DIALOGUE

对话

INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION DRIVEN BY BLOCKCHAIN’S ALGORITHMIC ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITY: A COMMENTARY ON GREGORY ET AL.‘S “COOPERATION AMONG STRANGERS”

区块链算法执行能力驱动的制度创新：对格雷戈里等人《陌生人之间的合作》的评论

We welcome the dialogue that our article “Cooperation among Strangers: Algorithmic Enforcement of Reciprocal Exchange with Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts” (Gregory, Beck, Henfridsson & Yaraghi, 2025) has triggered. Some brief clarifications are warranted. First, Coffman, Diaz, and Sadek (2025) claim that the most significant benefit of utilizing smart contracts is the reduction of transaction costs. We argue that this is a claim that needs to be unpacked in terms of the nature and circumstances in which transaction costs are reduced when exchange parties rely on the algorithmic enforcement capability of blockchain-based smart contracts to program reciprocal exchange. We agree that policing and enforcement costs—expenses related to ensuring that all parties adhere to the agreed-upon terms of the exchange agreement—may be reduced under favorable circumstances, including low costs of technology implementation, high adoption following blockchain confidence, and straightforward codification of the rules of an exchange agreement as a result of low contract complexity. However, we argue that the availability of standardized smart contracts for the types of transactions involved in the exchange agreement is essential for reducing bargaining and decision costs—the time and money spent in the process of negotiating and finalizing the terms of transactions involved in the exchange agreement (e.g., software development costs, legal fees for drafting and reviewing contracts prior to software implementation, time spent in negotiations). The degree to which such standardization is possible will depend on many factors, including industry characteristics, the evolution and maturity of blockchain technology, and characteristics of the specific use case. In sum, we welcome the discussion about transaction costs as an extension to our original framework, but suggest a further reflection and theory development will be needed to fully unpack when and why transaction costs are reduced. 我们欢迎我们的文章《陌生人之间的合作：基于区块链智能合约的算法执行互惠交换》（Gregory, Beck, Henfridsson & Yaraghi, 2025）所引发的讨论。有必要进行一些简要澄清。首先，Coffman, Diaz, and Sadek (2025) 声称，利用智能合约的最大好处是降低交易成本。我们认为，这一说法需要根据交换方依赖基于区块链智能合约的算法执行能力来编程互惠交换时，交易成本降低的本质和具体情况进行剖析。我们同意，在有利情况下，包括技术实施成本低、区块链信任度高带来的高采用率，以及由于合同复杂性低而使交换协议规则易于编码，监督和执行成本——确保所有方遵守交换协议约定条款的相关费用——可能会降低。然而，我们认为，对于交换协议中涉及的交易类型，标准化智能合约的可用性对于降低议价和决策成本至关重要——即谈判和确定交换协议中涉及的交易条款过程中所花费的时间和金钱（例如，软件开发成本、软件实施前起草和审查合同的法律费用、谈判所花费的时间）。这种标准化的可能性程度将取决于许多因素，包括行业特点、区块链技术的发展和成熟度，以及特定用例的特点。总之，我们欢迎将交易成本讨论作为对我们原始框架的延伸，但建议需要进一步反思和理论发展，以充分剖析交易成本在何时以及为何会降低。

Second, Lumineau, Wang, and Schilke (2025) claim that our conceptualization of “programmed reciprocity” is not unique to blockchains but also exists in traditional legal contracts. This critique seems to miss the point that we suggested programmed reciprocity as a novel mechanism of cooperation not previously theorized in the broader literature on reciprocity and cooperation. It explains how the algorithmic enforcement capability of blockchain-based smart contracts impacts the likelihood of cooperation among strangers. As the mechanism that links the predictor to the outcome in our model, programmed reciprocity cannot be understood in isolation without considering the concept of algorithmic enforcement in our original paper (which captures the idea of automated rule enforcement highlighted by Lumineau et al., 2025). In our view, there is thus little, if any, contradiction between our original paper and what Lumineau et al. (2025) propose. The second point in the debate article, that the nature of the terms of an agreement need to be also considered in addition to the number of terms, is a welcomed suggestion and extension. 其次，吕米诺、王和席尔克（2025）声称我们对“程序化互惠”的概念化并非区块链所独有，在传统法律契约中也存在。这一批评似乎误解了我们的观点——我们提出“程序化互惠”是一种新的合作机制，在更广泛的互惠与合作文献中尚未有相关理论。它解释了基于区块链的智能合约的算法执行能力如何影响陌生人之间的合作可能性。作为我们模型中连接预测器与结果的机制，若不考虑原始论文中算法执行的概念（该概念体现了吕米诺等人2025年强调的自动规则执行思想），就无法孤立地理解“程序化互惠”。在我们看来，我们的原始论文与吕米诺等人（2025）的观点之间几乎不存在矛盾，即便有也微乎其微。辩论文章中的第二个观点——除了条款数量，协议条款的性质也需要被考虑——是一个受欢迎的建议和延伸。

We would like to share two overarching reflections upon reading the two dialogue articles commenting on our original framework. The first important reflection is that we wholeheartedly agree with Coffman et al. (2025) that conceptualizing blockchain technology as a new economic institution alongside firms, markets, commons, and so forth is significant. Second, Coffman et al.’s (2025) and Lumineau et al.’s (2025) commentaries about blockchain relevance and the nature of contract terms, respectively, are related and provide input into the following framework. 我们想分享对两篇评论我们原始框架的对话文章的两点总体思考。第一点重要思考是，我们完全赞同Coffman等人（2025）的观点，即把区块链技术概念化为与企业、市场、公域等并列的新型经济制度具有重要意义。第二，Coffman等人（2025）关于区块链相关性的评论和Lumineau等人（2025）关于合同条款性质的评论是相关的，并且为以下框架提供了思路。

The extent to which we will witness institutional innovation associated with blockchain innovation and adoption across industries will likely depend on whether institutional entrepreneurs consider it relevant to use and innovate with blockchain technology. The first dimension we propose is the degree to which the exchange agreement entails transactions with goods (or services) along a continuum ranging from fully physical to fully digital. The greater the focus on exchange of digital goods, the more feasible and likely it is that blockchain technology will be implemented and adopted. As Coffman et al. (2025) 我们将见证与区块链创新及跨行业应用相关的制度创新的程度，可能取决于制度创业者是否认为使用区块链技术并对其进行创新是相关的。我们提出的第一个维度是交换协议涉及从完全实体到完全数字的连续体中的商品（或服务）交易的程度。对数字商品交换的关注程度越高，区块链技术就越有可能被实施和采用。正如Coffman等人（2025）

emphasize, contracts that pertain to physical artifacts or human behavior in the physical world must be enforced through physical intervention, making it less feasible and likely that blockchain will be considered as the most relevant option for fostering cooperation. The second dimension we propose is the degree of contract completeness, which can vary between complete and incomplete. To some extent, this relates to the comments by Lumineau et al. (2025) about the nature of the terms and whether they can be clearly spelled out and transferred into machine-readable language. We argue that this also depends on the ability of exchange parties to write and codify in software a comprehensive contract that specifies precisely the obligations and action rules in every conceivable scenario and state of the world that the parties can possibly foresee, as smart contracts require such a priori specification. The greater the possibilities for developing and implementing complete contracts, the greater the likelihood that economic actors will consider blockchain technology to be relevant for supporting cooperation and exchange, because more complete contracts engender trust in this novel technology as an alternative institution, which is particularly applicable under such circumstances. 强调，涉及有形实物或现实世界人类行为的合同必须通过物理干预来执行，这使得区块链不太可能成为促进合作的最相关选择。我们提出的第二个维度是合同的完整程度，它可以在完全完整和不完整之间变化。在某种程度上，这与Lumineau等人（2025）关于条款的性质以及这些条款是否能够被清晰地阐述并转化为机器可读语言的评论有关。我们认为，这还取决于交易双方编写和编码一份全面合同的能力，该合同需精确规定双方在所有可预见的场景和世界状态下的义务和行动规则，因为智能合约需要这种先验规范。开发和实施完整合同的可能性越大，经济行为体就越有可能认为区块链技术对支持合作与交易相关，因为更完整的合同会在这种情况下作为一种新型替代制度产生对这项技术的信任。

DIGITAL GOODS, COMPLETE CONTRACTS

数字商品，完整合同

This combination represents the ideal scenario for blockchain-based smart contracts and algorithmic enforcement. It is highly viable for minimizing “last mile” problems as blockchain-based solutions with algorithmic enforcement are deployed. Examples include finance- and investing-related exchanges involving peer-to-peer transactions with digital assets such as cryptocurrencies or non-fungible tokens. 这种组合代表了基于区块链的智能合约和算法执行的理想场景。随着基于区块链且具备算法执行能力的解决方案的部署，它对于减少“最后一公里”问题极具可行性。例如，涉及点对点数字资产（如加密货币或非同质化代币）交易的金融和投资相关交易所。

DIGITAL GOODS, INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS

数字商品，不完整合同

This combination presents challenges but still offers potential for using blockchain-based smart contracts for algorithmic enforcement of reciprocal exchange. The difficulties of precisely specifying and programming the procedural steps involved in enforcing contractual terms and rules of the exchange, which is exacerbated by contract complexity, are challenges that actors deal with in this scenario of incomplete contracts. Examples include complex digital service agreements and evolving software licenses. 这种组合带来了挑战，但仍有潜力利用基于区块链的智能合约对互惠交换进行算法化执行。在执行合同条款和交换规则所涉及的程序步骤时，精确规范和编程这些步骤存在困难，而合同复杂性又加剧了这一问题。在这种不完全合同的场景中，行为者需要应对这些挑战。例如复杂的数字服务协议和不断演变的软件许可。

PHYSICAL GOODS, COMPLETE CONTRACTS

实物商品，完整合同

This combination requires integration with the Internet of Things and other technologies, also briefly hinted at by Coffman et al. (2025). We could imagine a future scenario of autonomous economic systems wherein physical machines and the movement of physical goods are controlled by blockchain-based smart contracts enforcing prespecified rules of an exchange. Examples would be automated inventory systems and controlling the authorized movement of goods along the supply chain. 这种结合需要与物联网及其他技术相融合，这一点Coffman等人（2025）也曾简要提及。我们可以设想一个自主经济系统的未来场景：物理机器与实体商品的流动由基于区块链的智能合约控制，这些合约强制执行预设的交易规则。例如，自动化库存系统以及供应链中商品授权流动的控制。

PHYSICAL GOODS, INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS

有形商品，不完整合同

This combination arguably represents the most challenging scenarios where the relevance of using blockchain technology may be perceived as much lower by economic actors relative to the other scenarios. Examples include complex manufacturing agreements and long-term service contracts with undefined parameters. Blockchain-based smart contracts might service as a complementary tool to autonomously coordinate some transactions rather than the primary enforcement mechanism. 这种组合可以说是最具挑战性的场景，在这些场景中，经济行为体可能认为区块链技术的相关性相对于其他场景要低得多。例如复杂的制造协议和参数不明确的长期服务合同。基于区块链的智能合约可能作为一种补充工具，自主协调一些交易，而不是主要的执行机制。

CONCLUSION

结论

Blockchain technology, particularly due to the algorithmic enforcement capabilities of smart contracts that run on blockchain networks, addresses fundamental economic coordination problems, which is why we should expect to see institutional innovation going forward. In sum, the framework introduced above could indicate where blockchain could potentially lead to a true institutional innovation versus an enhancement of existing mechanisms. However, despite the potentials for institutional innovation, we need not forget that two social forces collide—the need for stability versus the desire for change—when new innovations meet established institutions. 区块链技术，尤其是由于智能合约在区块链网络上的算法执行能力，解决了根本性的经济协调问题，这就是为什么我们应该期待未来出现制度创新。总之，上述框架可以表明区块链可能会带来真正的制度创新，还是对现有机制的改进。然而，尽管存在制度创新的潜力，我们也不能忘记，当新的创新遇到既有的制度时，两种社会力量会发生碰撞——对稳定的需求与对变革的渴望。

REFERENCES

参考文献

Coffman, C. D., Diaz, F. P., & Sadek, J. 2025. Contracting with strangers: A transaction cost economics perspective on Gregory, Beck, Henfridsson, and Yaraghi’s “Cooperation among Strangers.” Academy of Management Review, 50: 903905.
Coffman, C. D., Diaz, F. P., & Sadek, J. 2025. 与陌生人签约：从交易成本经济学视角看 Gregory, Beck, Henfridsson 和 Yaraghi 的《陌生人之间的合作》。《管理学会评论》，50：903-905。

Gregory, R. W., Beck, R., Henfridsson, O., & Yaraghi, N. 2025. Cooperation among strangers: Algorithmic enforcement of reciprocal exchange with blockchainbased smart contracts. Academy of Management Review, 50: 859873.
格雷戈里，R. W.，贝克，R.，亨弗里德松，O.，& 亚拉吉，N. 2025. 陌生人之间的合作：基于区块链智能合约的算法强制执行互惠交换。《管理学会评论》，50: 859873.

Lumineau, F., Wang, W., & Schilke, O. 2025. Reframing blockchain’s promise: A commentary on Gregory, Lumineau, F., Wang, W., & Schilke, O. 2025. 重塑区块链的潜力：对格雷戈里（Gregory）的评论，

Beck, Henfridsson, and Yaraghi’s “Cooperation among Strangers.” Academy of Management Review, 50: 900902. Beck, Henfridsson, and Yaraghi的《陌生人之间的合作》。《管理学会评论》，50: 900902。

Robert Wayne Gregory University of Miami 罗伯特·韦恩·格雷戈里 迈阿密大学

Roman Beck $\textcircled{1}$ Bentley University Roman Beck $\textcircled{1}$ Bentley University

Ola Henfridsson $\textcircled{1}$ University of Miami Ola Henfridsson $\textcircled{1}$ 迈阿密大学

Niam Yaraghi University of Miami https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2024.0695 Niam Yaraghi 迈阿密大学 https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2024.0695

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