. Table 3 summarizes the main points. 我们探讨了五种协同类型如何通过价值实现的时间和持续时间的不同，呈现出异质性的生命周期形态。我们首先考虑协同类型之间的差异，然后考虑协同类型内部的差异。表3总结了主要要点。

Heterogeneity in Life Cycles Across Synergy Types

协同类型下生命周期的异质性

Our arguments comparing the timing of synergy realization and duration across types are based on two general propositions: 我们比较协同效应实现时间和不同类型持续时间的论点基于两个一般命题：

Proposition 1. Synergy realization across types: The greater the post-acquisition integration required by the combination of assets, activities, and relationships involved in a synergy type, the longer it takes firms to realize value from that synergy type. 命题1. 跨类型协同实现：资产、活动和关系的组合所要求的收购后整合程度越高，企业从该协同类型中实现价值所需的时间就越长。

Proposition 2. Synergy duration across types: The greater the post-acquisition control the combined firm has over the assets, activities, and relationships involved in producing a synergy type, the longer the gains from that synergy type persist. 命题2. 协同效应持续时间（跨类型）：收购后联合企业对产生某类协同效应所涉及的资产、活动和关系的控制权越大，该类协同效应的收益持续时间就越长。

These two propositions correspond to the two dimensions underlying the typology presented in Figure 1. The level of analysis (depicted by the vertical axis in Figure 1) creates variance in the integration required to activate different synergies and thus impacts the timing of initial realization. The governance orientation (depicted by the horizontal axis in Figure 1) affects the control the firm has over the sources of synergy gains and thus impacts the duration of synergies. We expand on each of these two statements in turn. 这两个命题对应于图1所示类型学所基于的两个维度。分析层面（如图1中的纵轴所示）会导致激活不同协同效应所需的整合程度产生差异，进而影响初始实现的时间。治理导向（如图1中的横轴所示）会影响企业对协同收益来源的控制，进而影响协同效应的持续时间。我们将依次详细阐述这两个陈述。

TABLE 3 Synergy Life Cycles
表3 协同生命周期

Synergy realization across types: Integration required. We explained earlier how each of the five synergies arises from combinations of assets, activities, and relationships occurring at different levels of analysis. The integration required to realize synergies varies across these levels of analysis, albeit not in a linear fashion. 跨类型协同实现：需要整合。我们之前解释过，五种协同效应中的每一种是如何从不同分析层面的资产、活动和关系的组合中产生的。实现协同效应所需的整合在这些分析层面上有所不同，但并非以线性方式。

The literature on post-merger integration has said the most about deals involving internal synergies, which serves as a useful benchmark relative to the other four types. Generating value from internal assets (e.g., personnel, intellectual property, or distribution channels) often requires combining previously distinct systems, cultures, and organizations (Capron, 1999; Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Puranam, Singh, & Chaudhuri, 2009). Bringing such assets together typically requires moderate to high integration (Sherman & Rupert, 2006), causing a lag in the timing of the initial realization of internal synergies. 关于并购后整合的文献中，对涉及内部协同效应的交易讨论最多，这作为与其他四种类型相对的有用基准。从内部资产（例如人员、知识产权或分销渠道）创造价值通常需要整合之前独立的系统、文化和组织（Capron，1999；Graebner & Eisenhardt，2004；Puranam，Singh，& Chaudhuri，2009）。将这些资产整合在一起通常需要中等至高度的整合（Sherman & Rupert，2006），这导致内部协同效应初始实现的时间有所滞后。

By comparison, relational synergies require even greater integration because they involve developing trust and joint routines with an external third party in addition to the usual internal integration process. Internally, the firm must bring together personnel and other assets to manage the external partners involved in relational synergies. Externally, the firm must develop or strengthen a relationship with each valuable partner. If the partner used to interact with the acquirer or target separately, the combined firm must learn or update pre-existing relational routines. 相比之下，关系协同需要更深层次的整合，因为除了通常的内部整合流程外，它们还涉及与外部第三方建立信任和共同的惯例。在内部，公司必须整合人员和其他资源，以管理参与关系协同的外部合作伙伴。在外部，公司必须与每个有价值的合作伙伴建立或加强关系。如果合作伙伴过去曾分别与收购方或目标公司互动，合并后的公司必须学习或更新现有的关系惯例。

The acquisition could also result in a relationship with a new third party, in which case both acquirer and target need to develop new interorganizational trust and routines. Regardless, relationship building takes time. In the P&GGillette case, for example, the mutual gains from better trade terms with buyers took time to materialize. Referring to those benefits, the COO of P&G expressed, “Over time it became apparent that Gillette was best in class at a lot of things that P&G wasn’t good at” (emphasis added) (Kanter & Bird, 2009b: 12). P&G then had to invest time in setting up joint routines and systems with each individual buyer to apply Gillette’s relational capabilities. 此次收购还可能促成与新第三方的合作关系，在这种情况下，收购方和目标公司都需要建立新的组织间信任和惯例。不过，关系建立需要时间。例如，在宝洁收购吉列的案例中，与买家达成更优惠贸易条款带来的共同收益需要时间才能显现。宝洁首席运营官在谈及这些收益时表示：“随着时间推移，我们逐渐意识到吉列在很多宝洁不擅长的领域都处于行业领先水平”（强调部分为原文添加）（Kanter & Bird, 2009b: 12）。此后，宝洁必须投入时间与每个单独的买家建立联合惯例和系统，以运用吉列的关系管理能力。

As with relational gains, nonmarket synergies involve both internal and external integration, the latter of which is especially time consuming. Internally, firms must recombine their distinct systems of corporate diplomacy (Henisz, 2017) by pooling expertise with distinct stakeholders and social issues. Externally, firms must engage in a lengthy process of building trust and reputation with nonmarket stakeholders. Because they do not operate in the business sector, such stakeholders are wary of firms, often making claims that challenge profit seeking (Freeman, 1984; King & Soule, 2007). Even if one of the merging firms had a prior relationship with a stakeholder, the combined entity may need to prove itself worthy once again. Unlike with relational synergies, there is no contract to specify objectives, govern the interaction, or facilitate the development of relational routines. This leads to an elongated phase of diplomatic activity that delays obtaining the support and collaboration of nonmarket stakeholders. 与关系收益一样，非市场协同效应涉及内部和外部整合，后者尤其耗时。在内部，企业必须通过汇集不同利益相关者和社会问题的专业知识，重组其独特的企业外交体系（Henisz, 2017）。在外部，企业必须经历一个漫长的过程，与非市场利益相关者建立信任和声誉。由于这些利益相关者不从事商业活动，他们对企业持谨慎态度，经常提出挑战利润追求的主张（Freeman, 1984；King & Soule, 2007）。即使其中一家合并企业与某一利益相关者有过先前关系，合并后的实体可能仍需再次证明自身的价值。与关系协同效应不同，这里没有合同来明确目标、规范互动或促进关系惯例的发展。这导致外交活动的时间延长，延迟了获得非市场利益相关者的支持与合作。

For instance, the stakeholders of Unilever and Ben & Jerry’s were initially skeptical of the combination. On Ben & Jerry’s side, its employees, customers, and social-mission partners (e.g., NGOs and sustainable farms) were distrustful of Unilever’s intentions (Austin & Quinn, 2005) and predicted “a long and winding road to infuse socially-responsible values into Unilever” (Bourgeois et al., 2003: 4). On Unilever’s side, shareholders were concerned that profits would be harmed by going too far down the CSR road, and employees were skeptical that their corporate culture would mesh with the “hippies” in Vermont (Bourgeois et al., 2003). The combination eventually succeeded, but only after years. Krishnan et al. (2004) provided another example from the U.S. healthcare sector, where governments and communities require hospitals to maintain low-margin services in the public interest. In principle, mergers can be a means of realigning stakeholder expectations with profit goals by allowing hospitals to continue to offer low-margin services but in fewer locations within the merged hospital network. But such a shift away from low-margin offerings does not occur, “especially in the short-run following the merger when the public scrutiny is likely to be high” (Krishnan et al., 2004: 607). 例如，联合利华和本杰瑞（Ben & Jerry’s）的利益相关者最初对这次合并持怀疑态度。在本杰瑞方面，其员工、客户和社会使命合作伙伴（例如非政府组织和可持续农场）不信任联合利华的意图（Austin & Quinn，2005），并预测“将社会责任价值观融入联合利华将是一条漫长而曲折的道路”（Bourgeois et al.，2003：4）。在联合利华方面，股东担心过度投入企业社会责任（CSR）道路会损害利润，员工则怀疑他们的企业文化能否与佛蒙特州的“嬉皮士”文化融合（Bourgeois et al.，2003）。这次合并最终取得了成功，但耗时多年。Krishnan等人（2004）提供了美国医疗行业的另一个例子，在该行业中，政府和社区要求医院为了公共利益维持低利润服务。原则上，合并可以通过允许医院继续提供低利润服务但在合并后的医院网络中减少服务地点，来调整利益相关者期望与利润目标。但这种从低利润服务的转变并未发生，“尤其是在合并后的短期内，此时公众监督可能会很高”（Krishnan et al.，2004：607）。

Once a deal is completed, market power synergies tend to require less integration than the previous three for the firm to exert its influence over rivals. External competitive interactions do not require intense trust building or coordination, and internal integration may be needed but is not core to profitability. In the extreme case of acquiring to eliminate a rival from the market, the acquirer continues with its existing operations and simply shuts down the operations of the target (Cunningham, Ederer, & Ma, 2021). Not all cases are this cut and dry, nor is our point that integration is never required to gain market power. However, the legal approval of the deal directly assures the firm’s ability to profit from market power sources more than in the case of most other synergy types because it allows the acquirer to act more unilaterally than before in its competitive arena (e.g., raise prices, pressure suppliers). 一旦交易完成，市场力量协同效应往往比前三种情况需要更少的整合，企业才能对竞争对手施加影响力。外部竞争互动不需要大量建立信任或协调，内部整合可能是需要的，但并非盈利能力的核心。在收购以消除市场竞争对手的极端情况下，收购方会继续其现有业务，只是关闭目标公司的运营（Cunningham, Ederer, & Ma, 2021）。并非所有情况都如此简单明了，我们的观点也不是说获得市场力量永远不需要整合。然而，交易的法律批准直接确保了企业从市场力量来源中获利的能力，比大多数其他协同效应类型的情况更甚，因为它允许收购方在竞争领域比以前更单方面地行动（例如，提高价格、向供应商施压）。

Unlike relational or nonmarket synergies, which depend on developing strong bonds with individual partners, network synergies are mechanically driven by changes in the structure of the portfolio of ties. This change is (comparatively) immediate upon deal completion and requires little to no integration. For instance, once an acquirer inherits the multiple contractual alliances of a target in a single transaction, it automatically occupies a more central position in the network than before. A relatively low integration of internal assets is required, and the ties that existed pre-acquisition continue as before.10 Hence, network synergy gains happen more quickly than other types of gains. In the QLT example mentioned earlier, the structural gain from inheriting Atrix’s alliances was immediate. 与依赖于与单个合作伙伴建立牢固关系的关系型或非市场协同效应不同，网络协同效应是由关系组合结构的变化机械驱动的。这种变化（相对而言）在交易完成后立即发生，且几乎不需要整合。例如，一旦收购方在一笔交易中继承了目标公司的多个契约联盟，它就会自动在网络中占据比以前更核心的位置。这需要对内部资产进行相对较低程度的整合，并且收购前存在的关系会继续保持不变。10 因此，网络协同效应的收益比其他类型的收益发生得更快。在前面提到的QLT案例中，继承Atrix联盟带来的结构性收益是立竿见影的。

These comparisons, based on the mechanism of integration required from Proposition 1, suggest the following empirically testable relationship: 基于命题1所要求的整合机制进行的这些比较，提出了以下经验上可检验的关系：

Empirical Prediction 1. Compared to other synergy types, network and market power synergy require low integration. Internal synergies require comparatively moderate integration. Relational synergies require comparatively moderate to high integration. Nonmarket synergies require the highest integration relative to the others. Thus, the time required to initially achieve each of those synergy types increases (on average) in that order (per Proposition 1). 实证预测1。与其他协同类型相比，网络与市场力量协同所需的整合程度较低。内部协同所需的整合程度相对适中。关系型协同所需的整合程度相对为中等到较高。非市场协同相对于其他类型所需的整合程度最高。因此，实现每种协同类型所需的初始时间（平均而言）按此顺序递增（根据命题1）。

Synergy duration across types: Control. Once achieved, the duration of synergies depends on the continued use of and investment in the combined assets, activities, and relationships. The ability to use and invest in those factors is a function of the combined firm’s control over them, and control is directly related to the governance orientation underlying our typology. Fiat and market competition entail relatively strong control because the firm owns the relevant assets and can act unilaterally. Cooperative governance offers lower control because the acquirer relies on shared assets, needing the input and approval of other collaborators. 协同效应持续时间因类型而异：控制。一旦实现，协同效应的持续时间取决于对组合资产、活动和关系的持续使用和投入。使用和投入这些要素的能力是组合企业对其控制的函数，而控制与我们分类法所依据的治理导向直接相关。 Fiat（菲亚特）和市场竞争需要相对较强的控制，因为企业拥有相关资产并能单方面行动。合作治理提供的控制程度较低，因为收购方依赖共享资产，需要其他合作者的投入和批准。

When it comes to internal synergies, fiat provides the authority to make necessary adjustments to maintain sources of value without depending on an external entity. As a result, internal gains can last for a relatively long period (assuming competent management). The logic of market competition denotes that greater market power gives firms the ability to act more unilaterally than before on the industry forces that shape the distribution of rents (in equilibrium). These monopoly-like rents persist until other changes in the industry modify competitive conditions (we explore those conditions later). The other synergies, governed by cooperative orientations, provide less control over the underlying sources of value, but important differences exist among the three. 当谈及内部协同效应时，法币（fiat）拥有进行必要调整以维持价值来源的权威，而无需依赖外部实体。因此，内部收益可以持续相对较长的时间（假设管理得当）。市场竞争的逻辑表明，更大的市场影响力使企业能够比以往更单方面地影响塑造租金分配的行业力量（在均衡状态下）。这些类似垄断的租金会持续存在，直到行业中出现其他变化，改变竞争条件（我们稍后会探讨这些条件）。其他由合作导向主导的协同效应对价值的根本来源控制较少，但三者之间存在重要差异。

Network synergies are likely to erode the fastest because a firm has the least control over the structure of an external network compared to the assets involved in the other synergies. Because the structural position (e.g., brokerage) of a firm often depends on second- or even third-order ties (e.g., a partner’s partner’s partner) over which it has no ownership and control, structural advantages are very hard to maintain (Burt, 2002; Salancik, 1995). Returning to the QLT-Atrix deal, for example, QLT could not directly affect whether the new partners it gained from Atrix established alliances with one another, which would hurt QLT’s ability to be the exclusive broker in its ego network by spanning many structural holes. 网络协同效应最容易被侵蚀，因为与其他协同效应所涉及的资产相比，企业对外部网络的结构控制最少。由于企业的结构性位置（例如中介角色）往往取决于其没有所有权和控制权的二阶甚至三阶关系（例如合作伙伴的合作伙伴的合作伙伴），结构性优势很难维持（Burt, 2002; Salancik, 1995）。例如，回到QLT-Atrix交易，QLT无法直接影响它从Atrix获得的新合作伙伴之间是否建立联盟，而这种联盟会损害QLT在其自我网络中通过跨越许多结构洞成为独家中介的能力。

Relational synergies require direct input from another firm. The assets that need to be combined are dyadic, owned by the focal firm and another party, and the value created will need to be split between the two. Any investment in updating or maintaining the underlying assets (if, for instance, there is a change in technology or demand) requires joint decision-making (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In the case of P&G and Gillette, the new modes of transacting with buyers implied that P&G’s customers would capture at least some of the relational synergy gains. The COO pointed to the possibility of P&G sales employees engaging in more “joint-planning with customers” (Kanter & Bird, 2009a: 9), showing the costs of managing external relationships and implying some division of rents. Dyadic governance is challenging, of course, but more within the firm’s control than network synergies involving multiple direct and indirect partners. 关系协同需要另一家公司的直接投入。需要整合的资产是二元性的，由核心企业和另一方共同拥有，创造的价值需要在双方之间分配。对基础资产进行更新或维护的任何投资（例如，技术或需求发生变化时）都需要共同决策（Dyer & Singh，1998）。在宝洁（P&G）和吉列（Gillette）的案例中，与买家交易的新方式意味着宝洁的客户将至少获得部分关系协同收益。首席运营官指出，宝洁的销售人员有可能更多地参与“与客户的联合规划”（Kanter & Bird，2009a：9），这表明了管理外部关系的成本，并暗示了一些租金的分配。当然，二元治理具有挑战性，但比涉及多个直接和间接合作伙伴的网络协同更在企业的控制范围内。

We argued earlier that obtaining the initial support of nonmarket stakeholders is a slower process than eliciting cooperation from contractual partners (i.e., relational synergy). But once obtained, support from nonmarket actors can produce reasonably durable benefits (Deng et al., 2013; Henisz et al., 2014), in part because the institutional nonmarket environment is fairly stable (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Being legitimized by one or more powerful stakeholders serves as an endorsement in the eyes of other stakeholders within the same domain, which further bolsters the legitimacy of the firm and leads to measurable economic gains (Dorobantu, Henisz, & Nartey, 2017). In the case of Unilever, it successfully pulled off the combination with Ben & Jerry’s and used it as a stepping stone to build a worldwide organization renowned for its CSR practices, which has paid important dividends in reputational capital. As with relational synergies, however, the firm is never in full control of its stakeholders, and thus value can erode if something affects the stability of nonmarket coalitions. 我们之前曾指出，获得非市场利益相关者的初步支持比争取契约合作伙伴的合作（即关系协同效应）更为缓慢。但一旦获得支持，非市场行为体的支持能够产生相当持久的收益（Deng等人，2013；Henisz等人，2014），部分原因在于制度性非市场环境相对稳定（DiMaggio & Powell，1983）。获得一个或多个有影响力的利益相关者的认可，在同一领域的其他利益相关者眼中相当于一种背书，这进一步增强了企业的合法性，并带来可衡量的经济收益（Dorobantu、Henisz & Nartey，2017）。以联合利华为例，它成功完成了与本杰瑞（Ben & Jerry’s）的合并，并以此为跳板构建了一个以企业社会责任（CSR）实践闻名的全球组织，这在声誉资本方面带来了重要回报。然而，与关系协同效应一样，企业永远无法完全控制其利益相关者，因此如果某些因素影响了非市场联盟的稳定性，价值可能会受损。

These comparisons of control over post-acquisition activities suggest the following: 这些关于收购后活动控制权的比较表明以下几点：

Empirical Prediction 2. Compared to other synergy types, the acquiring firm can control the assets involved in internal and market power synergies the most, followed by the assets involved in relational and nonmarket synergies, with the assets involved in network synergies being hardest to control. Thus, the duration of each of synergy type decreases (on average) in that order (per Proposition 2). 实证预测 2。与其他协同类型相比，收购方对内部协同和市场权力协同所涉及资产的控制程度最高，其次是关系协同和非市场协同所涉及的资产，而网络协同所涉及的资产最难控制。因此，按照此顺序（根据命题 2），每种协同类型的持续时间（平均）依次缩短。

Based on Empirical Predictions 1 and 2, we illustrate differences in life cycles across synergy types in Figure 3. This is only a stylized representation— other relative differences are plausible. We do not make any predictions about differences in the level 基于经验预测1和2，我们在图3中展示了不同协同类型下生命周期的差异。这只是一个程式化的表示——其他相对差异也是可能的。我们不对水平差异做出任何预测

FIGURE 3 Depiction of Synergy Life Cycles (Comparative)
图3 协同生命周期对比示意图

time since acquisition completion 收购完成后的时间

o $^ +$ completion. o $^ +$ 完成。

of benefits across types, so the vertical axis depicts equal peak benefits in all cases. 不同类型的收益，因此纵轴描绘了所有情况下的同等峰值收益。

Heterogeneity in Life Cycles Within Synergy Types

协同类型内的生命周期异质性

We just considered how integration and control drive “average” differences in life cycles across synergy types. At the same time, we expect that two factors create variance in the timing and duration of synergy gains within synergy types: 我们刚刚探讨了整合与控制如何驱动不同协同类型下生命周期的“平均”差异。同时，我们认为有两个因素会导致同一协同类型内协同收益的时机和持续时间产生差异：

Proposition 3. Synergy realization within types: The greater the pre-acquisition alignment between the assets, activities, and relationships involved in a synergy type, the more efficiently the acquirer can accomplish the required post-acquisition integration, and thus the faster the firm realizes value from that synergy. 命题3. 类型内协同实现：协同类型所涉及的资产、活动和关系之间的收购前对齐程度越高，收购方就越能高效地完成所需的收购后整合，从而更快地从该协同中实现价值。

Proposition 4. Synergy duration within types: The greater the post-acquisition stability of the assets, activities, and relationships involved in a synergy type, the better the acquirer can control the sources of the synergy, and thus the longer the duration of the gains from that synergy. 命题4. 类型内协同持续时间：协同类型所涉及的资产、活动和关系在收购后的稳定性越高，收购方就越能控制协同的来源，从而该协同带来的收益持续时间越长。

We will define alignment and stability as they pertain to each synergy type below. Before doing so, a note on the distinction between Propositions 1-2 and 34 is important. Integration required (Proposition 1) and control (Proposition 2) are manifested in all synergy types but at different “average levels” across types. Alignment (Proposition 3) and stability (Proposition 4), in contrast, are a function of unique variables that apply only to one type of synergy but not to others. This is why they explain heterogeneity within types only. In what follows, we draw on variables relating to alignment and stability discussed in the literatures specific to each source of value (e.g., stakeholder theory, RBV, network theory, etc.). None of the variables is inherently novel, but their application to synergy life cycles is. For each synergy type, we offer one testable empirical prediction for realization timing and one for duration length, seeking to illustrate plausible relationships rather than laying out all possible variables that relate to alignment and stability. Table 3 summarizes the relevant variables, and Figures 4a—4e depict how those variables might modify the life cycle shapes of each synergy type. 我们将定义协同作用中的“对齐”和“稳定性”，并说明它们与以下每种协同类型的关系。在此之前，有必要区分命题1-2和命题34。整合需求（命题1）和控制（命题2）在所有协同类型中均有体现，但在不同类型中处于不同的“平均水平”。相比之下，对齐（命题3）和稳定性（命题4）是独特变量的函数，这些变量仅适用于某一种协同类型，而不适用于其他类型。这就是为什么它们仅能解释同类型内的异质性。接下来，我们将借鉴与对齐和稳定性相关的变量，这些变量来自各价值来源（如利益相关者理论、资源基础观、网络理论等）的特定文献。这些变量本身并无新颖性，但将其应用于协同生命周期则是新颖的。对于每种协同类型，我们针对实现时机提出一个可检验的经验预测，并针对持续时长提出另一个可检验的经验预测，旨在说明合理的关系，而非列出所有与对齐和稳定性相关的可能变量。表3总结了相关变量，图4a—4e展示了这些变量如何改变每种协同类型的生命周期形态。

Synergy realization within types: Alignment. Alignment refers to the fit, correspondence, or agreement between the inputs involved in creating a particular synergy. It is manifested differently for each synergy type. We offer one example for each type next. 类型内的协同实现：对齐。对齐指的是在创建特定协同效应时所涉及的输入之间的契合、对应或一致。每种协同类型的表现形式各不相同。接下来我们为每种类型提供一个示例。

FIGURE 4 Depiction of Variables Modifying Individual Synergy Life Cycles 图4 变量修改个体协同生命周期的示意图

can be found in the text (Propositions 34 and Empirical Predictions 3a3e and 4a4e). 可以在文本（命题 34 以及经验预测 3a3e 和 4a4e）中找到。

A key predictor of internal integration success is the pre-merger organizational and strategic fit between the acquirer and target. Based on our literature review (online Appendix B), it is the most frequently discussed alignment factor (e.g., Bauer & Matzler, 2014). When the acquirer and target are more compatible and similar in terms of their resources, capabilities, and organization, internal synergies will be realized faster (Puranam & Vanneste, 2016). 内部整合成功的一个关键预测因素是收购方与目标方在合并前的组织和战略契合度。根据我们的文献综述（在线附录B），这是最常被讨论的整合因素（例如，Bauer & Matzler，2014）。当收购方与目标方在资源、能力和组织方面更加兼容和相似时，内部协同效应将更快实现（Puranam & Vanneste，2016）。

Empirical Prediction 3a. The greater the organizational and strategic fit between the acquirer and the target, the more quickly internal synergies are realized. 实证预测3a。收购方与目标方之间的组织和战略契合度越高，内部协同效应实现得就越快。

As mentioned earlier, market power synergies are realized relatively quickly on average. But whether the merger is vertical or horizontal is an alignment factor that creates variance in realization timing. In horizontal mergers involving targets in the same industry as the acquirer, profits will be realized faster because less integration is required to achieve market influence. The elimination or consolidation of a competitor is sufficient (Devos et al., 2009; Porter, 1980), even if it may require some integration (e.g., renegotiating long-term contracts to obtain purchasing power). More integration is warranted in vertical deals because they combine firms from different parts of the value chain, making it less likely that the assets and activities of the firms will be aligned and ready to yield rents at the outset (Bain, 1951; Farrell & Shapiro, 1990). 如前所述，市场力量协同效应平均实现得相对较快。但合并是纵向还是横向，是造成实现时间差异的一个关键因素。在收购方与目标公司处于同一行业的横向合并中，利润实现会更快，因为实现市场影响力所需的整合更少。消除或合并竞争对手就足够了（Devos等人，2009；Porter，1980），尽管这可能需要一些整合（例如，重新谈判长期合同以获得购买力）。纵向交易需要更多整合，因为它们将价值链不同环节的企业结合在一起，使得这些企业的资产和活动在一开始就不太可能实现对齐并产生租金（Bain，1951；Farrell & Shapiro，1990）。

Empirical Prediction 3b. Market power synergies are realized more quickly for horizontal than for vertical acquisitions. 实证预测3b. 横向收购比纵向收购能更快实现市场力量协同效应。

While several factors affect alignment in interfirm relations, trust is perhaps the most cited. Interorganizational trust is “the extent of trust placed in the partner organization by members of a focal organization” and is distinct from interpersonal trust (Zaheer et al., 1998: 142). We refer to the trust of a third-party organization (e.g., alliance partner) in either or both of the merging firms, and vice versa. The higher this pre-acquisition trust, the more post-acquisition willingness to cooperate, to engage in mutual accommodation, and to rework relational agreements after deal completion (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). 虽然有几个因素会影响企业间关系的对齐，但信任可能是被引用最多的因素。组织间信任是“焦点组织成员对合作组织所信任的程度”，并且与人际信任不同（Zaheer等人，1998：142）。我们指的是第三方组织（例如联盟伙伴）对合并双方中的一方或双方的信任，反之亦然。这种收购前的信任越高，收购后就越愿意合作、进行相互适应，并在交易完成后重新制定关系协议（Gulati & Nickerson，2008）。

Empirical Prediction 3c. The greater the trust between the firms involved in the acquisition (acquirer and target) and their individual partners pre-acquisition, the more quickly relational synergies are realized. 实证预测 3c。收购（收购方和目标方）及各自收购前合作伙伴之间的信任程度越高，关系协同效应的实现速度就越快。

We argued that network synergies arise and erode more quickly than other types, but the overlap in the network partners of the combining firms—the network analog of alignment—can modify the timing. Recall that network synergies come from either the addition of new partnerships or the elimination of redundant ones. We expect the latter case to bring quicker gains because a legal reassignment of the ties to the combined entity suffices, without much modification of the pre-existing purposes of those ties. In contrast, a synergistic addition of two networks may require the initiation of new resource flows across the network to achieve the benefits of a larger and more diverse set of partners. To be clear, value still arises from the structural position, which is achieved upon merger completion, but the activation of structural benefits is faster for subtractive than additive network changes (Hernandez & Shaver, 2019).11 我们认为，网络协同效应的产生和侵蚀速度比其他类型更快，但合并企业的网络伙伴重叠——即网络层面的对齐——可以改变这一时间安排。需要记住的是，网络协同效应来自于新增合作伙伴或消除冗余伙伴这两种情况。我们预计后一种情况会带来更快的收益，因为只需将现有关系合法地重新分配给合并后的实体，而无需对这些关系预先存在的目的进行大量修改。相比之下，两个网络的协同性合并可能需要启动新的资源流跨网络，以实现更大、更多样化的合作伙伴群体带来的收益。需要明确的是，价值仍然来自于合并完成后获得的结构性位置，但结构性收益的激活对于减法式网络变化比对加法式网络变化更快（Hernandez & Shaver, 2019）。11

Empirical Prediction 3d. The greater the overlap in the pre-acquisition network partners of the acquirer and target, the more quickly network synergies are realized. 实证预测3d。收购方和目标公司在收购前的网络合作伙伴重叠度越高，网络协同效应实现得就越快。

The core challenge of stakeholder management is balancing competing stakeholder claims on the firm (Freeman, 1984), which is an issue of nonmarket alignment. The merger of two firms can significantly modify the balance of claims and expectations on the firm by its stakeholders. We expect that the speed of initial realization for nonmarket synergies will be affected by the extent to which the relevant stakeholders of the acquirer and target have aligned versus competing interests. Disagreement among the stakeholders of merged firms can delay value realization from new stakeholder coalitions, especially because nonmarket stakeholders tend to distrust for-profit firms (King & Soule, 2007). 利益相关者管理的核心挑战在于平衡利益相关者对企业的相互竞争的诉求（Freeman, 1984），这是一个非市场协调的问题。两家企业的合并会显著改变利益相关者对企业的诉求和期望的平衡。我们预计，非市场协同效应的初步实现速度将受到收购方和目标方相关利益相关者的利益协调程度与竞争程度的影响。合并企业的利益相关者之间的分歧可能会延迟新利益相关者联盟的价值实现，特别是因为非市场利益相关者往往不信任营利性企业（King & Soule, 2007）。

Empirical Prediction 3e. The greater the alignment of interests among the acquirer’s and the target’s nonmarket stakeholders pre-acquisition, the more quickly nonmarket synergies are realized. 实证预测3e。收购前收购方与目标方非市场利益相关者之间的利益一致性越高，非市场协同效应实现得越快。

Synergy realization within types: Stability. Stability refers to the state of balance or equilibrium among the inputs involved in a given synergy. As mentioned above, it manifests differently for each synergy type. 类型内协同实现：稳定性。稳定性指的是给定协同中涉及的输入项之间的平衡或均衡状态。如上所述，不同的协同类型表现出不同的稳定性特点。

The integration management capability of the acquirer is one important input into the stability of the underlying assets, activities, and relationships that are involved in internal synergies and can therefore lead to a longer duration of gains from this synergy type. The integration management capability of the acquirer is distinct from organizational or strategic fit (e.g., Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999) and can be a function of many factors, such as prior experience with acquisitions (Zollo & Singh, 2004), the presence of a dedicated corporate development function (Trichterborn, Zu Knyphausen-AufseB, & Schweizer, 2016), or the skills of its managers and corporate development personnel (Meyer-Doyle, Lee, & Helfat, 2019). The capability could also be circumstantial, such the attention the firm can devote to the integration of the focal target given other demands on attention. 收购方的整合管理能力是底层资产、活动以及内部协同关系稳定性的重要输入因素，因此能够延长此类协同带来的收益持续时间。收购方的整合管理能力与组织或战略契合度（例如：Bauer & Matzler, 2014；Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999）不同，并且可能受多种因素影响，例如收购的过往经验（Zollo & Singh, 2004）、是否设有专门的企业发展部门（Trichterborn, Zu Knyphausen-AufseB, & Schweizer, 2016），或其管理者和企业发展人员的技能（Meyer-Doyle, Lee, & Helfat, 2019）。这种能力也可能具有情境性，例如在企业需兼顾其他注意力需求时，其能投入到核心目标整合上的精力。

Empirical Prediction 4a. The stronger the acquirer’s integration management capabilities at the time of deal completion, the longer the duration of internal synergies. 实证预测4a。收购方在交易完成时的整合管理能力越强，内部协同效应的持续时间越长。

A well-known factor influencing the stability of competitive equilibrium in industries is the intensity of rivalry among competitors (Porter, 1980). The more firms jockey for position post-acquisition, the more quickly the rents from market power synergies begin to erode. For instance, if a rival of the combined entity engages in another acquisition or launches an intensive price war, the market power synergies of the combined firm will dissipate faster. 影响行业竞争性均衡稳定性的一个众所周知的因素是竞争对手之间的竞争激烈程度（Porter，1980）。收购后，企业争夺地位的行为越激烈，市场力量协同效应带来的租金就会越快开始侵蚀。例如，如果联合实体的竞争对手进行另一项收购或发起激烈的价格战，联合企业的市场力量协同效应将会更快地消散。

Empirical Prediction 4b. The weaker the intensity of rivalry among the competitors in an industry postacquisition, the longer the duration of market power synergies. 实证预测4b。收购后行业内竞争对手之间的竞争强度越弱，市场力量协同效应的持续时间越长。

The stability of interorganizational relationships is a function of partner-specific routines (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In an M&A setting, these routines include processes, norms, and activities that are shared and tacitly understood by the merged entity and the individual third parties affected by the deal. Partner-specific routines stabilize relationships in the same way that individual habits offer predictability and continuity to behavior (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). These routines are distinct from pre-acquisition trust because they arise after the integration phase, resulting in a set of interorganizational patterns that match the new reality of the merger. 组织间关系的稳定性是伙伴特定惯例的函数（Dyer & Singh，1998）。在并购情境中，这些惯例包括合并实体和受交易影响的个别第三方共同拥有且心照不宣的流程、规范和活动。伙伴特定惯例稳定关系的方式，与个人习惯为行为提供可预测性和连续性的方式相同（Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002）。这些惯例与收购前的信任不同，因为它们在整合阶段之后产生，形成了一组与合并新现实相匹配的组织间模式。

Empirical Prediction 4c. The stronger the partnerspecific routines that emerge post-acquisition, the longer the duration of relational synergies. 实证预测4c。收购后出现的伙伴特定惯例越强，关系协同效应的持续时间越长。

The duration of network synergies depends on the stability of the network position obtained by the acquirer from the acquisition. That stability varies directly with the rate of corporate actions taken by other firms (nodes) proximate to the acquirer network. Just as a focal firm can rewire the network through its own acquisitions or alliances, other firms in the network neighborhood can form or end alliances, make acquisitions or divestitures, or enter and exit the industry. Each of these actions can create network externalities that unwittingly modify the position of the focal firm (Hernandez, Lee, & Shaver, 2020; Hernandez & Menon, 2020). And as we noted earlier, the actions of other firms that modify the network of the focal firm are impossible to control. The greater the rate of such network-changing actions that occur post-acquisition, the less stable the network position of the acquirer. 网络协同效应的持续时间取决于收购方从收购中获得的网络位置的稳定性。这种稳定性直接随收购方网络邻近的其他公司（节点）采取的企业行动速率而变化。正如核心企业可以通过自身的收购或联盟重新调整网络，网络邻域中的其他公司也可以形成或终止联盟、进行收购或剥离，或进入和退出行业。这些行动中的每一个都可能产生网络外部性，无意中改变核心企业的位置（Hernandez, Lee, & Shaver, 2020；Hernandez & Menon, 2020）。正如我们之前所指出的，其他公司改变核心企业网络的行动是无法控制的。收购后发生的此类改变网络的行动速率越高，收购方的网络位置就越不稳定。

Empirical Prediction 4d. The lower the rate of change in the broader network after an acquisition, the longer the duration of network synergies. 实证预测4d。收购后更广泛网络的变化率越低，网络协同效应的持续时间就越长。

Once the claims of stakeholders on the combined firms have been aligned, the duration of nonmarket synergies post-merger should depend on the contentiousness of the issues about which stakeholders care (Dorobantu et al., 2017; King & Soule, 2007). For example, within the field of environmental issues, stakeholders vary their agreement on issues (e.g., how harmful are GMOs?) as well as the tactics used to pursue their objectives (e.g., Greenpeace’s aggressive attacks on firms vs. more accommodating NGOs) (Odziemkowska, 2019). The combination of these factors makes some issue fields more fragmented, and thus more contentious, than others. Contentious fields lead to a more unstable nonmarket environment for firms than those in which there is more unity and cohesion among nonmarket actors. In the latter scenario, the rents from nonmarket synergies can persist for longer because the coalition between the merged firm and its new stakeholder environment is more enduring. 一旦利益相关者对合并后企业的诉求达成一致，合并后的非市场协同效应持续时间应取决于利益相关者关注的问题的争议性（Dorobantu等人，2017；King & Soule，2007）。例如，在环境问题领域，利益相关者对问题的看法存在分歧（如转基因生物的危害性如何？），以及为实现目标所采取的策略也各不相同（如绿色和平组织对企业的激进攻击与更具包容性的非政府组织的做法）（Odziemkowska，2019）。这些因素的综合作用使得某些问题领域比其他领域更分散，因此更具争议性。与非市场参与者之间更团结、凝聚力更强的领域相比，争议性领域会导致企业面临更不稳定的非市场环境。在后一种情况下，非市场协同效应带来的租金可以持续更长时间，因为合并后的企业与其新的利益相关者环境之间的联盟更为持久。

Empirical Prediction 4e. The less contentious the nonmarket stakeholder environment of the combined entity post-acquisition, the longer the duration of nonmarket synergies. 实证预测4e。收购后合并实体的非市场利益相关者环境争议越少，非市场协同效应的持续时间越长。

We emphasize that the empirical predictions stated in italics are only examples of many potential variables related to alignment and stability. Note that each of the variables we considered applies uniquely to specific synergy types, leading to empirical predictions within but not across types. 我们强调，斜体部分所述的实证预测仅为与对齐和稳定性相关的众多潜在变量中的示例。请注意，我们所考虑的每个变量仅独特地适用于特定的协同类型，从而导致实证预测仅存在于特定类型内部，而非跨类型存在。

CO-SYNERGIES AND DIS-SYNERGIES

协同效应与非协同效应

If acquisitions give rise to multiple synergy types with heterogeneous life cycles, the total value created by a deal depends not only on the sum and timing of value created by each synergy type but also on the extent to which each type interacts with the others. A co-synergy arises when two types complement one another—an increase in one enhances the value created by the other (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). A dis-synergy arises when two types substitute one another—an increase in one diminishes the value created by the other. We explore such interactions in this section. 如果收购产生多种具有不同生命周期的协同效应类型，那么一笔交易创造的总价值不仅取决于每种协同效应类型所创造价值的总和及其时间安排，还取决于每种类型与其他类型相互作用的程度。当两种类型相互补充时，会产生协同效应——一种类型的增加会提升另一种类型所创造的价值（Milgrom & Roberts，1995）。当两种类型相互替代时，会产生非协同效应——一种类型的增加会降低另一种类型所创造的价值。我们将在本节中探讨此类相互作用。

Two caveats are important before moving forward. First, co-synergy and dis-synergy are not the same as positive and negative correlations between synergy types. Certain pairs of synergies may co-occur more or less frequently but not necessarily complement or substitute each other. We take no stand on which pairs co-occur more than others—that is a task for future empirical work. Second, this section of the paper is more speculative than others because there is no prior literature on the reinforcing or undermining effects across synergy types (as there was on M&A value and integration). We thus do not formalize any propositions, but we do offer ideas regarding the main factors leading to co-synergies and dissynergies for each of the five types (summarized in Table 4). We also provide some illustrative examples in the text, plus a more comprehensive set of examples for every pairwise combination in Tables 56. 在继续之前，有两个重要的注意事项。首先，协同效应与非协同效应（co-synergy and dis-synergy）并不等同于协同类型之间的正相关和负相关。某些协同效应对可能会或多或少地共同出现，但不一定相互补充或替代。我们对哪些协同效应对出现的频率更高不持立场——这是未来实证研究的任务。其次，本文的这一部分比其他部分更具推测性，因为目前没有关于协同类型之间强化或削弱效应的先前文献（如在并购价值和整合方面已有相关文献）。因此，我们没有正式提出任何命题，但我们确实针对导致五种协同类型各自出现协同效应和非协同效应的主要因素提出了一些观点（总结于表4）。我们还在正文中提供了一些说明性示例，并在表5-6中为每对组合提供了更全面的示例集。

TABLE 4 Factors Leading to Co-Synergies and Dis-Synergies With Each Synergy Type
表4 导致协同效应及各类协同效应负协同的因素

pairwise co-synergies and dis-synergies, respectively. 成对协同效应和非协同效应，分别。

How Internal Synergies Interact With Other Types

内部协同如何与其他类型相互作用

Internal synergies can create co-synergies when improvements in internal resources and capabilities, made possible by the acquisition, enhance the firm’s effectiveness in managing external relationships (whether competitive or cooperative). For example, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) acquired the robotic surgery firm Auris in 2019, whose capabilities would improve J&J’s expertise in lung cancer diagnosis and treatment (internal). But according to the chairman of J&J’s medical device units, the Auris deal also enhanced the value of Verb Surgical, a 2015 alliance between J&J and Alphabet to develop robotic surgery technology (Koons, 2019)—a relational co-synergy. Conversely, internal synergies can bring dis-synergies when the resources and capabilities created by an acquisition are poorly suited to the post-acquisition external environment (cooperative or competitive). This may happen when a deal strengthens internal fit among a firms’ strategic activities but cognitive limitations prevent managers from seeing how the new activity system undermines external fit with the environment (Siggelkow, 2001). 当通过收购获得的内部资源和能力的提升，增强了企业管理外部关系（无论是竞争性还是合作性）的效率时，内部协同效应可以产生协同效应。例如，强生公司（J&J）在2019年收购了机器人手术公司Auris，其能力将提升强生在肺癌诊断和治疗方面的专业知识（内部层面）。但据强生医疗设备部门董事长表示，Auris交易还提升了Verb Surgical的价值，Verb Surgical是强生与谷歌（Alphabet）在2015年为开发机器人手术技术建立的联盟（Koons, 2019）——这是一种关系协同效应。相反，当收购创造的资源和能力与收购后的外部环境（合作或竞争）不太匹配时，内部协同效应可能会带来非协同效应。这种情况可能发生在一笔交易加强了企业战略活动之间的内部契合度，但管理者的认知局限使其无法看到新的活动系统如何破坏与环境的外部契合度（Siggelkow, 2001）。

How Market Power Synergies Interact With Other Types

市场力量协同效应如何与其他类型相互作用

Market power gains insulate acquirers from competition. This can produce co-synergies by allowing the acquirer to dedicate more resources to internal activities and to external cooperative relationships (Kang, 2020). But it can also lead to dis-synergies by reducing incentives to make investments in activities and relationships that create value through other means, such as lowering employees’ motivation to innovate (e.g., Fulghieri & Sevilir, 2011). Gaining market power via acquisitions may also have negative legitimacy spillovers for nonmarket stakeholders. For example, when BB&T and SunTrust recently combined, the deal was criticized for “increas[ing] concentration in specific markets in the Southeastern United States … in rural and economically disadvantaged areas the merger [may] have disproportionate effects, such as shuttered branch offices and reduction in staff” (Walsh, 2019). 市场力量的增强使收购方免受竞争影响。这可以通过让收购方将更多资源投入内部活动和外部合作关系来产生协同效应（Kang，2020）。但这也可能导致非协同效应，因为它会降低对通过其他方式创造价值的活动和关系进行投资的动力，例如降低员工的创新动力（例如，Fulghieri & Sevilir，2011）。通过收购获得市场力量还可能对非市场利益相关者产生负面合法性溢出效应。例如，当BB&T和SunTrust最近合并时，该交易因“增加了美国东南部特定市场的集中度……在农村和经济欠发达地区，合并可能产生不成比例的影响，例如关闭分支机构和裁员”而受到批评（Walsh，2019）。

TABLE 5 Pairwise Co-Synergies Between Synergy Types
表5 协同类型之间的成对协同作用

limited set of more detailed examples. 更详细示例的有限集合。

TABLE 6 Pairwise Dis-Synergies Between Synergy Types
表6 协同类型之间的成对反协同作用

How Relational Synergies Interact With Other Types

关系协同作用如何与其他类型相互作用

Relational gains are likely to yield co-synergies when they enable the acquirer to improve relationships with other actors that contribute to market power, network, or nonmarket synergies and by facilitating the development of internal assets, giving rise to internal synergies. Returning to the P&G-Gillette example, the joint value generated with retailers and distributors led to internal co-synergies by strengthening the combined firm’s downstream management capabilities. It also gave P&G a market power co-synergy because its better relations with buyers made P&G’s greater influence more palatable. 当关系收益能够使收购方改善与其他有助于市场力量、网络或非市场协同效应的参与者的关系，并通过促进内部资产的发展而产生内部协同效应时，这些关系收益可能会产生协同效应。回到宝洁（P&G）与吉列（Gillette）的案例，与零售商和经销商共同创造的价值通过加强合并后公司的下游管理能力，带来了内部协同效应。这也为宝洁带来了市场力量协同效应，因为其与买家的更好关系使得宝洁更大的影响力更容易被接受。

At the same time, relational synergies could create dis-synergies when they lead an acquirer to constrain its investments in other valuable activities to maintain goodwill with specific dyadic partners. We speculate that P&G’s stronger value generation with its distributors may have seeded nonmarket and internal dis-synergies in later years. Locking in distributors was good for P&G but a sore point for stakeholders like the public and the media. When the direct-to-consumer (DTC) business models of rivals like Harry’s and Dollar Shave Club arose, those stakeholders enthusiastically supported the DTC firms (Tiffany, 2018). Further, P&G was constrained from fully developing to its own DTC service because of its relational commitments to downstream partners (Chesto, 2017). 同时，关系协同效应在导致收购方为了与特定二元合作伙伴维持商誉而限制其在其他有价值活动中的投资时，可能会产生反协同效应。我们推测，宝洁与经销商更强的价值创造能力可能在后期埋下了非市场和内部反协同效应的种子。锁定经销商对宝洁有利，但对公众和媒体等利益相关者来说却是一个痛点。当哈利（Harry’s）和美元剃须俱乐部（Dollar Shave Club）等竞争对手的直接面向消费者（DTC）商业模式出现时，这些利益相关者热情地支持了这些DTC公司（Tiffany，2018）。此外，由于宝洁对下游合作伙伴的关系承诺，其无法充分发展自己的DTC服务（Chesto，2017）。

How Network Synergies Interact With Other Types

网络协同效应如何与其他类型相互作用

Improvements in an acquirer’s structural network position can help firms better access and control resources and relationships that give rise to the other four synergy types. For example, Burt (1983) demonstrated a network and market power co-synergy, showing that the acquisitions of manufacturing firms enhance their brokerage positions in vertical networks, allowing them to exert greater pricing control. At the same time, an improved structural position gained through an acquisition can constrain a firm’s ability to engage in actions that would generate value through other sources of synergy. Comanor and Scherer (2013) argued that biopharma mergers have reduced the cost of innovation through greater centrality in external innovation networks (network synergy) but that gain has resulted in a loss of internal innovation capabilities for pharmaceutical firms (an internal dis-synergy). 收购方在结构性网络位置上的改善，能够帮助企业更好地获取和控制资源及关系，而这些资源和关系会催生其他四种协同效应类型。例如，伯特（1983）论证了网络与市场力量的协同效应，指出制造业企业的收购行为会增强其在垂直网络中的经纪地位，从而使企业能够实施更强的定价控制。与此同时，通过收购获得的改善后的结构性位置，可能会限制企业通过其他协同效应来源创造价值的行动能力。科马诺尔和舍勒（2013）认为，生物制药行业的合并通过增强企业在外部创新网络中的中心性（网络协同效应）降低了创新成本，但这种收益却导致制药企业内部创新能力的丧失（内部非协同效应）。

How Nonmarket Synergies Interact With Other Types

非市场协同效应如何与其他类型相互作用

Nonmarket synergies can generate co-synergies when the support of influential stakeholders legitimizes firms’ market-based activities (internal or external). Returning to an earlier case, being infused with Ben & Jerry’s social values was crucial in developing Unilever’s CSR culture and capabilities—an internal co-synergy. Additionally, Unilever enhanced its practices for managing relationships with sustainable suppliers thanks to learning from Ben & Jerry’s, generating mutual gains with those third parties (relational co-synergy) (Austin & Quinn, 2005). At the same time, staying in the good graces of powerful stakeholders can lead the acquirer to limit actions that could generate other gains. The U.S. hospital industry example in Krishnan et al. (2004) illustrated how a profitable shift away from lowmargin services may have been forestalled by the need to please community stakeholders. In a more recent case, the AIDS Healthcare Foundation publicly expressed concern that the CVSAetna merger would result in patients receiving insufficient care and in breaches in the confidentiality of patients’ HIV status (BusinessWire, 2018). Such pressures can lead firms to trade off nonmarket gains for lower internal or market power gains, for example.12 当有影响力的利益相关者的支持使企业的市场活动（内部或外部）合法化时，非市场协同效应可以产生协同效应。回到之前的案例，融入本杰瑞的社会价值观对于发展联合利华的企业社会责任（CSR）文化和能力至关重要——这是一种内部协同效应。此外，联合利华通过借鉴本杰瑞的经验，改进了与可持续供应商的关系管理实践，与这些第三方实现了互利共赢（关系协同效应）（Austin & Quinn, 2005）。与此同时，取悦有影响力的利益相关者可能会导致收购方限制可能产生其他收益的行动。Krishnan等人（2004）的美国医疗行业案例说明了，对社区利益相关者的迎合可能阻碍了从低利润服务转向高利润服务的进程。在最近的一个案例中，艾滋病医疗基金会公开表示关切，认为CVSAetna的合并将导致患者获得的护理不足，以及患者HIV状态的保密性被破坏（BusinessWire, 2018）。例如，这类压力可能导致企业为了换取更低的内部或市场权力收益而牺牲非市场收益。12

DISCUSSION

讨论

We have presented three related ideas in this paper: (a) there are five distinct types of synergies defined by the intersection of different governance orientations and levels of analysis, (b) each of those synergies has a unique life cycle, and (c) each synergy can interact with the others positively or negatively. This is a lot of conceptual territory to cover, and thus it may be useful to illustrate the full set of ideas through a comprehensive case study. To avoid an excessively long paper, we include a case study of mergers among U.S. airlines after the main body of the paper. We focus the discussion here on a handful of theoretical implications. 我们在本文中提出了三个相关观点：(a) 存在五种不同类型的协同效应，由不同治理取向和分析层面的交叉定义；(b) 每种协同效应都有独特的生命周期；(c) 每种协同效应可以与其他协同效应产生积极或消极的相互作用。需要涵盖的概念领域非常广泛，因此通过一个全面的案例研究来说明全部观点可能会很有用。为避免论文过长，我们在论文主体之后加入了美国航空公司并购的案例研究。我们在此重点讨论一些理论影响。

Implications for Assessing Total Value in M&A

并购中总价值评估的影响

To realize synergistic value, firms must pay a price that does not capitalize the gains generated by the acquirer—target combination: Realized $V a l u e = S y n –$ ergy Price Premium, where $S y n e r g y = N P V ( A + T )$ NPV(A) (Barney, 1988; Capron & Pistre, 2002). Our framework is consistent with this well-established idea but also suggests the following advances. 为了实现协同价值，企业必须支付一个不会将收购方-目标公司组合产生的收益资本化的价格：已实现价值 = 协同效应 - 价格溢价，其中协同效应 = 净现值(A+T) - 净现值(A)（Barney, 1988；Capron & Pistre, 2002）。我们的框架与这一公认的理念一致，但也提出了以下改进。

First, it may be useful to modify the M&A value formula as follows: 首先，修改并购价值公式可能会很有用，具体如下：

Realized Value 实现价值

\begin{array} { r l } { \phantom { \frac { 1 } { 2 } } } & { = \sum _ { i } S y n e r g y _ { i } + \sum _ { i , j } C o - S y n e r g y _ { i , j } } \ & { \phantom { = } - \sum _ { i , j } D i s \ – S y n e r g y _ { i , j } - P r i c e \ P r e m i u m } \end{array} \begin{array} { r l } { \phantom { \frac { 1 } { 2 } } } & { = \sum _ { i } 协同作用 _ { i } + \sum _ { i , j } 协同作用 _ { i , j } } \ & { \phantom { = } - \sum _ { i , j } 协同作用 _ { i , j } - 价格溢价 } \end{array}

（注：这里对“S y n e r g y”“C o - S y n e r g y”“D i s – S y n e r g y”“P r i c e P r e m i u m”进行了中文术语化处理，假设是“协同作用”“协同作用”“协同作用”“价格溢价”，若实际有其他专业术语需求请根据具体语境调整。）

（再次检查：原输入中的连字符和空格是排版符号，保留了原格式，仅替换了英文术语为中文。）

修正后准确输出（去除注）：

\begin{array} { r l } { \phantom { \frac { 1 } { 2 } } } & { = \sum _ { i } 协同作用 _ { i } + \sum _ { i , j } 协同作用 _ { i , j } } \ & { \phantom { = } - \sum _ { i , j } 协同作用 _ { i , j } - 价格溢价 } \end{array}

We have simply decomposed the monolithic synergy to account for distinct synergy sources and their interactions. Synergy is the value created by synergy source i, Co-Synergyi,j represents the complementarity between synergy source $_ i$ and any of the other four sources $j ,$ and $D i s – S y n e r g y _ { i , j }$ is the substitution between source i and any of the other four sources j. As always, the price premium applies to the deal as a whole. 我们仅将整体协同效应分解，以说明不同的协同源及其相互作用。协同效应是协同源i创造的价值，Co-Synergy_{i,j}表示协同源i与其他四个源中的任何一个j之间的互补性，而Dis-Synergy_{i,j}则是源i与其他四个源中的任何一个j之间的替代性。一如既往，价格溢价适用于整个交易。

Second, the decomposition implies that the basic unit of analysis to understand potential and realized value is the individual synergy type, not the deal as a whole, because different synergy types have different profit logics. There may be a one-to-one correspondence between deals and individual synergies in some cases (e.g., an acquisition that produces only market power synergy), but most deals have the potential for multiple synergy types. 其次，这种分解意味着，要理解潜在价值和已实现价值，基本的分析单位是个体协同类型，而非整个交易，因为不同的协同类型具有不同的盈利逻辑。在某些情况下（例如，一笔仅产生市场力量协同的收购），交易与个体协同之间可能存在一一对应关系，但大多数交易都有产生多种协同类型的潜力。

Third, different synergies are likely manifested through different indicators, so a single indicator of deal performance will not capture total value created (Zollo & Meier, 2008). Fourth, value for different synergy types occurs over different time scales. These last two points make the quantification of the value created by a deal more challenging than reflected in current practice because the metrics and time scales used to assess value for one synergy type may not readily compare with the metrics and time scales appropriate for another type. We noted earlier that research has focused on inferring synergy through its manifestations more than its sources. Those manifestations are measured overwhelmingly via abnormal stock returns (see online Appendix A and Table A1-3 in that appendix), which may be a useful way to assess some dimensions of M&A value. But stock returns are limited when identifying sources of value (Houston, James, & Ryngaert, 2001; Sheen, 2014). That limitation becomes more severe in light of the five-synergy typology we introduce because shareholders may not be attuned to all synergy types. More fundamentally, shareholders are only one of many stakeholders affected by an acquisition whose interests and notions of value may or may not be compatible with those of other parties affected by the deal. 第三，不同的协同效应可能通过不同的指标表现出来，因此单一的交易绩效指标无法捕捉到创造的总价值（Zollo & Meier，2008）。第四，不同类型协同效应带来的价值产生在不同的时间尺度上。最后这两点使得对交易创造价值的量化比当前实践中所反映的更为困难，因为用来评估某种协同效应类型价值的指标和时间尺度可能无法轻易与适用于另一种类型的指标和时间尺度相比较。我们之前提到，研究更多地侧重于通过协同效应的表现形式而非其来源来推断协同效应。这些表现形式绝大多数是通过异常股票回报率来衡量的（见在线附录A及其附录中的表A1-3），这可能是评估并购价值某些维度的一种有用方法。但在识别价值来源时，股票回报率存在局限性（Houston, James, & Ryngaert, 2001；Sheen, 2014）。鉴于我们引入的五重协同效应类型学，这种局限性变得更为严重，因为股东可能并未关注所有协同效应类型。更根本的是，股东只是受收购影响的众多利益相关者之一，其利益和价值观念可能与受交易影响的其他各方的利益和价值观念相容或不相容。

We thus encourage M&A scholars and practitioners to broaden the concept and measurement of the total value of an acquisition. A more comprehensive and useful notion of value created will result from analyzing each synergy source separately, plus accounting for co- and dis-synergies. This will require appropriate indicators of value for each synergy type, attuned to their distinct nature and life cycles. While ultimately all profits show up as revenue gains or cost reductions, tracking the contribution of each of the five synergy sources to revenues or costs will probably require developing intermediate metrics. We see this as an exciting opportunity for future research and practice in the M&A space. 因此，我们鼓励并购学者和从业者拓宽对收购总价值的概念和衡量方法。通过分别分析每个协同效应来源，并考虑协同与非协同效应，将产生一个更全面且有用的价值创造概念。这将需要针对每种协同效应类型的适当价值指标，以适应其独特的性质和生命周期。虽然最终所有利润都会体现为收入增长或成本降低，但追踪五个协同效应来源中每一个对收入或成本的贡献，可能需要开发中间指标。我们认为这是并购领域未来研究和实践的一个令人兴奋的机会。

Other Implications

其他影响

This paper has important ramifications for empirical research. We just noted the need for a more pluralistic set of metrics to link each synergy type’s M&A performance. The typology also begs for new ways to identify the existence of different synergy types. Studies on target selection may be useful. Empirical work on who acquires whom is sparse compared to work on deal performance (exceptions include Hernandez & Shaver, 2019; Kaul & Wu, 2016; Mitchell & Shaver, 2003; Rogan & Sorenson, 2014). Yet target choice studies allow researchers to observe how combinations of specific acquirer and target attributes and assets affect the likelihood of a potential deal being realized, under the reasonable assumption that firms will be more likely to select a target the greater the expected synergy from the combination. For example, matching methods could be used to assess how various indicators of the five synergy types predict acquirer-target combinations (Akkus, Cookson, & Hortaçsu, 2015; Rao, Yu, & Umashankar, 2016). These studies could illuminate which type of synergy is most important as a driver of target choice across industries, competitive conditions, or institutional contexts. 本文对实证研究具有重要影响。我们刚刚指出，需要一套更具多元性的指标来关联每种协同类型的并购绩效。这种分类法还需要新的方法来识别不同协同类型的存在。关于目标选择的研究可能会有所帮助。与交易绩效研究相比，关于谁收购谁的实证研究较为稀少（例外情况包括Hernandez & Shaver, 2019；Kaul & Wu, 2016；Mitchell & Shaver, 2003；Rogan & Sorenson, 2014）。然而，目标选择研究使研究者能够观察特定收购方和目标方的属性及资产组合如何影响潜在交易实现的可能性，其合理假设是，企业会更倾向于选择能带来更大预期协同效应的目标。例如，可以使用匹配方法来评估五种协同类型的各种指标如何预测收购方-目标方组合（Akkus, Cookson, & Hortaçsu, 2015；Rao, Yu, & Umashankar, 2016）。这些研究可以阐明在不同行业、竞争条件或制度环境下，哪种协同类型是目标选择的最重要驱动因素。

Recent advances in text-based analysis and machine learning might be useful to identify the types of synergies managers are seeking across deals. Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and Rabier (2017) used a basic text analysis of annual reports, press releases, and conference calls to infer the types of synergies firms obtain through M&A. More sophisticated machine learning techniques could analyze large amounts of text and unlock latent variables that may help identify distinct synergy sources. Further, lab or field experiments can yield useful insights into some of the mechanisms that give rise to certain types of synergies (for an example of generating market power effects in an experiment, see Davis & Wilson, 2008). And to document the life cycles proposed in Table 3, qualitative methodologies may offer important insights into how different types of synergies evolve over time. Similar to how the qualitative study by Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) uncovered the process by which sellers choose buyers in M&A, qualitative work may reveal how firms discover and realize (or fail to realize) the various types of synergies in our typology. 基于文本的分析和机器学习的最新进展可能有助于识别管理者在交易中寻求的协同类型。Hoberg和Phillips（2010）以及Rabier（2017）采用了对年度报告、新闻稿和电话会议的基础文本分析，以推断企业通过并购获得的协同类型。更复杂的机器学习技术可以分析大量文本，并揭示潜在变量，这些变量可能有助于识别不同的协同来源。此外，实验室或实地实验可以为某些协同类型产生的机制提供有用的见解（例如，在实验中产生市场力量效应的例子，见Davis & Wilson, 2008）。为了记录表3中提出的生命周期，定性方法可能为不同类型的协同如何随时间演变提供重要见解。类似于Graebner和Eisenhardt（2004）的定性研究揭示了卖方在并购中选择买方的过程，定性研究可能会揭示企业如何发现和实现（或未能实现）我们分类学中各种类型的协同。

The concept of synergy life cycles can be a useful lens to better understand post-merger integration. The synergy typology raises a first-order question: is integration required to realize value in the first place? Our work suggests that integration matters less for market power and network synergies and more for internal, relational, and stakeholder synergies. A second-order issue raised by the typology is that, when integration is necessary, it will vary in difficulty and length according to the synergy being pursued. Prior literature has said a lot about integration involving internal assets but almost nothing about integration involving external contractual and noncontractual partners. We have argued that this “external integration” is unique because it involves interactions, trust-building, and negotiation with third parties in addition to the usual internal adjustments. Future research should explore the actual process involved in pulling off deals involving dual externalinternal integration tasks. 协同生命周期的概念可以作为一个有用的视角，帮助更好地理解并购后的整合。协同类型学提出了一个一阶问题：首先，是否需要整合才能实现价值？我们的研究表明，整合对市场力量和网络协同的影响较小，而对内部、关系型和利益相关者协同的影响更大。类型学提出的二阶问题是，当整合是必要的时候，其难度和时长会根据所追求的协同类型而有所不同。以往的文献对涉及内部资产的整合有很多论述，但对涉及外部契约和非契约合作伙伴的整合几乎没有提及。我们认为这种“外部整合”具有独特性，因为它除了通常的内部调整外，还涉及与第三方的互动、信任建立和谈判。未来的研究应该探索完成涉及双重外部-内部整合任务的交易时实际涉及的过程。

We considered the potential co- and dis-synergies across types, focusing on pairwise combinations. A higher-order exercise would be to consider how various configurations of multiple synergy types may impact the novelty and value created by deals. Similar to technological recombination (Fleming, 2001; Schumpeter, 1934), synergy arises from the recombination of assets previously under the purview of separate firms, which the combined entity puts to some new use. Hence, synergies may not only differ by the types of underlying assets that come together (as we have emphasized) but also by how unique and original the configurations of asset combinations are. Unique configurations could arise within synergy types (e.g., the originality of the combined internal assets) and also across types (e.g., the originality of the combined internal assets, external networks, and stakeholder relations). Such configurational metrics could also serve to study post-merger integration. For instance, deals involving more unique or complex recombinations of assets may be harder to integrate but also offer greater payoffs if managed well (Rabier, 2017). 我们考虑了不同类型之间潜在的协同与非协同效应，重点关注成对组合。更高阶的研究将是探讨多种协同类型的不同配置如何影响交易创造的新颖性和价值。与技术重组类似（Fleming, 2001；Schumpeter, 1934），协同效应源于原本由不同企业管辖的资产的重组，而合并后的实体将这些资产用于某种新用途。因此，协同效应不仅因组合的基础资产类型不同而有所差异（正如我们所强调的），还因资产组合配置的独特性和原创性而异。独特的配置可能在协同类型内部产生（例如，组合内部资产的原创性），也可能在不同类型之间产生（例如，组合内部资产、外部网络和利益相关者关系的原创性）。此类配置指标也可用于研究并购后的整合。例如，涉及更独特或复杂资产重组的交易可能更难整合，但如果管理得当，也能带来更大的回报（Rabier, 2017）。

By developing a theoretically grounded and comprehensive typology of M&A synergies, we have attempted to move the focus away from synergy manifestations and toward their sources. Doing so allows us to introduce three novel synergy types arising from changes in firms’ external cooperate environments in addition to the traditional synergies arising from changes in asset ownership and competition. Our expansive typology offers a systematic identification of potential synergies, a more nuanced understanding of heterogeneity in the dynamics of synergy realization, and a broader conception of value than previously available. We hope this framework can be valuable for both scholars and managers interested in M&A. 通过构建一个理论基础扎实且全面的并购协同效应类型学，我们试图将研究焦点从协同效应的表现形式转向其来源。这样做使我们能够引入三种源于企业外部合作环境变化的新型协同效应类型，此外还包括源于资产所有权变化和竞争变化的传统协同效应。我们的全面类型学提供了对潜在协同效应的系统性识别，对协同效应实现动态中异质性的更细致理解，以及比以往更广泛的价值概念。我们希望这一框架能对并购领域的学者和管理者都具有价值。

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CASE STUDY

案例研究

APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

将该框架应用于航空业

A comprehensive case study can help bring the full value of our ideas to life and make the theoretical concepts more digestible. A seasoned M&A executive (Oliver Engert, senior partner and head of the merger management practice at McKinsey & Company) suggested that the U.S. airline mergers between United Airlines and Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines, and American Airlines and US Airways illustrate our ideas well. We will describe the five synergy types, their life cycles, and some of the co- and dis-synergies that arose in those mergers. 一个全面的案例研究可以帮助将我们理念的全部价值付诸实践，并使理论概念更易于理解。一位经验丰富的并购高管（奥利弗·恩格特，麦肯锡公司高级合伙人兼并购管理业务负责人）指出，美国联合航空公司与大陆航空公司、达美航空公司与西北航空公司以及美国航空公司与全美航空公司之间的合并很好地体现了我们的理念。我们将描述五种协同效应类型、它们的生命周期，以及这些合并中出现的一些协同效应和非协同效应。

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Emilie R. Feldman (feldmane@wharton.upenn.edu) is the Michael L. Tarnopol Professor and professor of management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. She received her Doctor of Business Administration in Strategy from the Harvard Business School. Her research examines corporate strategy and governance, with particular interests in the internal functioning of multi-business firms and the role that divestitures, spinoffs, and mergers and acquisitions play in corporate reconfiguration. 艾米莉·R·费尔德曼（feldmane@wharton.upenn.edu）是宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院的迈克尔·L·塔尔诺波尔教授和管理学教授。她在哈佛商学院获得了战略方向的工商管理博士学位。她的研究考察企业战略与治理，尤其关注多业务企业的内部运作，以及剥离、分拆和并购在企业重组中所起的作用。

Exequiel Hernandez (exequiel@wharton.upenn.edu) is the Max and Bernice Garchik family presidential associate professor at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. He received his PhD from the Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. He studies global and corporate strategy, with a focus on how external relationships—both formal and informal—help firms internationalize, innovate, and improve performance. 埃克塞基埃尔·埃尔南德斯（exequiel@wharton.upenn.edu）是宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院的马克斯和伯妮斯·加奇克家族教授。他拥有明尼苏达大学卡尔森管理学院的博士学位。他研究全球和企业战略，重点关注外部关系（无论是正式还是非正式）如何帮助企业实现国际化、创新并提升绩效。

Airline mergers generated gains from each of the five synergy types. In terms of internal synergies, a major motivation of these transactions was to increase the utilization of airplanes. By consolidating passengers on overlapping routes, merging airlines optimized the utilization of airplanes by filling more seats per flight and enhanced the overall efficiency of the route network by redeploying airplanes freed up by the consolidations to fly on other routes. Additional internal synergies resulted from combinations of IT systems, marketing budgets, and personnel (e.g., pilots and flight attendants). For example, “Delta’s chief information officer, Theresa Wise, said the airline had to merge 1,199 computer systems down to about 600, including one—a component within the airline’s reservation system—dating from 1966. The challenge, she said, was to switch the systems progressively so that passengers would not notice. Ms. Wise, who has a doctorate in applied mathematics, devised a low-tech solution: she set up a timeline of the steps that had to be performed by pinning colored Post-it notes on the wall of a conference room” (Mouawad, 2011). 航空公司合并带来了五种协同效应类型中每一种的收益。在内部协同方面，这些交易的一个主要动机是提高飞机利用率。通过整合重叠航线上的乘客，合并后的航空公司通过增加每趟航班的座位占用率优化了飞机利用率，并通过将整合后腾出的飞机重新部署到其他航线，提高了航线网络的整体效率。其他内部协同效应来自于IT系统、营销预算和人员（如飞行员和空乘人员）的整合。例如，“达美航空公司首席信息官特蕾莎·怀斯（Theresa Wise）表示，该航空公司必须将1199个计算机系统整合至约600个，其中包括一个可追溯至1966年的系统——这是该航空公司预订系统的一个组件。她说，挑战在于逐步切换系统，以免乘客察觉。拥有应用数学博士学位的怀斯女士想出了一个低技术含量的解决方案：她通过在会议室的墙上张贴彩色便签来制定必须执行的步骤时间表”（Mouawad，2011）。

One of the clearest consequences of these airline mergers was an enhancement in market power synergies. Airlines reduced competition by merging with their rivals, yielding greater exclusivity and thus pricing power on certain routes. As an example, Delta-Northwest came under fire a year after their merger for exerting pricing power: critics cited a $5 %$ increase in revenues (and a $3 1 %$ increase in profits) accompanied by only a $2 %$ increase in load factor as evidence that the airline boosted its revenues by raising prices rather than by flying more airplanes (Sanati, 2013). This also reflects co-synergies between internal and market power considerations, in that the same factor (optimization of the route network) promoted greater internal efficiency and external pricing power. Other market power synergies resulted from the combined airlines gaining greater bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers of key inputs like fuel, physical plants, and catering, among others. 这些航空公司合并最明显的后果之一是市场力量协同效应的增强。航空公司通过与竞争对手合并来减少竞争，从而在某些航线上获得更大的排他性和定价权。例如，达美航空与西北航空合并一年后就因行使定价权而受到批评：批评者指出，收入增长5%（利润增长31%），而载客率仅增长2%，这表明该航空公司是通过提高价格而非增加飞机飞行量来提高收入的（Sanati，2013）。这也反映了内部和市场力量考量之间的协同作用，因为同样的因素（航线网络优化）既促进了更大的内部效率，又增强了外部定价权。其他市场力量协同效应来自于合并后的航空公司在燃料、厂房和餐饮等关键投入品供应商方面获得了更大的议价能力。

Airlines have numerous cooperative ties with complementors such as credit card companies, hotel chains, car rental agencies, and travel services providers. Airline mergers generated relational synergies by improving the profitability of at least some of these dyadic relationships. For example, when American Airlines (AA) and US Airways merged, they considered whether to offer credit cards through Citi (which previously offered the AA card) or Barclays (which previously offered the US Airways card). The stakes were high: American alone had roughly 69 million members in its frequent-flier program, so whichever credit card company was chosen would gain the ability to market to a massive pool of customers. “‘It is a delicious tidbit for a bank to grab,’ said Jay Sorensen, president of IdeaWorks Co., a Wisconsin-based airline consulting firm. ‘The ability to have a relationship with the world’s largest airline is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity’” (Mecia, 2013). For airlines, ties with credit card companies are also a means of locking in clients, a nonzero-sum benefit typical of relational synergies. In the end, American Airlines maintained partnerships with both Citi and Barclays, underscoring the desire to preserve trust and relational routines that the airlines had developed over time with their separate credit card partners. 航空公司与信用卡公司、连锁酒店、租车机构和旅游服务提供商等互补方有着众多合作关系。航空公司的合并通过提升至少部分这种二元关系的盈利能力产生了关系协同效应。例如，当美国航空公司（AA）与全美航空公司合并时，他们考虑是通过花旗银行（此前曾发行AA信用卡）还是巴克莱银行（此前曾发行全美航空信用卡）提供信用卡。赌注很高：仅美国航空公司的常旅客计划就拥有约6900万会员，因此无论选择哪家信用卡公司，都将获得向庞大客户群进行营销的能力。“对银行来说，这是一个诱人的‘美味小食’，”威斯康星州一家航空公司咨询公司IdeaWorks Co.的总裁杰伊·索伦森（Jay Sorensen）表示，“与全球最大航空公司建立关系的机会是千载难逢的”（Mecia，2013）。对航空公司而言，与信用卡公司的合作也是锁定客户的一种手段，这是非零和效益，是关系协同效应的典型特征。最终，美国航空公司与花旗银行和巴克莱银行都保持了合作关系，这突显了该公司希望维护与各自信用卡合作伙伴长期建立的信任和关系惯例的意愿。

Airlines belong to networks due to the constellation alliances that have become standard in the industry (Star Alliance, OneWorld Alliance, and SkyTeam). Constellation alliances allow members to link to the routes of other airlines that fly to destinations to which a focal airline does not and by providing amenities to frequent travelers such as transfers within airports, airport lounges, improved customer analytics and service, and greater opportunities to earn and use airline miles. Becoming more central in these alliances through a merger can generate network synergies. For example, United Airlines and Lufthansa were both members of Star Alliance, meaning that United passengers could fly to major hubs in Germany and then connect to and enjoy amenities within Lufthansa’s route network. By merging with United, Continental’s destinations and amenities became part of United. This improved United’s structural position within the Star Alliance network, in that United was a larger, more central, more connected, and more prominent partner to which the other airlines could connect.13 航空公司属于网络型企业，这是因为联盟组合已成为该行业的标准（如星空联盟、寰宇一家和天合联盟）。联盟组合使成员能够连接到其他航空公司的航线，这些航线飞往焦点航空公司无法到达的目的地，同时为常旅客提供便利，如机场内转机、机场贵宾室、改进的客户分析和服务，以及更多赚取和使用航空里程的机会。通过合并在这些联盟中变得更核心，可以产生网络协同效应。例如，联合航空公司和汉莎航空公司都是星空联盟的成员，这意味着联合航空公司的乘客可以飞往德国的主要枢纽，然后转机并享受汉莎航空公司航线网络内的便利设施。通过与联合航空公司合并，大陆航空公司的目的地和便利设施成为联合航空公司的一部分。这改善了联合航空公司在星空联盟网络中的结构性地位，因为联合航空公司成为了一个更大、更核心、更互联且更突出的合作伙伴，其他航空公司可以与之连接。13

Another source of network synergy came from the combination of the two firms’ pre-existing networks of third-party service providers (credit cards, hotels, car rentals, and other services). For example, by enlarging the network of partners with which the airline’s customers could make hotel and car rental bookings and earn miles, American was placed in a more central position in this network than either of the pre-merger airlines had been, allowing American to gain greater status in the eyes of third-party providers. In other cases, value arose from consolidating the network to reduce redundant ties and make the firm a more exclusive broker between different kinds of providers. For example, both American Airlines and US Airways had separate partnerships with Marriott before the merger, which were consolidated into a single partnership after the completion of the deal and allowed the new American to be a more exclusive broker between Marriott and other service providers (e.g., car rental agencies and vacation booking sites). This kind of structural value arising from improvements in the network comes in addition to any gains from making individual partnership more jointly beneficial (which would fall under relational synergies). 网络协同效应的另一个来源来自两家公司原有第三方服务提供商网络（信用卡、酒店、租车及其他服务）的整合。例如，通过扩大合作伙伴网络，使航空公司客户能够预订酒店和租车并累积里程，美国航空在该网络中比合并前的任何一家航空公司都处于更核心的位置，从而在美国航空在第三方提供商眼中获得了更高的地位。在其他情况下，价值来自于整合网络以减少冗余联系，使公司成为不同类型提供商之间更具排他性的中介。例如，美国航空公司和全美航空公司在合并前都与万豪有独立的合作关系，合并完成后这些合作关系被整合成单一合作关系，使新的美国航空成为万豪与其他服务提供商（如租车机构和度假预订网站）之间更具排他性的中介。这种来自网络改进的结构性价值，除了通过使个别合作关系更具共同效益而获得的收益（这将属于关系协同效应）之外，还会产生额外价值。

Airline mergers also influenced nonmarket synergies. Airlines interact with many nonmarket groups: the media, environmental groups, communities, governments, labor unions, and travelers’ coalitions, to name a few. The approval or censure of one of these stakeholders in a merger could have a significant impact on the standing of an airline in the eyes of that particular group but also in the eyes of other groups. For example, a major reason that the merger between AA and US Airways ultimately happened was that the management of US Airways worked very hard to attain the buy-in of key American constituents: “US Airways lobbied the creditors [of American Airlines, which was in bankruptcy at the time], and began a media outreach, including meeting with newspaper editorial boards. In July, [US Airways CEO Doug] Parker spoke at the National Press Club, joined by American’s unions. The airline met with elected officials, civic and business leaders in Washington, Philadelphia, and Charlotte, where US Airways has hubs, and Miami and Dallas, which are American hubs” (Loyd, 2013). As a result, these constituents advocated in favor of the merger, allowing it to proceed more seamlessly than typical airline mergers (Fubini, Garvin, & Knoop, 2017). The crucial point is that the combination of the two firms’ key constituents had to be aligned for the deal to go forward and create value. As an example of an unfavorable stakeholder reaction, the earlier quote about Delta increasing prices without attendant operational improvements illustrates how nonmarket stakeholders, like the media and consumer advocates, might react negatively to airline mergers. That example also illustrates a dis-synergy between the market power benefits of raising prices versus the nonmarket costs of losing legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders. 航空公司合并也影响了非市场协同效应。航空公司会与众多非市场群体互动，例如媒体、环保组织、社区、政府、工会以及旅客联盟等。在合并过程中，这些利益相关者中的某一方的认可或谴责，不仅会对航空公司在特定群体眼中的地位产生重大影响，还会影响其他群体对其的看法。例如，美国航空（AA）与全美航空（US Airways）的合并最终得以实现，主要原因之一是全美航空管理层为争取美国关键利益相关者的支持付出了巨大努力：“全美航空游说美国航空的债权人（当时美国航空正处于破产状态），并开始开展媒体宣传，包括与报纸社论委员会会面。7月，[全美航空首席执行官道格]帕克与美国航空的工会一同在国家新闻俱乐部发表演讲。该航空公司还与华盛顿、费城、夏洛特（全美航空的枢纽所在地）、迈阿密和达拉斯（美国航空的枢纽所在地）的民选官员、市民和商界领袖会面”（Loyd, 2013）。结果，这些利益相关者支持该合并，使得合并过程比典型的航空公司合并更为顺利（Fubini, Garvin, & Knoop, 2017）。关键在于，两家公司的关键利益相关者的利益组合必须一致，交易才能推进并创造价值。作为利益相关者负面反应的例子，此前关于达美航空在未改进运营的情况下提高票价的引述，说明了媒体和消费者权益倡导者等非市场利益相关者可能对航空公司合并产生负面反应。该例子还说明了提高票价带来的市场力量收益与失去关键利益相关者合法性所产生的非市场成本之间的不协同性。

These airline mergers can also usefully illustrate the life cycles of the five synergies. We emphasize the timing of initial realization and the duration of synergy benefits. 这些航空公司的合并也能很好地说明五种协同效应的生命周期。我们强调初始协同效应实现的时机以及协同效应收益的持续时间。

Consistent with the earlier discussion, it took some time for the airlines to initially realize internal synergies. For example, United Airlines worked for over five years to fully integrate its reservations system, infamously grounding its entire global fleet in 2015 when the whole system went down. However, once the integration needed to achieve internal synergies was complete, airlines continued to enjoy these benefits while making the appropriate investments in the technology, people, and other resources needed to maintain these gains. Indeed, airlines in the United States have been able to achieve historically high profits since the three major mergers, in part due to the cost savings from internal synergies. 与之前的讨论一致，航空公司花了一些时间才初步意识到内部协同效应。例如，联合航空公司花了五年多的时间来完全整合其预订系统，2015年该系统全面瘫痪时，其全球机队曾被著名地停飞。然而，一旦实现内部协同效应所需的整合完成，航空公司继续享受这些收益，同时对维持这些收益所需的技术、人员和其他资源进行适当投资。事实上，自三次重大合并以来，美国的航空公司已经能够实现历史最高利润，部分原因是内部协同效应带来的成本节约。

In terms of market power synergies, the airlines were clearly able to raise prices quite easily and quickly, with little integration required following the legal approval of their combinations. This led to a rapid increase in profitability (as bemoaned by the media and consumer advocates, which we mentioned earlier). Absent other structural changes among the remaining players in the industry, it is quite likely that Delta and Northwest, for example, would have been able to sustain their increased level of revenues and profitability for a long time. The fact that United-Continental and AmericanUS Airways mergers happened in quick succession also illustrates that market power synergies can be altered when industry forces change. But in the United States, however, after those three deals, the structure of the industry changed permanently in favor of the three major airlines and does not appear to be threatened for the time being. 在市场力量协同效应方面，航空公司显然能够相当轻松且迅速地提高价格，在其合并获得法律批准后，几乎不需要整合。这导致盈利能力迅速提升（正如我们之前提到的，媒体和消费者权益倡导者对此颇有怨言）。如果行业内其他剩余参与者没有发生其他结构性变化，例如达美航空和西北航空很可能能够长期维持其增加的收入和盈利能力。联合大陆航空与美国航空的合并接连快速发生，这也表明当行业力量发生变化时，市场力量协同效应可能会改变。然而，在美国，在这三笔交易之后，航空业的结构永久性地向三大航空公司倾斜，目前似乎并未受到威胁。

The negotiations and decision-making that American went through in choosing Citi as its credit card partner were lengthy (Mecia, 2013), evidencing that the initial realization timing for relational synergies may be elongated as companies integrate external relationships while reconfiguring internal personnel and processes to run those partnerships. However, the contracts that airlines sign with their credit card partners are long-lasting, and in a steady state, airlines rarely change credit card partners (Mecia, 2013), illustrating how trust and relational assets may be built over time and support contractual relationships. For example, the five-year $$ 1$ billion contract that American signed with Citi in 2013 was recently renewed, suggesting that both sides felt they could continue to build on the partner-specific routines that had been developed during the first five-year synergy realization phase. 美国在选择花旗作为其信用卡合作伙伴的过程中经历的谈判和决策过程漫长（Mecia，2013），这表明随着公司整合外部关系并重新配置内部人员和流程以运营这些合作关系，关系协同效应的初始实现时机可能会延长。然而，航空公司与信用卡合作伙伴签订的合同具有长期性和稳定性，航空公司很少更换信用卡合作伙伴（Mecia，2013），这说明信任和关系资产可能会随着时间的推移而建立，并支持合同关系。例如，美国航空在2013年与花旗签订的5亿美元五年期合同最近得到了续签，这表明双方都认为可以在第一个五年协同效应实现阶段发展起来的特定于合作伙伴的惯例基础上继续发展。

In terms of network synergies, the gains from an improved structural position within a constellation alliance occur quickly. For example, when Continental merged with United, United’s centrality and status within the Star Alliance network improved immediately. To illustrate how network synergies can erode, however, it is instructive to look at what happens when mergers cause airlines to switch constellation alliances. For example, Continental left SkyTeam to join Star Alliance when it merged with United, and US Airways left Star Alliance to join OneWorld when it merged with American. The centrality and status gained by those airlines through previous mergers was immediately lost, showing how quickly structural positions within networks can change because companies have little control over the actions of network partners. 在网络协同方面，在联盟星座内改善结构地位所带来的收益会迅速显现。例如，当大陆航空与联合航空合并时，联合航空在星空联盟网络中的中心性和地位立即得到提升。然而，为了说明网络协同如何被削弱，观察合并导致航空公司转换联盟星座时发生的情况会很有启发性。例如，大陆航空在与联合航空合并后离开天合联盟，加入了星空联盟；而全美航空在与美国航空合并后离开星空联盟，加入了寰宇一家。这些航空公司通过之前的合并所获得的中心性和地位立即丧失，这表明网络中的结构地位变化之快，因为企业对网络合作伙伴的行为几乎无法控制。

Finally, attaining the support of nonmarket stakeholders is a very long process, and in some cases, it may never occur. One need only observe that the media and consumer advocates rarely write favorable articles about airline mergers. However, airlines have continued investing in relationships with nonmarket actors, and the benefits of some nonmarket synergies have persisted. For example, on the tenth anniversary of its merger with Northwest, Delta touted the ongoing benefits of its continuing investments in its Salt Lake City hub: “While Salt Lake City is Delta’s fourth largest hub (behind Atlanta, Detroit and Minneapolis), it is the airline’s fastestgrowing, adding 25 percent more seats since 2014. Salt Lake is part of a Western tri-hub structure for Delta with Los Angeles and Seattle. Salt Lake ‘is more important and more valuable than it was as a stand-alone hub with a smaller West Coast presence prior to the merger,’ [Delta chief financial officer Paul] Jacobson said. Fees paid by Delta will fund much of the ongoing $$ 3.6$ billion project to rebuild Salt Lake City International Airport. ‘It is a really big investment for us. I think it signals our value that we have for the airport and for the community . . . We are grateful to the Salt Lake community, and hope that as we cross this 10-year milestone that everyone can see the benefits we’ve been able to generate,’ Jacobson said” (Davidson, 2018). 最后，获得非市场利益相关者的支持是一个非常漫长的过程，在某些情况下，这一过程可能永远不会发生。只需观察一下，媒体和消费者权益倡导者很少会撰写关于航空公司合并的正面文章。然而，航空公司一直在持续投资与非市场行为者的关系，一些非市场协同效应的好处也一直存在。例如，在与西北航空公司合并十周年之际，达美航空吹嘘其持续投资盐湖城枢纽所带来的持续收益：“虽然盐湖城是达美航空的第四大枢纽（仅次于亚特兰大、底特律和明尼阿波利斯），但它是该航空公司增长最快的枢纽，自2014年以来新增了25%的座位。盐湖城与洛杉矶和西雅图一起构成了达美航空的西部三枢纽结构。盐湖城‘比合并前作为西海岸较小存在的独立枢纽时更加重要和更有价值’，[达美航空首席财务官保罗]雅各布森表示。达美航空支付的费用将为持续进行的36亿美元盐湖城国际机场重建项目提供大部分资金。‘这对我们来说确实是一笔巨额投资。我认为这表明了我们对机场和社区的价值……我们感谢盐湖城社区，并希望在我们跨越这10年里程碑之际，每个人都能看到我们能够创造的效益’，雅各布森表示”（Davidson，2018）。

The case of these airline mergers brings the key features of our synergy typology to life, and it illustrates that a more expansive conceptualization of synergies may be needed to get at the total value created by a deal. In particular, the case illustrates how value can arise from external cooperative relationships with individual partners—from the networks in which they are embedded and from relationships with nonmarket stakeholders—in addition to the operational and competitive improvements typically associated with airline mergers. The case also shows that some synergy types may reinforce each other and others may offset each other. It demonstrates that each synergy type may create and sustain value over different time horizons. 这些航空公司合并的案例生动地展现了我们协同效应类型学的关键特征，也表明为了全面理解一笔交易创造的总价值，可能需要对协同效应进行更广泛的概念化。具体而言，该案例说明了价值不仅可以来自与个别合作伙伴的外部合作关系——包括它们所处的网络以及与非市场利益相关者的关系——还可以来自通常与航空公司合并相关的运营和竞争改进。该案例还表明，某些协同效应类型可能相互强化，而另一些则可能相互抵消。它还证明，每种协同效应类型可能在不同的时间范围内创造并维持价值。

CASE STUDY REFERENCES

案例研究参考资料

Davidson, L. 2018, October 25. A decade after the big Delta-Northwest merger, the airline says its Salt Lake City hub has prospered. Salt Lake Tribune. Retrieved from https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2018/ 10/25/decade-after-big-delta/
Davidson, L. 2018年10月25日。在大型三角洲-西北合并十年后，该航空公司表示其盐湖城枢纽发展良好。《盐湖城论坛报》。取自https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2018/ 10/25/decade-after-big-delta/

Fubini, D. G., Garvin, D. A., & Knoop, C.-I. 2017. Merging American Airlines and US Airways (A). Harvard Business School case 417-054.
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Loyd, L. 2013, February 24. How US Airways snagged the merger with American Airlines. Philadelphia Inquirer. Retrieved from https://www.inquirer. com/philly/business/20130224_How_US_Airways_ snagged_the_merger_with_American_Airlines.html
劳埃德，L. 2013年2月24日。美国航空如何成功收购美国航空公司。《费城问询报》。取自https://www.inquirer.com/philly/business/20130224_How_US_Airways_snagged_the_merger_with_American_Airlines.html

Mecia, T. 2013, February 19. American, US Airways merger could launch credit card battle. Fox Business. Retrieved from https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/ american-us-airways-merger-could-launch-credit-cardbattle
Mecia, T. 2013年2月19日。美国航空与全美航空合并或引发信用卡争夺战。福克斯商业网。取自 https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/american-us-airways-merger-could-launch-credit-cardbattle

Mouawad, J. 2011, May 18. Delta-Northwest merger’s long and complex path. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/business/19air. html
Mouawad, J. 2011年5月18日。达美西北航空合并的漫长而复杂历程。《纽约时报》。取自https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/business/19air.html

Sanati, C. 2013, October 23. Delta proves that consolidation drives up ticket fares. Fortune. Retrieved from http://fortune.com/2013/10/23/delta-proves-thatconsolidation-drives-up-ticket-fares/ Sanati, C. 2013年10月23日。达美航空证明整合会推高机票价格。《财富》杂志。取自http://fortune.com/2013/10/23/delta-proves-thatconsolidation-drives-up-ticket-fares/

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